O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) While recognizing and confirming the authority of local governments to exercise zoning power within their respective territorial boundaries, it is the intention of this chapter to establish as state policy minimum procedures governing the exercise of that power. The purpose of these minimum procedures is to assure that due process is afforded to the general public when local governments regulate the uses of property through the exercise of the zoning power. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate any zoning decision made by a local government prior to January 1, 1986, or to require a local government to exercise its zoning power. (b) Consistent with the minimum procedures required by this chapter, local governments may: (1) Provide by ordinance or resolution for such administrative officers, bodies, or agencies as may be expedient for the efficient exercise of their zoning powers; and (2) Provide by ordinance or resolution for procedures and requirements in addition to or supplemental to those required by this chapter.
History
Code 1981, § 36-66-2, enacted by Ga. L. 1985, p. 1139, § 1.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Procedural requirements of this chapter are mandatory. - County’s failure to comply with the notice provisions of O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a) invalidated the subject zoning action. McClure v. Davidson, 258 Ga. 706, 373 S.E.2d 617 (1988). County’s failure to comply with the mandatory language of O.C.G.A. Ch. 66, T. 36 in enacting a zoning ordinance rendered the ordinance void. Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County, 261 Ga. 153, 401 S.E.2d 527 (1991). No requirement that zoning power be exercised. - While the Georgia Public Service Commission (PSC) had the authority to regulate the placement of electrical substations, no requirement existed that every complex construction project be subject to zoning-like restrictions as an agency was not required to exercise the agency’s zoning power under O.C.G.A. § 36-66-2(a); the broad statu-
tory delegations of authority to the PSC did not specifically mention siting and did not provide sufficient objective standards to control the PSC’s discretion so a trial court improperly directed the PSC to consider the propriety of a power company’s construction of a substation and apply specific standards to the case. Ga. PSC v. Turnage, 284 Ga. 610, 669 S.E.2d 138 (2008). Appeals. - Without express statutory language, a local government does not have the authority to create direct appeals of rezoning decisions. Walton County v. Scenic Hills Estates, Inc., 261 Ga. 94, 401 S.E.2d 513 (1991). Cited in Kingsley v. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc., 259 Ga. App. 207, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2002); Buckner v. Douglas County, 273 Ga. App. 765, 615 S.E.2d 850 (2005); Century Ctr. at Braselton, LLC v. Town of Braselton, 285 Ga. 380, 677 S.E.2d 106 (2009).
Notes of Decisions
City of Roswell v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 549 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. 2001).
· cites it 12× “04 (2001) (listing cases exempting interim zoning and building moratoria from the procedural requirements applying to ordinary zoning ordinances and also cases holding interim zoning and stop-gap ordinances invalid as a result of procedural defects).”
Tilley Props., Inc. v. Bartow Cnty., 401 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. 1991).
· cites it 8× “Printed copies of the policies and procedures must be available for distribution to the public. Id.”
Shelley v. Town of Tyrone, 806 S.E.2d 535 (Ga. 2017).
· cites it 2× “’ ” This pronouncement in Little may have been overbroad, because OCGA § 36-66-2 (b) (2) — a provision of the ZPL not mentioned in Little — says that local governments may “[p]rovide by ordinance or resolution for procedures and requirements in addition to or supplemental to…”
Kingsley v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 576 S.E.2d 569 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 6× “” OCGA § 36-66-2 (a). In that regard, OCGA § 36-66-4 (a) provides that local governments must hold a hearing on any action “resulting in a zoning decision” and publish notice of that hearing at least 15 but not more than 45 days prior to the date of the hearing.”
McClure v. Davidson, 373 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. 1988).
· cites it 2× “Section 36-66-2 (a) provides as follows: While recognizing and confirming the authority of local governments to exercise zoning power .”
Century Ctr. at Braselton, LLC v. Town of Braselton, 677 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. 2009).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 36-66-2 (a). In the same act, “zoning” is defined as including “the power of local governments to provide within their respective territorial boundaries .”
Walton Cnty. v. Scenic Hills Estates, Inc., 401 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1991).
· cites it 4× “For example some statutes provide for a “hearing as is provided in Chapter 13 of Title 50, the ‘Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.”
C & H Dev., LLC v. Franklin Cnty., 670 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “706, 709 (3) ( 373 SE2d 617 ) (1988) (quoting OCGA § 36-66-2 (a)). 6 This includes “[t]he grant of a permit relating to a special use of property.”
Se. Towers, LLC v. Pickens Cnty., Ga., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
· cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. § 36-66-2. It also requires local governments to adopt standards governing the exercise of their zoning power.”
DeKalb Cnty. v. Buckler, 654 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Here, neither the Historic Preservation Act nor the DeKalb County ordinance provides that failure to have seven active members on the HPC invalidates an HPC decision.”
Hoechstetter v. Pickens Cnty., 303 Ga. 786 (Ga. 2018).
· cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 36-66-2 (a) (“The purpose of these minimum procedures is to assure that due process is afforded to the general public when local governments regulate the uses of 3 property through the exercise of the zoning power.”). As such, when a hearing is too attenuated in…”
— 36-66-2(a) — 4 cases
City of Roswell v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 549 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. 2001).
“04 (2001) (listing cases exempting interim zoning and building moratoria from the procedural requirements applying to ordinary zoning ordinances and also cases holding interim zoning and stop-gap ordinances invalid as a result of procedural defects).”
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