O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-30-2 (2019)

Management and disposition of property

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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The council or other governing body of a municipal corporation has discretion in the management and disposition of its property. Where such discretion is exercised in good faith, equity will not interfere therewith.

History

Civil Code 1895, § 746; Civil Code 1910, § 895; Code 1933, § 69-203. History of Code section. - This Code section is derived from the decision in Semmes v. Columbus, 19 Ga. 471 (1856) and Mayor of Athens v. Camak, 75 Ga. 429 (1885).

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Cities and Towns in Georgia: A Distinction with a Difference?,’’ see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 385 (1963). For note discussing governmental immunity from tort liability in Georgia, see 5 Ga. St. B. J. 494 (1969).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Property held by municipality for governmental or public uses cannot be sold without express legislative authority, but must be devoted to the use and purpose for which the property was intended. McPherson v. City of Dawson, 221 Ga. 861, 148 S.E.2d 298 (1966). This section authorizes a city to sell any property owned in the city’s purely proprietary capacity. McPherson v. City of Dawson, 221 Ga. 861, 148 S.E.2d 298 (1966). Rule of judicial noninterference. - Court of equity will not interfere with the discretionary action of the governing officers of a city within the sphere of their

legally delegated powers, unless such action is arbitrary, and amounts to an abuse of discretion. McMaster v. Mayor of Waynesboro, 122 Ga. 231, 50 S.E. 122 (1905); Mayor of Gainesville v. Dunlap, 147 Ga. 344, 94 S.E. 247 (1917); South Ga. Power Co. v. Baumann, 169 Ga. 649, 151 S.E. 513 (1929). Courts cannot inquire into the motives of the mayor and general council of a municipality in enacting an ordinance, and cannot set the same aside if it is not unreasonable, ultra vires, or unconstitutional. South Ga. Power Co. v. Baumann, 169 Ga. 649, 151 S.E. 513 (1929). Municipality having discretion under

this section in the management and disposition of the municipality’s property, in the absence of illegality, fraud, or clear abuse of discretion of the municipal authorities, equity will not interfere therewith, nor inquire into the propriety, economy, and general wisdom of the undertaking. Kirkland v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 824, 76 S.E.2d 396 (1953). Business affairs of a municipality are committed to the corporate authorities, and the courts will not interfere except in a clear case of mismanagement or fraud. J.C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 210 Ga. 591, 82 S.E.2d 132 (1954); Singer v. City of Cordele, 225 Ga. 323, 168 S.E.2d 138 (1969); Hamsley v. City of Unadilla, 265 Ga. 494, 458 S.E.2d 627 (1995). Allegations that the city was employing extra police officer’s and expending large sums of money to protect property during an emergency brought about by a strike were insufficient to show such abuse of city council’s discretion as would entitle the petitioners, suing as ‘‘citizens and taxpayers,’’ to the injunctive relief prayed for. Gulledge v. Augusta Coach Co., 210 Ga. 377, 80 S.E.2d 274 (1954), criticized, Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263, 109 S.E.2d 798 (1959).

Board of a municipality empowered to perform a particular act in the board’s discretion will not be interfered with or controlled by the courts in the board’s discretionary acts unless the board’s discretion is manifestly abused, nor will the court inquire into the propriety, economy, or wisdom of the undertaking, or into the details of the manner adopted to carry the matter into execution. Macon Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Snow Properties, Inc., 218 Ga. 262, 127 S.E.2d 598 (1962). Governing body of city is not answerable for erroneous exercise of that body’s discretion, although injurious consequences may result therefrom. Semmes v. Mayor of Columbus, 19 Ga. 471 (1856); Mayor of Athens v. Camak, 75 Ga. 429 (1885). Municipal corporation may bind itself, and cannot abrogate any contract which the municipality has the right to make under the municipality’s charter. Jonesboro Area Athletic Ass’n v. Dickson, 227 Ga. 513, 181 S.E.2d 852 (1971). Cited in Jarrett v. City of Boston, 209 Ga. 530, 74 S.E.2d 549 (1953); Pittman v. City of Jesup, 232 Ga. 635, 208 S.E.2d 456 (1974); Silver v. City of Rossville, 253 Ga. 13, 315 S.E.2d 898 (1984).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 128 et seq., 160 et seq. C.J.S. - 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 148. 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 1153, 1154, 1162. ALR. - Validity of municipal ordinance as affected by motive of members of council which adopted it, 32 A.L.R. 1517. Power of municipal corporation to pur-

chase or charter a boat or barge, 39 A.L.R. 1332. Power to detach land from municipal corporations, towns, or villages, 117 A.L.R. 267. Injunction against legislative body of state or municipality, 140 A.L.R. 439. Power of municipal corporation to lease or sublet property owned or leased by it, 47 A.L.R.3d 19.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1984–2016 · leading case: Tuten v. City of Brunswick, 418 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1992).
Tuten v. City of Brunswick, 418 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1992). · cites it 4× “[9] Although the common law authorities cited in footnote three of the majority opinion prohibit a municipality from conveying land dedicated as a public park without express legislative authority, OCGA § 36-37-6 provides the necessary legislative authority to a municipal…”
City of Waycross v. Pierce Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 793 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 2× “Lastly, the City posits that the trial court erred in granting interlocutory injunctive relief because equity should not interfere in the management decisions of a municipality in the absence of bad faith, illegality, fraud or a clear abuse of discretion.”
Silver v. City of Rossville, 315 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 7× “As authority, Silver cites OCGA § 36-30-2 and Kirkland v. Johnson, 209 Ga.”
Credle v. East Bay Holding Co., 440 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1994). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 36-30-2. This conclusion also requires that we reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Edwardses and the Credles, the losing bidders, could recover bid preparation costs if they could show they reasonably believed that the bid would be awarded based solely on the…”
Hamsley v. City of Unadilla, 458 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. 1995). · cites it 2× “Because the taxpayers dismissed with *495 prejudice their previous appeals that raised this issue, we decline to address it in this appeal.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.