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2018 Georgia Code 36-1-16 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 1. General Provisions, 36-1-1 through 36-1-27.

36-1-16. Garbage, trash, waste, or refuse not to be transported across state or county boundaries for dumping without permission; exemption.

  1. No person, firm, corporation, or employee of any municipality shall transport, pursuant to a contract, whether oral or otherwise, garbage, trash, waste, or refuse across state or county boundaries for the purpose of dumping the same at a publicly or privately owned dump, unless permission is first obtained from the governing authority of the county in which the dump is located and from the governing authority of the county in which the garbage, trash, waste, or refuse is collected.
  2. Subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply to the transportation of any material which is regulated pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 5 of Title 12, the "Georgia Water Quality Control Act," or Article 1 of Chapter 9 of Title 12, "The Georgia Air Quality Act."

(Ga. L. 1971, p. 445, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1911, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1345, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 918, § 3; Ga. L. 1993, p. 91, § 36.)

Cross references.

- Solid waste handling, disposal, generally, T. 12, C. 8.

Law reviews.

- For survey article on local government law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 285 (2007) and 60 Mercer L. Rev. 262 (2008). For survey article on zoning and land use law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 493 (2007) and 60 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (2008). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 186 (1992).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16 is constitutional, and the statute gives Georgia counties a role in protecting the public health and welfare with respect to the operation of waste dumps within the counties' respective boundaries. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).

O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16(a) is unconstitutional because the statute impairs interstate commerce by improperly giving Georgia counties the power to veto the importation of solid waste. Fulton County v. City of Atlanta, 280 Ga. 353, 629 S.E.2d 196 (2006).

Unconstitutional application.

- County's application of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16 to prohibit a waste management company from operating a landfill, which was owned by a municipality but located in the county, as a regional landfill, i.e., from receiving waste from outside the county and from outside the state, violated the company's constitutional commerce clause right to engage in interstate commerce without discriminatory intervention. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 731 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).

County resolution preventing a waste management firm from importing waste of any kind into the county from other counties and other locations violated the commerce clause of the federal constitution. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).

Judgments from federal court binding on state court during appeal.

- Since simultaneous actions challenging the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16 were pending in state and federal court, and an appeal from the federal district court order was pending, estoppel by judgment precluded state court consideration of the matter on appeal because judgments from a federal court remain binding during the pendency of an appeal. Mayor of Forsyth v. Monroe County, 260 Ga. 296, 392 S.E.2d 865 (1990).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity of statutory or municipal regulations as to garbage, 72 A.L.R. 520; 135 A.L.R. 1305.

Regulation and licensing of private garbage or rubbish removal services, 83 A.L.R.2d 799.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Forsyth v. Monroe Cnty., 392 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. 1990).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 1990 | 260 Ga. 296

...This appeal arises in an action for an injunction and declaratory relief Monroe County, Georgia, brought against the City of Forsyth and Diamond Waste, Inc. The Superior Court of Monroe County entered an order granting temporary injunctive relief to Monroe County after finding OCGA § 36-1-16 constitutional....
...This action arose after the County determined it would not permit the acceptance of waste from outside the county for disposal at the City-owned sanitary landfill located outside the corporate limits. The basis for the County's authority was its interpretation of OCGA § 36-1-16, which states that [n]o person, firm, corporation, or employee of any municipality shall transport ......
...On the same day the County filed this action, Diamond Waste filed for an injunction in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Three months after the superior court entered its order from which this appeal arises, the federal court entered a final judgment granting the injunction after holding that OCGA § 36-1-16 violated the Commerce Clause....
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Fulton Cnty. v. City of Atlanta, 629 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2006 | 280 Ga. 353, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 951, 62 ERC (BNA) 1735

...Feil III, Douglas Alton Henderson, Troutman Sanders, LLP, Robert Douglas Mowrey, David M. Meezan, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, for Appellees. Brock, Clay & Calhoun, Carlton L. Kell, amicus curiae. THOMPSON, Justice. In this case of first impression, we are called upon to decide whether OCGA § 36-1-16(a) unconstitutionally impairs the free flow of interstate commerce....
...Under the contracts, municipal solid waste is to be collected in the city, taken to transfer stations in South Fulton County and Cobb County, and transported to landfills in Forsyth County and Butts County for final disposal. On November 3, 2004, Fulton County made a demand upon the city to comply with the provisions of OCGA § 36-1-16(a). [1] When the city refused, Fulton County filed suit seeking declaratory and equitable relief. The city answered and moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that OCGA § 36-1-16(a) is unconstitutional because it impairs *197 interstate commerce....
...d the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself." 112 S.Ct. at 2024. Fort Gratiot is controlling here. Like the Michigan statute, OCGA § 36-1-16(a) gives Georgia counties the power to veto the importation of solid waste....
...Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir.1991), upon which Fulton County relies, was decided prior to Fort Gratiot and does not, therefore, support Fulton County's position. See Diamond Waste v. Monroe County, 828 F.Supp. 52 (M.D.Ga. 1993). 2. After filing its answer and challenging the constitutionality of OCGA § 36-1-16(a), the City of Atlanta notified the Attorney General of its challenge....
...solid waste . . . that is not generated in the county in which the disposal area is located unless the acceptance of solid waste . . . is explicitly authorized in the approved county solid waste management plan." 112 S.Ct. at 2022. [3] In fact, OCGA § 36-1-16(a) impinges on interstate commerce even more than the Michigan statute because it empowers counties to control both the importation and the exportation of waste.