CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 30, 2000 | 272 Ga. 506, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2017
...Because I disagree with the determination made in the majority opinion, and in keeping with the principles stated in my dissent in Gwinnett County v. Yates,
265 Ga. 504,
458 S.E.2d 791 (1995), I respectfully dissent. NOTES [1] 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 1, Par. III(a). [2] See OCGA §
36-5-22.1; Bd....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 3, 1991 | 261 Ga. 399
...loy counsel to represent county officers. A county governing authority does not have the express authority to hire attorneys under either the 1983 Georgia Constitution, see Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I(a, b) and Para. 3, or under statutory law, see OCGA §
36-5-22.1....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 16, 1998 | 269 Ga. 678
...(2) Action affecting the composition, form, procedure for election or appointment, compensation, and expenses and allowances in the nature of compensation of the county governing authority. [3] See Gray v. Dixon,
249 Ga. 159, 164,
289 S.E.2d 237 (1982). [4] OCGA §
36-5-22.1(a). [5] OCGA §
36-5-22.1(b)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 9, 2012 | 720 S.E.2d 608, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 70
...ormity clause providing “for an exception to the general rule of preemption when general law authorizes the local government to act and the local ordinance does not conflict with general law.” Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., supra. OCGA §
36-5-22.1 (a) (1) gives each county governing authority original and exclusive jurisdiction over “[t]he directing and controlling of all the property of the county, according to law, as the governing authority deems expedient.” Moreover, as al...
...th respect to OCGA §
16-10-6. Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., supra. As already discussed, the County was authorized to enact section 3 so long as it did not conflict with general law. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b); OCGA §
36-5-22.1 (a) (1); Franklin County v....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 22, 1999 | 271 Ga. 791, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 4109
...Also, "[e]mployees of the county are `personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority,' and action affecting them in the form of a `home rule ordinance' is constitutionally permissible." Guhl v. Williams,
237 Ga. 586, 588,
229 S.E.2d 382 (1976). In addition, OCGA
36-5-22.1(b) grants "the governing authority of each county exclusive jurisdiction to control all county property, levy general taxes for county purposes, establish roads and bridges, fill vacancies in county offices, and regulate the county police, health, and support for the poor." Krieger, supra at 680,
506 S.E.2d 366....
...ations, method of selection, appointment, *464 compensation, tenure and other such related matters pertaining to the office." It is without dispute that the board is authorized to create the office of county manager pursuant to the authority of OCGA §
36-5-22. [2] In Gray v. Dixon, supra at 161,
289 S.E.2d 237, we declared §
36-5-22 constitutional and explained that the legislation does not conflict with the county home rule amendment"[t]he General Assembly has simply agreed to share with certain county governments a limited portion of its power to change the form of county government." Id....
...And while we disapproved an ordinance which created the position of county manager and appointed the county manager as "chief executive officer of the ... county and the administrative head of the county government," a subsequent ordinance in the language of §
36-5-22 and which did not have the effect of "stripping the chairman of his authority," was declared constitutional....
...Accord Krieger, supra at (1),
506 S.E.2d 366 (an attempt to confer executive powers on a county manager is an action affecting the form of county government in violation of constitutional home rule authority). Accordingly, we hold that Walton County's ordinance, which tracks the language of §
36-5-22, vests in the office of county manager certain administrative functions, and does not attempt to confer on that office the executive powers reserved for the chairman, is consistent with the county's home rule authority, and does not violate the Georgia Constitution....
...llate review. Ga. Dept. of Nat. Resources v. Coweta County,
261 Ga. 484,
405 S.E.2d 470 (1991). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] This authority is conferred under Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I(a) of the Georgia Constitution. [2] OCGA §
36-5-22(a) provides: "The governing authority of any county of this state or the General Assembly may create in and for those counties in which it deems necessary or advisable the office of county manager and may vest in such office powers, duties, and responsibilities of an administrative nature....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 13, 2000 | 538 S.E.2d 737, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 4181
...budget as required under Georgia law. See OCGA §
36-81-3 (b). The use to which such surplus funds are put is, of course, limited to the legal purposes set forth in the laws of this State. See, e.g., 1983 Ga. Const. Art. EX, Sec. IV, Par. II; OCGA §§
36-5-22.1,
48-5-220....
