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The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, substituted "fines and bond forfeitures" for "fines and forfeitures" in subparagraph (a)(2)(C). See Editor's notes for applicability.
- Ga. L. 2015, p. 693, § 4-1/HB 233, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to seizures of property for forfeiture that occur on or after that date. Any such seizure that occurs before July 1, 2015, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such seizure."
- For article, "The Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965 (this chapter)," see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 333 (1967). For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979). For annual survey of local government law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (2004). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2015).
Although the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6 (b) is ambiguous, the statute indicates that the state does not wish to give our cities the power to enact a distinctive law of contract. City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517 (1995).
- Under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II), and this section, cities do not have the power to adopt entirely new charters changing a cities' form of government. Thus, a new charter created by a special law does not contravene Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV.), which forbids the legislature from adopting a special law covering a subject matter dealt with by an existing general law. Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 207 S.E.2d 475 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6).
Fundamental and substantive changes in city government cannot be made by a municipality under general home rule laws. Bruck v. City of Temple, 240 Ga. 411, 240 S.E.2d 876 (1977).
General Assembly has reserved legislative power to enact new charters for existing cities when such charters include drastic changes in the composition and form of city government, and the election and terms of office of the members of the governing authority of cities. Bruck v. City of Temple, 240 Ga. 411, 240 S.E.2d 876 (1977).
- Existence of prior statutes permitting the enlargement of boundaries does not deprive the General Assembly of the power to alter and extend municipal boundaries without the consent of the persons affected thereby. Lee v. City of Jesup, 222 Ga. 530, 150 S.E.2d 836 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 993, 87 S. Ct. 1307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1967).
- Local law extending municipal boundaries does not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process of the law because the law subjects property owners in the area annexed to taxation by the municipality; nor does the law deny to such property owners equal protection of the law within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 14. Lee v. City of Jesup, 222 Ga. 530, 150 S.E.2d 836 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 993, 87 S. Ct. 1307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1967).
Statute does not provide the sole method by which the General Assembly may amend the city charter so as to change city boundaries. Lee v. City of Jesup, 222 Ga. 530, 150 S.E.2d 836 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 993, 87 S. Ct. 1307, 18 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1967).
There is no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that local annexation statute itself make provisions for myriad adjustments between the annexed territory and the municipality which the annexation necessitates. Bruck v. City of Temple, 240 Ga. 411, 240 S.E.2d 876 (1977).
Both county governments and municipalities may levy taxes for public purposes connected with administration of county and city governments; as a corollary to this principle, it follows that counties and municipalities may appropriate and expend money for such public purpose. Peacock v. Georgia Mun. Ass'n, 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981).
- City code section which made it unlawful for a wrecker service to refuse to accept checks and major credit cards is constitutional, and is not ultra vires under the home rule powers conferred by subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6. Upton v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 250, 392 S.E.2d 244 (1990).
- Establishment by a city council of the Atlanta, Georgia, Bureau of Taxicabs and Vehicles for Hire, and the authorization of an administrative hearing procedure for the enforcement of the regulation of taxicabs was not an ultra vires act because it did not improperly divest the municipal court of jurisdiction to hear such cases under O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a)(6); the provisions of the city charter were consistent with the concept of concurrent jurisdiction, and the city had the power to regulate and license vehicles for hire and to create boards and commissions under the city charter. Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d 307 (2006).
Cited in Dodson v. Graham, 462 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976); Lambert v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 645, 250 S.E.2d 456 (1978); Savage v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 671, 251 S.E.2d 268 (1978); Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 384 S.E.2d 631 (1989).
- Municipal ordinances which create the status of domestic partnership are violative of constitutional and statutory provisions precluding municipal legislation relating to legal status and relationship; thus, group health insurance coverage provided pursuant to such ordinances is violative of the public policy of this state. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-26.
City has home rule power to amend a city's charter by ordinance so as to remove from the charter a limitation on the millage rate which the city may use in levying ad valorem taxes. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-19.
City may amend a city's charter by resolution to increase the fines and imprisonment which may be imposed by a recorders court for violations of city ordinances. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-20.
- Municipality may not under the municipality's home rule powers amend the municipality's charter to impose a residency requirement for election to the municipal governing authority. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-45.
- Date of a municipal general election constitutes an integral aspect of the procedure for election for members of the municipal governing authority, and thus may not be altered by the municipality under this chapter. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-140 (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 35, T. 36).
Municipality is not empowered, by virtue of former § 21-3-51, to amend its charter by ordinance with respect to the date of the municipality's municipal general election. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-33.
- Municipality may treat an election ordered as a result of the failure of a prior election as a continuation of that prior election, recognizing those acts validly conducted. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-23.
No city acting under this chapter could alter court having jurisdiction over state offenses. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U71-30.
Garbage collection fee would not violate this section. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-192 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6).
- O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6 expressly precludes a municipality from providing by either ordinance or charter amendment for a fine or forfeiture in excess of $1,000. 1999 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U99-11.
- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 14. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 111 et seq., 124 et seq.
- 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 157, 195 et seq., 244, 245.
- Certificates by state authorizing operation of motorbus lines over section of highway as affected by its subsequent annexation to city, 154 A.L.R. 1440.
Total Results: 8
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-11-30
Citation: 638 S.E.2d 307, 281 Ga. 342, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3705, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 1030
Snippet: affecting the jurisdiction of any court. . ..” OCGA § 36-35-6 (a) (6). Thus, the City cannot impede the exercise
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-05-19
Citation: 581 S.E.2d 16, 276 Ga. 590, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 1565, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 475
Snippet: comprehensive nature of a state statute.[2] OCGA § 36-35-6(a)(5) provides for the express preemption of local
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-11-03
Citation: 492 S.E.2d 193, 268 Ga. 586, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 4007, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 708
Snippet: of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a); OCGA § 36-35-6 (a); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, supra at 164
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1995-03-14
Citation: 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517, 1995 WL 116312
Snippet: of an independent governmental power.” OCGA § 36-35-6 (b). And, by requiring private entities which recognize
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1990-06-08
Citation: 260 Ga. 250, 392 S.E.2d 244
Snippet: rule powers conferred upon the city by OCGA § 36-35-6 (a) et seq. (b) Both of these arguments were rejected
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1989-10-13
Citation: 384 S.E.2d 631, 259 Ga. 526, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 414
Snippet: is inconsistent with the constitution. OCGA § 36-35-6. These issues are not raised here. [2] Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1989-03-02
Citation: 376 S.E.2d 662, 259 Ga. 14, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 203
Snippet: (1) the charter amendment conflicts with OCGA § 36-35-6 (a) (2) (c) prohibiting the city from amending
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1983-09-07
Citation: 306 S.E.2d 257, 251 Ga. 375
Snippet: 36-35-3 (Code Ann. § 69-1017); see also OCGA § 36-35-6 (Code Ann. § 69-1018). In the Code of 1982, the