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2018 Georgia Code 36-75-11 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 36-75-11 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 36-75-11

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Chapter 75 information not found

ARTICLE 3 ENFORCEMENT BOARDS CREATED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 2003

36-75-11. Resolutions and referendums required prior to issuance of bonded indebtedness for new projects; exclusions.

  1. On and after May 24, 2007, no public safety and judicial facilities authority created and activated by a single county pursuant to this chapter shall be authorized to issue bonds for new projects unless a resolution approving such projects passed by a majority vote of the governing authority of the county that created and activated such authority was ratified by the electors of the county in a referendum.
  2. The proceeds of bonds issued by a public safety and judicial facilities authority created and activated by a single county pursuant to this chapter and any interest on such proceeds shall be used only for the projects set forth in the resolution approving the issuance of such bonds or for debt service on such bonds.
  3. Any authority other than the type of authority defined in paragraph (1) of Code Section 36-75-3:
    1. Which is authorized by general or local Act to operate and issue bonds in a single county that has activated or that activates a public safety and judicial facilities authority pursuant to this chapter; and
    2. Which constructs or operates buildings or facilities for use by any department, agency, division, or commission of any county that has activated or that activates a public safety and judicial facilities authority pursuant to this chapter

      shall obtain approval by resolution and referendum as provided in this Code section prior to issuing bonds for any new buildings, facilities, or real property or improvements to existing buildings, facilities, or real property and shall be bound to such resolution as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section.

  4. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this Code section shall apply only to the issuance of bonds the principal and interest of which will be repaid, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, through funds of the county by agreement between the county and:
    1. A public safety and judicial facilities authority created and activated pursuant to this chapter; or
    2. Any authority other than the type of authority defined in paragraph (1) of Code Section 36-75-3 that meets the conditions set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (c) of this Code section.
  5. The provisions of this Code section shall not apply under any circumstances to the issuance of "recovery zone economic development bonds" and "recovery zone facility bonds" as such terms are defined in Section 1401 of the federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

(Code 1981, §36-75-11, enacted by Ga. L. 2007, p. 421, § 1/HB 181; Ga. L. 2010, p. 4, § 2/HB 203.)

The 2010 amendment, effective May 7, 2010, substituted "bonds" for "bonded indebtedness" in the middle of subsection (a); substituted the present provisions of subsection (b) for the former provisions, which read: "If a public safety and judicial facilities authority created and activated by a single county pursuant to this chapter desires to fund multiple projects in a bond issue, such projects shall be ranked in the order they will be funded after approval by the governing authority and ratification by the electors under this Code section. Such order of funding shall be binding on the public safety and judicial facilities authority and such projects shall be funded in the order approved unless a different order is submitted to the governing authority for approval and electors for ratification."; in subsection (c), substituted "issue bonds" for "incur bonded indebtedness" near the beginning of paragraph (c)(1), and in the ending undesignated paragraph, substituted "buildings, facilities, or real property" for "buildings or facilities" twice and added "and shall be bound to such resolution as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section" at the end; and added subsections (d) and (e).

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2007, "May 24, 2007" was substituted for "the effective date of this Code section" in subsection (a).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- War on Terrorism Local Assistance Act, O.C.G.A. § 36-75-1 et seq., is not unconstitutional because the Act does not violate the uniform terms and conditions provision for development authorities in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. III; the uniformity required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. III in the laws creating development authorities is the same uniformity required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a) in laws of a general nature. Dev. Auth. v. State, 286 Ga. 36, 684 S.E.2d 856 (2009).

Classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary and is therefore constitutional.

- War on Terrorism Local Assistance Act, specifically O.C.G.A. § 36-75-11(c), is not unconstitutional because the classification in § 36-75-11 is not unreasonable and arbitrary since the classification applies in precisely the same way and without exception to every county development authority throughout the state that currently meets or may, in the future, meet the criteria set forth in § 36-75-11(c); the purpose of § 36-75-11 is to protect against the accumulation of excessive bonded indebtedness, and the legislature had a reasonable basis to first address this critical financial situation in counties. Dev. Auth. v. State, 286 Ga. 36, 684 S.E.2d 856 (2009).

Legislation enacting the War on Terrorism Local Assistance Act, Ga. L. 2003, p. 862, does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV because the legislation and O.C.G.A. § 36-75-11(c) are logically related and do not embrace discordant subjects when the legislation generally pertains to public safety and judicial facilities authorities, and § 36-75-11(c) applies to authorities in counties that have activated public safety and judicial facilities authorities; it was the legislature's decision to enact a statute imposing a referendum requirement on any authority that has been authorized to incur bonded indebtedness in a county with an activated public safety and judicial facilities authority when that authority has constructed or operates buildings or facilities for use by a department, agency, division, or commission of such county. Dev. Auth. v. State, 286 Ga. 36, 684 S.E.2d 856 (2009).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 36-75-11

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Dev. Auth. of DeKalb Cnty. v. State, 684 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2009 | 286 Ga. 36, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3050

...Michael J. Jacobs, Atlanta, William J. Linkous, Jr., Decatur, for appellee. HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice. Development Authority of DeKalb County ("DADC") and DeKalb County appeal from the superior court's rejection of their constitutional challenges to OCGA § 36-75-11(c), which imposes a referendum requirement on the issuance of bonds by "[a]ny authority" which is authorized to operate and incur bonded indebtedness in a county with an activated public safety and judicial facilities authority ("PSJF aut...
...t the criteria to activate a PSJF authority; moreover, DeKalb County is the only county that has so activated a PSJF authority pursuant to the WTLA Act. The issue at the core of this appeal arose when the WTLA Act was amended in May 2007 to add OCGA § 36-75-11....
...at (c)(1), and the authority "constructs or operates buildings or facilities for use by any department, agency, division, or commission of any county that has activated or that activates a [PSJF authority]." Id. at (c)(2). Uncodified § 3 of the legislation enacting OCGA § 36-75-11 expressly provides that "[a]ll laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed." Ga....
...L. 2007, supra, p. 422, § 3. As noted above, appellant DeKalb County is the only county in Georgia that has an activated PSJF authority, and it is uncontroverted that appellant DADC meets both of the criteria required of "[a]ny authority" in OCGA § 36-75-11(c), inasmuch as DADC is both authorized to incur bonded indebtedness in DeKalb County and has constructed or operates buildings or facilities for use by a DeKalb County department, agency, division or commission. Accordingly, under the plain and unambiguous terms of OCGA § 36-75-11(c), DADC is required to "obtain approval by resolution and referendum ......
...ears, ... the burden is on the party alleging a statute to be unconstitutional to prove it." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dee v. Sweet, 268 Ga. 346, 348(1), 489 S.E.2d 823 (1997). 2. Appellants contend that the referendum requirement in OCGA § 36-75-11(c) violates the "uniform terms and conditions" provision for development authorities in Art....
...[Cit.]" [Cits.] A law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable. [Cit.] Id. at 889(3), 218 S.E.2d 593. Appellants argue OCGA § 36-75-11 is unconstitutional for two reasons: the statute is unreasonable and arbitrary because it applies to development authorities in counties but not those in municipalities, and the statute lacks uniformity because it applies to only one county development authority, namely, DADC. We find no merit in either argument. In light of our agreement with the trial court that the purpose of OCGA § 36-75-11 is "to protect against the accumulation of excessive bonded indebtedness," the Legislature had a reasonable basis to first address this critical financial situation in counties....
...See generally Farley v. State, 272 Ga. 432, 531 S.E.2d 100 (2000) (under rational basis test, legislature may legitimately make imperfect and piecemeal classifications in area of economics). Accordingly, we reject appellants' contention that the classification in OCGA § 36-75-11 is unreasonable and arbitrary. [2] As to appellants' other argument, the plain language of OCGA § 36-75-11 establishes that it applies to "[a]ny authority" that meets the criteria set forth in subsection (c); it is not unconstitutional merely because DADC is presently the only authority that meets those criteria....
...535, "`[i]t is not necessary that every [development authority] in the State, at the time of the passage of the law, should fall within its operation, but it is necessary that none should be excepted in such a way that it can never fall within its provisions.' [Cit.]" Because OCGA § 36-75-11 applies in precisely the same way and without exception to every county development authority throughout the State that currently meets or may, in the future, meet the criteria set forth in subsection (c), the trial court did not err by rejecting this constitutional challenge to the statute. 3. Appellants next contend that OCGA § 36-75-11(c) violates the constitutional provision in Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a) that "no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law." This argument is based on appellants' contention that OCGA § 36-75-11(c) is a special law that unconstitutionally affects an area governed by general law, namely, the DAL. See OCGA § 36-62-11. This argument fails, however, based on our holding in Division 1, supra, that the legislative classification in OCGA § 36-75-11 is reasonable [3] and that the statute applies generally to "[a]ny authority" that meets the criteria in subsection (c). As the trial court correctly found, OCGA § 36-75-11(c) is a general law that *860 preempted by implication the exemption from referenda set forth in OCGA § 36-62-11 as to those development authorities that meet the criteria of authorities defined in OCGA § 36-75-11(c). The trial court did not err by rejecting this constitutional challenge. 4. In their final enumeration, appellants contend that Act 235, House Bill 181, Ga. L. 2007, p. 421 ("H.B. 181"), the legislation enacting OCGA § 36-75-11(c), violated the "multiple subject" provision in Art....
...e [Constitution]. Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 10-11, 193 S.E. 869 (1937). See also Crews v. Cook, 220 Ga. 479, 481, 139 S.E.2d 490 (1964). As the trial court correctly found, H.B. 181 generally pertains to PSJF authorities and subsection (c) of OCGA § 36-75-11 contained in H.B....
...with an activated PSJF authority when that authority has constructed or operates buildings or facilities for use by a department, agency, division or commission of such county. Based on our review of the manner in which the Legislature enacted OCGA § 36-75-11, we conclude that it does not suffer from any of the constitutional infirmities alleged by appellants....
...mit the referendum requirement only to the issuance of bonds "the principal and interest of which will be repaid, directly or indirectly, through funds of the county," id. at § 2, the bill was not enacted and thus the referendum requirement in OCGA § 36-75-11(c) continues to apply, without restriction, to a qualifying authority's issuance of bonds for " any new buildings or facilities or improvements to existing buildings or facilities." (Emphasis supplied.) [2] Although municipalities were initially included in the House Bill that became OCGA § 36-75-11(c), see H.B....
...Kasim Reed of the 35th proposed an amendment to strike "municipality" from the bill, which was adopted, id. at 2840, and the bill, with Sen. Reed's amendment among others, was eventually enacted as Ga. L. 2007, p. 421. [3] Although appellants argue the purpose of the "county"—only provision in OCGA § 36-75-11(c) was to exclude the City of Atlanta, the effect of the statutory language is to exclude any municipality that may eventually meet the qualifications to activate a PSJF authority....