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2018 Georgia Code 36-60-13 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 36-60-13 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 36-60-13

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Chapter 60 information not found

ARTICLE 2 CLERKS OF GOVERNING AUTHORITIES OF MUNICIPALITIES

36-60-13. Multiyear lease, purchase, or lease-purchase contracts.

  1. Each county or municipality in this state shall be authorized to enter into multiyear lease, purchase, or lease-purchase contracts of all kinds for the acquisition of goods, materials, real and personal property, services, and supplies, provided that any such contract shall contain provisions for the following:
    1. The contract shall terminate absolutely and without further obligation on the part of the county or municipality at the close of the calendar or fiscal year in which it was executed and at the close of each succeeding calendar or fiscal year for which it may be renewed as provided in this Code section;
    2. The contract may provide for automatic renewal unless positive action is taken by the county or municipality to terminate such contract, and the nature of such action shall be determined by the county or municipality and specified in the contract;
    3. The contract shall state the total obligation of the county or municipality for the calendar or fiscal year of execution and shall further state the total obligation which will be incurred in each calendar or fiscal year renewal term, if renewed; and
    4. The contract shall provide that title to any supplies, materials, equipment, or other personal property shall remain in the vendor until fully paid for by the county or municipality.
  2. In addition to the provisions enumerated in subsection (a) of this Code section, any contract authorized by this Code section may include:
    1. A provision which requires that the contract will terminate immediately and absolutely at such time as appropriated and otherwise unobligated funds are no longer available to satisfy the obligations of the county or municipality under the contract; or
    2. Any other provision reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the county or municipality.
  3. Any contract developed under this Code section containing the provisions enumerated in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be deemed to obligate the county or municipality only for those sums payable during the calendar or fiscal year of execution or, in the event of a renewal by the county or municipality, for those sums payable in the individual calendar or fiscal year renewal term.
  4. No contract developed and executed pursuant to this Code section shall be deemed to create a debt of the county or municipality for the payment of any sum beyond the calendar or fiscal year of execution or, in the event of a renewal, beyond the calendar or fiscal year of such renewal.
  5. No contract developed and executed pursuant to this Code section may be delivered if the principal portion of such contract, when added to the amount of debt incurred by any county or municipality pursuant to Article IX, Section V, Paragraph I of the Constitution of Georgia, exceeds 10 percent of the assessed value of all taxable property within such county or municipality.
  6. No contract developed and executed pursuant to this Code section may be delivered if the real or personal property being so financed has been the subject of a referendum which failed to receive the approval of the voters of the county or municipality within the immediately preceding four calendar years, unless such real or personal property is required to be financed pursuant to a federal or state court order, or imminent threat thereof, as certified by the governing authority of the county or municipality.
  7. No contract developed and executed pursuant to this Code section with respect to the acquisition of real property may be delivered unless a public hearing has been held by the county or municipality after two weeks' notice published in a newspaper of general circulation within the county or municipality.
    1. On or after July 1, 2000, no contract developed and executed or renewed, refinanced, or restructured pursuant to this Code section with respect to real property may be delivered if the lesser of either of the following is exceeded:
      1. The average annual payments on the aggregate of all such outstanding contracts exceed 7.5 percent of the governmental fund revenues of the county or municipality for the calendar year preceding the delivery of such contract plus any available special county 1 percent sales and use tax proceeds collected pursuant to Code Section 48-8-111; or
      2. The outstanding principal balance on the aggregate of all such outstanding contracts exceeds $25 million; provided, however, that with respect to any county or municipality in which, prior to July 1, 2000, the outstanding principal balance on the aggregate of outstanding contracts exceeds $25 million, such outstanding contracts may be renewed, refinanced, or restructured, but no new contracts shall be developed and executed until the outstanding principal balance on such outstanding contracts has been reduced so that the $25 million limitation of this subparagraph, or the limitation in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, whichever is lower, is not exceeded.
    2. Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to contracts developed and executed or renewed, refinanced, or restructured pursuant to this Code section which are for projects or facilities:
      1. For the housing of court services, where any other state law or laws authorize the project or facility to be financed and paid for from the collection of fines rather than from tax revenues; or
      2. Which have been previously approved in the most recent referendum calling for the levy of a special county 1 percent sales and use tax pursuant to Part 1 of Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 48.
  9. Any such contract may provide for the payment by the county or municipality of interest or the allocation of a portion of the contract payment to interest, provided that the contract is in compliance with this Code section.
  10. Nothing in this Code section shall restrict counties or municipalities from executing reasonable contracts arising out of their proprietary functions.

(Code 1981, §36-60-13, enacted by Ga. L. 1988, p. 1954, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 441, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1443, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 36/HB 942; Ga. L. 2013, p. 272, § 1/HB 473.)

The 2012 amendment, effective May 1, 2012, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in the introductory paragraph of subsection (a).

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, inserted "or fiscal" throughout subsections (a), (c), and (d).

Code Commission notes.

- Two 1988 Acts added a new Code Section 36-60-12. Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, the Code section enacted by Ga. L. 1988, p. 1847 has retained the Code Section 36-60-12 designation and the Code section enacted by Ga. L. 1988, p. 1954 has been redesignated as Code Section 36-60-13.

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, "Code section" was substituted for "Code Section" in the first occurrence of the words in the introductory language of subsection (b).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 55, repealed Ga. L. 1988, p. 1954, § 2, providing for the terms and conditions under which counties or municipalities may enter into certain one year, or less, contracts. For present provisions, see Code Section 36-60-14.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on local government law, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 359 (1990). For annual survey of local government law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2005); and 58 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2006). For survey article on local government law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 147 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 does not violate the constitutional debt limitations of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I. Barkley v. City of Rome, 259 Ga. 355, 381 S.E.2d 34 (1989).

Contract under section is not debt.

- Contract which satisfies the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 does not constitute a "debt" within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I and therefore does not require voter approval. Barkley v. City of Rome, 259 Ga. 355, 381 S.E.2d 34 (1989).

Lease agreement is not debt.

- There is no distinction in O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 between real and personal property and the strictures on leases for each class of property are the same; similarly, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a), providing for a popular vote on the assumption of debt, makes no distinction between the two classes of property. Therefore, a county's decision to enter a lease purchase agreement with the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia to finance and construct a new courthouse was not a debt requiring a vote under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a) and was in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 because it did not require future county commissioners to renew the contract, it allowed the county to terminate its financial obligations at the end of each calendar year, and it would never require the county to expend more than would be legally available under O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13. Bauerband v. Jackson County, 278 Ga. 222, 598 S.E.2d 444 (2004).

Contract as to provision of legal services.

- O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 did not apply to regulate over contract between county commissioners and county attorney for the provision of legal services. Brennan v. Chatham County Comm'rs, 209 Ga. App. 177, 433 S.E.2d 597 (1993).

Requirements of section violated.

- Multi-year computer lease purchase agreement entered into by the county violated the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13; therefore, the trial court properly granted the county's motion for summary judgment. Wasilkoff v. Douglas County, 227 Ga. App. 232, 488 S.E.2d 722 (1997) (events occurred prior to 1996 amendment).

Multiyear lease provision ambiguous.

- Multiyear lease provision allowing termination of the lease pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13 was ambiguous and the record did not show whether a county and the county's lessee intended the provision to apply generally to the lease or only if § 36-60-13 became applicable (i.e., appropriated funds were no longer available to allow the county to perform the county's obligations under lease). Thus, the county's right to terminate the lease under that provision was a fact issue for the jury to resolve. Etowah Valley Sporting Clay Park, LLC v. Dawson County, 294 Ga. App. 586, 669 S.E.2d 436 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0464, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 266 (Ga. 2009).

Settlement agreement enforceable.

- Trial court erred in denying a property owner's motion for summary judgment in a county breach of contract action because a settlement agreement between the parties was enforceable; the county attorney had authority to make the settlement offer on behalf of the county board, and while a vote in a public meeting was a required formality to effectuate the purchase, the board's failure to complete that formality when voting in the public meeting could not destroy an already existing settlement agreement. Old Peachtree Partners, LLC v. Gwinnett County, 315 Ga. App. 342, 726 S.E.2d 437 (2012).

Cited in CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Ga. 2002); Marlowe v. Colquitt County, 278 Ga. App. 184, 628 S.E.2d 622 (2006).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13

Total Results: 3  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Greene Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Circle Y Constr., Inc., 291 Ga. 111 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 29, 2012 | 728 S.E.2d 184, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1765

...ct for the acquisition of goods, materials, real and personal property, services, and supplies, but requires the contract to contain specified provisions.1 Counties and municipalities are authorized to enter into similar multi-year contracts by OCGA § 36-60-13 (a), which requires the contract to contain specified provisions that are nearly identical to those required by OCGA § 20-2-506 (b)....
...hibition against a political subdivision of Georgia incurring “new debt” without voter approval. See 1983 Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. V, Par. I (a); Bauerband v. Jackson County Bd. of Commrs., 278 Ga. 222 (1) (598 SE2d 444) (2004) (construing OCGA § 36-60-13)....
...City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 289 Ga. 612, 614 (713 SE2d 846) (2011). A multi-year acquisitional contract incurring new debt that is entered into by a political subdivision is void as a matter of law if it does not comply with either OCGA § 20-2-506 or § 36-60-13. See Wasilkoff v. Douglas County, 227 Ga. App. 232, 233 (488 SE2d 722) (1997) (applying OCGA§ 36-60-13 (a)). The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the trial court’s ruling on the School District’s motion to dismiss, accepting as true all well-pled material allegations in the complaint and resolving any doubts in favor of Circle Y....
...§ 20-2-506 (h).4 However, OCGA § 20-2-506 comes into play only when a school system enters into a multi-year acquisitional contract that has not received voter approval. See Wasilkoff v. Douglas County, supra, 227 Ga. App. at 233 (construing OCGA § 36-60-13)....
...which states that “[n]otwithstanding subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph, all local school systems which are authorized by law on June 30, 1983, to incur debt in excess of 10 percent... shall continue to be authorized to incur such debt.” OCGA § 36-60-13 (j) contains the identical provision applicable to multi-year contracts entered into by counties or municipalities. We asked the parties to address whether the Court of Appeals erred “in holding that a contract between a school distri...
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Bauerband v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Com'rs, 598 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 7, 2004 | 278 Ga. 222, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 1878

...with the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia ("ACCG") to finance and construct a new courthouse. ACCG is a non-profit organization that assists county governments. The proposed agreement is intended to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 36-60-13....
...ease, purchase, or lease purchase contracts of all kinds for the acquisition of goods, materials, real and personal property, services, and supplies" without incurring "debt" under the constitutional definition, the General Assembly has enacted OCGA § 36-60-13. The trial court found that the lease purchase agreement met all of the requirements of OCGA § 36-60-13. This Court has previously ruled upon the constitutional validity of OCGA § 36-60-13. OCGA § 36-60-13 authorizes only those contracts that terminate all obligation on the part of the municipality at the close of each calendar year. Consequently, such a contract would fall outside the purview of Art. IX, § V, Par. I since it does not constitute a "debt" within the meaning set forth in the Dawson case. Therefore, OCGA § 36-60-13 is constitutional. Barkley v. City of Rome, 259 Ga. 355, 356, 381 S.E.2d 34 (1989). Nonetheless, the Bauerbands contend that OCGA § 36-60-13 is unconstitutional as applied....
...They assert that Barkley does not apply, however, claiming that in that case there was not a genuine case or controversy between adversaries, but that the litigation was "arranged" solely to elicit a declaratory ruling on the constitutionality of OCGA § 36-60-13....
...VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI. The Bauerbands also assert that Barkley does not control because the contract at issue in that case dealt with personal property, whereas the contract in this case deals with real property. But, there is no distinction in OCGA § 36-60-13 between real and personal property; the strictures on leases for each class of property are the same....
...Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, § V, Par. I(a). This Court will not engraft such a distinction onto either the Constitutional provision or the statute. To the extent that the Bauerbands raise arguments addressing an unconstitutional application of OCGA § 36-60-13, they contend that the "reality" of the circumstances surrounding the lease purchase agreement mandates that future County commissions will necessarily be bound to re-authorize the lease, to avoid the consequences of terminating the arrangement that provides for the County's courthouse....
...substitutes would have to be quickly found. Similarly, if this lease agreement is terminated, other office and courtroom space would have to be quickly found. However, hard choices regarding a decision to terminate a contract provided for under OCGA § 36-60-13, and the attendant difficult circumstances they may present, do not render meaningless the power of termination, which is required by the Code section to be included in such an agreement....
...That power is present in this agreement, and future County commissions are not bound to renew the agreement. [2] Finally, the trial court found that the County's total obligations under the lease purchase agreement and its other outstanding contracts did not exceed the maximum obligation level permitted by OCGA § 36-60-13(h)(1)....
...There is no question that the County is receiving substantial benefits in exchange for its payments under the lease agreement; the construction and use of a courthouse. 3. The Bauerbands further contend that the lease purchase agreement does not meet the strictures of OCGA § 36-60-13....
...chedule, [3] and as "Additional *448 Rentals," which include fees for the services of the trustee, paying agent, and lessor. These fees are not set out in specific amounts, but are stated to be "the reasonable fees" for the associated services. OCGA § 36-60-13(a)(3) requires that the contract state the "total obligation" incurred by the County in each renewal year, if the contract is renewed....
...h a sum certain for the "Additional Rentals" in each prospective year of the contract. However, elsewhere in the statute, the General Assembly used the terms "sums payable in the individual calendar year renewal term" and "annual payments." See OCGA § 36-60-13(c) & (h)(1)(A)....
...The County's yearly obligations under the contract are established within the statute. Nonetheless, the Bauerbands assert that, because the "Additional Rents" are not set forth in dollar amounts, the proposed contract raises the possibility that OCGA § 36-60-13(h)(1)(A) could be violated because the "average annual payments on the aggregate of all such outstanding contracts [may] exceed 7.5 percent of the governmental fund revenues of the county." OCGA § 36-60-13(h)(1). But, the contract also provides that payments can be made only from "legally available funds appropriated for such purposes," and that the contract is to be construed so as to comply with OCGA § 36-60-13. Thus, as the trial court correctly found, under the contract, any funds that would cause a violation of OCGA § 36-60-13(h)(1), would not be "legally available." [4] Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] The Attorney General intervened to defend the constitutionality of OCGA § 36-60-13....
...oposed lease purchase agreement clearly contemplates the acquisition of the land by ACCG before performance. Nor would current County ownership of the property mean that the proposed agreement is not one for the acquisition of real estate under OCGA § 36-60-13; the courthouse will become part of the realty, and in any event OCGA § 36-60-13 provides for the "acquisition of goods, materials, real and personal property, services, and supplies," which clearly encompasses all acquisitions the County will make under the agreement.
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Barkley v. City of Rome, 381 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 13, 1989 | 259 Ga. 355

...tract for equipment. Appellant contends that the contract constitutes a "debt" within the meaning of Art. IX, Sec. V, Par. I of the 1983 Georgia Constitution and therefore requires voter approval. In addition, appellant seeks a declaration that OCGA § 36-60-13 is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize such a lease agreement....
...Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696, 713 (1899). Therefore, if a municipality undertakes an obligation that extends beyond a single fiscal year, then a new "debt" has been incurred within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution and requires voter approval. OCGA § 36-60-13 (1) and (3) authorize municipalities to enter into multi-year lease purchase contracts for the acquisition of goods so long as the contract provides: *356 (1) The contract shall terminate absolutely and without further obligation on the part of ......
...he total obligation of the ... municipality for the calender year of execution [as well as] the total obligation which will be incurred in each calender year renewal term, if renewed. ... A contract which satisfies the requirements set forth in OCGA § 36-60-13 does not require voter approval. OCGA § 36-60-13 authorizes only those contracts that terminate all obligation on the part of the municipality at the close of each calender year. Consequently, such a contract would fall outside the purview of Art. IX, Sec. V, Par. I since it does not constitute a "debt" within the meaning set forth in the Dawson case. Therefore, OCGA § 36-60-13 is constitutional. Since the lease agreement in the present case satisfies all the requisite provisions enumerated in OCGA § 36-60-13 and, therefore, does not conflict with constitutional limitation on new debt, the agreement is valid....