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Call Now: 904-383-7448The governing body of any municipality or county may dedicate and set apart for use as parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers and for other recreation purposes any lands or buildings or both, owned or leased by such municipality or county and not dedicated or devoted to another or inconsistent public use. Such municipality or county, in such manner as may now or hereafter be authorized or provided by law for the acquisition of lands or buildings for public purposes by the municipality or county, may acquire or lease lands or buildings or both, within or beyond the corporate limits of the municipality, for parks, playgrounds, recreation centers, and other recreational purposes. When the governing body of the municipality so dedicates, sets apart, acquires, or leases lands or buildings for such purposes, it may, on its own initiative, provide for their conduct, equipment, and maintenance, according to this chapter, by making an appropriation from the general municipal or county funds.
(Ga. L. 1923, p. 106, § 2; Code 1933, § 69-602; Ga. L. 1946, p. 152, § 2.)
- County is authorized by law to condemn private property for the public purpose of creating a recreational park. Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Gwinnett County, 258 Ga. 243, 368 S.E.2d 310 (1988).
- This section authorizes counties to enter into contracts so as to provide recreational facilities within a county. Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, 198 S.E.2d 659 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-64-2).
When a municipality dedicates property to a public use, the property may be put to all customary uses within the definition of the use. Any use which is inconsistent, or which substantially and materially interferes, with the use of the property for the particular purpose for which the property was dedicated will constitute a misuser or diversion. Norton v. City of Gainesville, 211 Ga. 387, 86 S.E.2d 234 (1955).
Municipal park is public utility, and portion thereof cannot be leased for term of years for private gain. Norton v. City of Gainesville, 211 Ga. 387, 86 S.E.2d 234 (1955); Harper v. City of Augusta, 212 Ga. 605, 94 S.E.2d 690 (1956).
Land may be dedicated for particular public use with reservation by proprietor of right to use the land for a specified purpose not inconsistent with the legal character of the dedication. City of Abbeville v. Jay, 205 Ga. 743, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949).
General Assembly may vacate and dispose of park, owned by municipality, which has been dedicated to public use, or authority to do so may be delegated to the municipality, in the absence of constitutional prohibitions. Harper v. City of Augusta, 212 Ga. 605, 94 S.E.2d 690 (1956).
- There is a clear distinction between property purchased by a municipal corporation and held for use by the corporation as an entity, or in the municipality's proprietary capacity, and property purchased by the city for the public use and benefit of the city's citizens. As to property acquired for strictly corporate purposes and held in the city's proprietary capacity, the power to dispose is unquestioned, but as to the latter, in the absence of express legislative authority, it is only when the public use has been abandoned or the property has become unsuitable or inadequate for the purpose to which the property was dedicated that the city has power to dispose of such property. Harper v. City of Augusta, 212 Ga. 605, 94 S.E.2d 690 (1956).
- When the city council owned the fee-simple title to a tract of land which had been dedicated to and used by the public as a park, and when the General Assembly expressly conferred upon the city authority to sell and dispose of that property upon conditions with which the city complied, the trial court did not err in holding that the city was authorized to make the sale. Harper v. City of Augusta, 212 Ga. 605, 94 S.E.2d 690 (1956).
- Legislative power to authorize the discontinuance of public parks and the sale of park lands cannot be questioned when the fee is in the city and when in so doing no private property is taken. Harper v. City of Augusta, 212 Ga. 605, 94 S.E.2d 690 (1956).
- It is perfectly obvious that if a dedication of streets and squares was liable to be recalled at the will of the original proprietor, the most destructive hindrance would be thrown in the way of their improvement, and the rankest injustice would be visited upon individuals. City of Abbeville v. Jay, 205 Ga. 743, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949).
Dedication of land to public use is in nature of estoppel in pais, and when an attempt is made by the proprietor to revoke the dedication by a sale of the land, the proprietor may be enjoined by any person interested in the use. City of Abbeville v. Jay, 205 Ga. 743, 55 S.E.2d 129 (1949).
Cited in City Council v. Newsome, 211 Ga. 899, 89 S.E.2d 485 (1955); City of Gainesville v. Pritchett, 129 Ga. App. 475, 199 S.E.2d 889 (1973); PMS Constr. Co. v. DeKalb County, 243 Ga. 870, 257 S.E.2d 285 (1979).
- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Dedication, § 4 et seq. 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 181. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parks, Squares, and Playgrounds, §§ 6, 24.
- 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §§ 1995 et seq., 2000, 2001.
- To what uses may park property be devoted, 18 A.L.R. 1246; 63 A.L.R. 484; 144 A.L.R. 486.
Power of municipal corporation to establish and maintain golf course, 36 A.L.R. 1301.
Statutes relating to establishment or administration of parks, as encroachment on right of local self-government, 88 A.L.R. 228.
Auditorium or stadium as public purpose for which public funds may be expended or taxing power exercised, 173 A.L.R. 415.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring land developer to dedicate portion of land for recreational purposes, or make payment in lieu thereof, 43 A.L.R.3d 862.
Public swimming pool as nuisance, 49 A.L.R.3d 652.
Construction of highway through park as violation of use to which park property may be devoted, 60 A.L.R.3d 581.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1988-05-26
Citation: 258 Ga. 243, 368 S.E.2d 310, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 221
Snippet: recreational property only by the terms of OCGA § 36-64-2; strictly construed, claims Williams Bros., this