Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448(Ga. L. 1974, p. 435, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1482, § 7; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2341, § 1.)
- Ga. L. 1974, pp. 435-6 which was codified as O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22, does not conflict with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I) and is constitutional. Gray v. Dixon, 249 Ga. 159, 289 S.E.2d 237 (1982).
- Any attempt by the board of commissioners to confer "executive powers" on the office of county manager would be an "action affecting the . . . form . . . of the county governing authority" in violation of subsection (c)(2) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I. Gray v. Dixon, 249 Ga. 159, 289 S.E.2d 237 (1982).
Ordinance creating the office of county manager which tracked the language of O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22 and vested in that office certain administrative functions, and did not attempt to confer the executive powers reserved for the chair, was consistent with the county's home rule authority and did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I. Krieger v. Walton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 271 Ga. 791, 524 S.E.2d 461 (1999).
Defendant county manager did not have final authority over decisions that resulted in termination of an employee from the county; such authority rests with the board of commissioners under Georgia's home rule provisions in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I. Lightsey v. Miles, (S.D. Ga. July 26, 2005).
Warning: 'results' key not found in API response
No results found for Georgia Code 36-5-22.