O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 36-85-20 (2019)

Exercise of authority not provision of liability insurance; sovereign immunity

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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The exercise by a municipality or county of the authority provided in this chapter shall not constitute the provision of liability insurance protection under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. The participation by a municipality or county as a member of an agency authorized by this chapter shall not constitute the obtaining of liability insurance and no sovereign immunity shall be waived on account of such participation.

History

Code 1981, § 36-85-20, enacted by Ga. L. 1986, p. 1496, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1454, § 5.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of ’92,’’ see 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 405 (1993).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - O.C.G.A. § 36-85-20 conflicts with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, as the statute read prior to the 1990 amendment, and was therefore void. Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129, 414 S.E.2d 647 (1992). County’s participation in an interlocal risk management plan did not constitute liability insurance for the purpose of waiving the county’s sovereign immunity to the extent of the plan’s coverage. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994). Even though the 1991 amendment of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, eliminated the language under which O.C.G.A. § 36-85-20 was found unconstitutionally void, the revision did not resurrect the statute and, accordingly, the statute did not provide a basis for finding a county’s participation in an interlocal risk management plan constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. The county’s purchase of such insurance agreement constituted the purchase of insurance under

O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) and the county waived the county’s sovereign immunity to the extent of such coverage; reversing in part, Gilbert v. Richardson, 211 Ga. App. 795, 440 S.E.2d 684 (1994). Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994). GIRMA allows waiver of sovereign immunity to extent of coverage. - Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to city and the officer involved in a car accident, based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, since it has been held that the constitutional provision providing waiver of immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities, that the nonwaiver of immunity provision of O.C.G.A. § 36-85-20 is unconstitutional, and that municipal coverage under a Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA) policy results in waiver of immunity to the extent of that coverage. Harden v. Burdette, 204 Ga. App. 733, 420 S.E.2d 626 (1992). Cited in Sinkfield v. Pike, 201 Ga. App. 652, 411 S.E.2d 889 (1991).

CHAPTER 86 LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY Sec.

Grant Program established; grant categories; rules and regulations; budget process; efficiency assessments.

Short title. Legislative findings and determinations; purpose. Definitions. Local Government Efficiency

Administrative rules and regulations. - Local Government Efficiency Grant Program, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Department of Community Affairs, Chapter 110-5.

Law reviews. - For note on 1993 enactment of this chapter, see 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 160 (1993).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1991–2007 · leading case: Gilbert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476 (Ga. 1994).
Gilbert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476 (Ga. 1994). · cites it 6× “We reached this conclusion after declaring § 36-85-20 unconstitutionally void because it conflicted with the 1983 Constitution’s waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of available liability insurance.”
Hiers v. City of Barwick, 414 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 1992). · cites it 12× “Next, they point out that OCGA § 36-85-20 states that participation in GIRMA does not constitute a waiver of immunity and does not constitute the provision of liability insurance protection under the Constitution.”
Weaver v. City of Statesboro, 653 S.E.2d 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that such insurance waives a city’s sovereign immunity to the extent of the insurance (despite the provisions of *36 OCGA§ 36-85-20, which statute the Court declared unconstitutional from its inception).”
Harden v. Burdette, 420 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 4× “In her first and third enumerations, Harden contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Union City and Burdette based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. She argues that sovereign immunity is waived to the extent of coverage under Union City’s GIRMA policy…”
Sinkfield v. Pike, 411 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “Appellants’ enumeration concerning the constitutionality of OCGA § 36-85-20 presents an argument not made in the trial court; therefore, we cannot consider it.”
Adams v. Perdue, 405 S.E.2d 305 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 36-85-20 states: “[tjhe participation by a municipality or county as a member of an agency authorized by this chapter shall not constitute the obtaining of liability insurance and no sovereign immunity shall be waived on account of such participation.”
Gilbert v. Richardson, 440 S.E.2d 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 12× “Under OCGA § 36-85-20, “[t]he exercise by a municipality or county of the authority provided in this chapter shall not constitute the provision of liability insurance protection under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX of the Constitution of the State of Georgia.”
CSX Transp., Inc., Nat'l Raliroad Passenger Corp. v. The City of Garden City, Arco, Inc., 325 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). “” O.C.G.A. § 36-85-20. Though Gilbert specifically referred to § 33-24-51(b) at issue in that case, we see no reason to distinguish the case on that ground.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.