O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-32-2 (2019)

Appointment of judges

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any general or local Act, the governing authority of each municipal corporation within this state having a municipal court, as provided by the Act incorporating the municipal corporation or any amendments thereto, is authorized to appoint a judge of such court. Any individual appointed as a judge under this Code section shall possess such qualifications as set forth in Code Section 36-32-1.1 and shall receive such compensation as shall be fixed by the governing authority of the municipal corporation. Any individual appointed as a judge under this Code section shall serve for a minimum term of one year and until a successor is appointed or if the judge is removed from office as provided in Code Section 36-32-2.1. Such term shall be memorialized in a written agreement between such individual and the governing authority of the municipal corporation or in an ordinance or a charter. With respect to an individual serving as a municipal court judge in a consolidated government, the local Act shall determine the term of such judge. (b) This Code section shall not be construed to require the governing authority of any municipal corporation to appoint a judge; but such governing authority may appoint a judge if, acting in its sole discretion, the governing authority determines that such appointment would be in the best interest of the municipal corporation.

History

Code 1933, § 69-704.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 489, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 3, § 36; Ga. L. 1995, p. 712, § 1; Ga. L. 2016, p. 367, § 1/HB 691.

Annotations

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2016, ‘‘Code Section 36-32-2.1’’ was substituted for ‘‘Code Section 36-32-2.2’’ in subsection (a).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Separation of powers. - Because a municipal court is a municipal office discharging strictly municipal functions, O.C.G.A. § 36-32-2(a) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III and the city was authorized to require the judge to reinstate the contract between the county and the private probation services company. Ward v. City of Cairo, 276 Ga. 391, 583 S.E.2d 821 (2003).

Judge was qualified to preside over case. - Municipal court judge was qualified to preside over the case although the judge was not a resident of the judicial circuit in which the court was located, when neither the mayor nor another member of the governing authority of the city served as a judge of the municipal court. Giles v. City of Locust Grove, 203 Ga. App. 164, 416 S.E.2d 758, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 758 (1992).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Clerk of Superior Court may not serve as Judge of Mayor’s Court. - Clerk of the Superior Court is prohibited by a common-law conflict of interest from

simultaneously serving as the Judge of the Mayor’s Court. 1984 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U84-22. Member of General Assembly may

not serve as municipal court judge. - While the separation of powers doctrine does not apply where the issues relate solely to municipal officials utilizing municipal powers, it does apply where it concerns a municipal court judge exercising state judicial powers. Because of that, the exercise of those state judicial powers

by a legislator would be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against a member of one branch exercising the powers of another branch of government. Therefore, a member of the Georgia General Assembly may not serve as a municipal court judge. 2014 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U2014-2.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, §§ 5, 7. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 205, 209.

C.J.S. - 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 366 et seq. 48A C.J.S., Judges, § 23 et seq. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 407, 418 et seq., 447, 448, 455.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1992–2022 · leading case: Ward v. City of Cairo, 583 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 2003).
Ward v. City of Cairo, 583 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 10× “In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether OCGA §§ 36-32-2 (a) and 42-8-100 (f) (1) and (g) (1) violate the separation of powers doctrine of the Georgia Constitution.”
Hilda Brucker v. City of Doraville, 38 F.4th 876 (11th Cir. 2022). · cites it 3× “Ga. Code §§ 36-32-2(a), 36-32-2.1(b)(1) (2016).”
Giles v. City of Locust Grove, 416 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 4× “The appellant argues that such a residency requirement exists by virtue of the following language contained in OCGA § 36-32-2 (a): “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any general or local Act, the governing authority of each municipal corporation within this…”
— 36-32-2(a) — 1 case
Hilda Brucker v. City of Doraville, 38 F.4th 876 (11th Cir. 2022). “Ga. Code §§ 36-32-2(a), 36-32-2.1(b)(1) (2016).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.