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The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, in the second sentence of subsection (a), substituted "Any individual" for "Any person" at the beginning, inserted "as set forth in Code Section 36-32-1.1" in the middle, and deleted "and shall serve at the pleasure of the governing authority" following "municipal corporation" at the end; and added the third through fifth sentences of subsection (a).
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2016, "Code Section 36-32-2.1" was substituted for "Code Section 36-32-2.2" in subsection (a).
- Because a municipal court is a municipal office discharging strictly municipal functions, O.C.G.A. § 36-32-2(a) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III and the city was authorized to require the judge to reinstate the contract between the county and the private probation services company. Ward v. City of Cairo, 276 Ga. 391, 583 S.E.2d 821 (2003).
- Municipal court judge was qualified to preside over the case although the judge was not a resident of the judicial circuit in which the court was located, when neither the mayor nor another member of the governing authority of the city served as a judge of the municipal court. Giles v. City of Locust Grove, 203 Ga. App. 164, 416 S.E.2d 758, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 758 (1992).
- Clerk of the Superior Court is prohibited by a common-law conflict of interest from simultaneously serving as the Judge of the Mayor's Court. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-22.
- While the separation of powers doctrine does not apply where the issues relate solely to municipal officials utilizing municipal powers, it does apply where it concerns a municipal court judge exercising state judicial powers. Because of that, the exercise of those state judicial powers by a legislator would be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against a member of one branch exercising the powers of another branch of government. Therefore a member of the Georgia General Assembly may not serve as a municipal court judge. 2014 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2014-2.
- 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, §§ 5, 7. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 205, 209.
- 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 288 et seq. 48A C.J.S., Judges, § 22 et seq. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 407, 418 et seq., 447, 448, 455.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2007-10-09
Citation: 651 S.E.2d 681, 282 Ga. 483, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 3082, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 721
Snippet: jurisdiction. [5] The effective date of OCGA § 36-32-2(f) was January 1, 2005. Ga. L.2003, p. 191, 222
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-03-27
Citation: 583 S.E.2d 821, 276 Ga. 391, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 1102, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 305
Snippet: we are called upon to determine whether OCGA §§ 36-32-2(a) and 42-8-100(f)(1) and (g)(1) violate the separation