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2018 Georgia Code 36-91-2 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 36-91-2 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 36-91-2

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Chapter 91 information not found

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

36-91-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the term:

  1. "Alternate bids" means the amount stated in the bid or proposal to be added to or deducted from the amount of the base bid or base proposal if the corresponding change in project scope or alternate materials or methods of construction is accepted.
  2. "Base bid" or "base proposal" means the amount of money stated in the bid or proposal as the sum for which the bidder or proposer offers to perform the work.
  3. "Bid bond" means a bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties for the faithful acceptance of the contract payable to, in favor of, and for the protection of the governmental entity for which the contract is to be awarded.
  4. "Change order" means an alteration, addition, or deduction from the original scope of work as defined by the contract documents to address changes or unforeseen conditions necessary for project completion.
  5. "Competitive sealed bidding" means a method of soliciting public works construction contracts whereby the award is based upon the lowest responsive, responsible bid in conformance with the provisions of subsection (b) of Code Section 36-91-21.
  6. "Competitive sealed proposals" means a method of soliciting public works contracts whereby the award is based upon criteria identified in a request for proposals in conformance with the provisions of subsection (c) of Code Section 36-91-21.
  7. "Emergency" means any situation resulting in imminent danger to the public health or safety or the loss of an essential governmental service.
  8. "Governing authority" means the official or group of officials responsible for governance of a governmental entity.
  9. "Governmental entity" means a county, municipal corporation, consolidated government, authority, board of education, or other public board, body, or commission but shall not include any authority, board, department, or commission of the state, or a public transportation agency as defined by Chapter 9 of Title 32.
  10. "Payment bond" means a bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties payable to the governmental entity for which the work is to be done and intended for the use and protection of all subcontractors and all persons supplying labor, materials, machinery, and equipment in the prosecution of the work provided for in the public works construction contract.
  11. "Performance bond" means a bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties for the faithful performance of the contract and to indemnify the governmental entity for any damages occasioned by a failure to perform the same within the prescribed time. Such bond shall be payable to, in favor of, and for the protection of the governmental entity for which the work is to be done.
  12. "Public works construction" means the building, altering, repairing, improving, or demolishing of any public structure or building or other public improvements of any kind to any public real property other than those projects covered by Chapter 4 of Title 32 or by Chapter 37 of Title 50. Such term does not include the routine operation, repair, or maintenance of existing structures, buildings, or real property, or any energy savings performance contract or any improvements or installations performed as part of an energy savings performance contract.
  13. "Responsible bidder" or "responsible offeror" means a person or entity that has the capability in all respects to perform fully and reliably the contract requirements.
  14. "Responsive bidder" or "responsive offeror" means a person or entity that has submitted a bid or proposal that conforms in all material respects to the requirements set forth in the invitation for bids or request for proposals.
  15. "Scope of project" means the work required by the original contract documents and any subsequent change orders required or appropriate to accomplish the intent of the project as described in the bid documents.
  16. "Scope of work" means the work that is required by the contract documents.
  17. "Sole source" means those procurements made pursuant to a written determination by a governing authority that there is only one source for the required supply, service, or construction item.

(Code 1981, §36-91-1, enacted by Ga. L. 2000, p. 498, § 1; Code 1981, §36-91-2, as redesignated by Ga. L. 2001, p. 820, § 12; Ga. L. 2007, p. 640, § 1/SB 146; Ga. L. 2012, p. 59, § 1/SB 113.)

The 2012 amendment, effective April 12, 2012, in paragraph (12), added "or by Chapter 37 of Title 50" at the end of the first sentence, and added ", or any energy savings performance contract or any improvements or installations performed as part of an energy savings performance contract" at the end of the last sentence.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Public works construction.

- Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia was immune from a suit by employees of a contractor who provided a forged payment bond to the Board; the maintenance contract was not for "public works construction" as defined in O.C.G.A. § 36-91-2(12); therefore, the provisions for payment bonds in O.C.G.A. § 13-10-60 et seq. did not apply. Further, the Board had no duty to investigate the information presented on the face of the payment bond. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Brooks, 324 Ga. App. 15, 749 S.E.2d 23 (2013).

Emergency sufficiently identified.

- City was not required to obtain a payment bond in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 36-91-90 because the requirement did not apply to emergency projects, O.C.G.A. § 36-91-22(e); the city's description in its minutes of the "emergency replacement of a 10-inch sanitary sewer main on Embassy Drive" was sufficient to describe the nature of the emergency. City of College Park v. Sekisui SPR Ams., LLC, 331 Ga. App. 404, 771 S.E.2d 101 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1141, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 471 (Ga. 2015).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 36-91-2

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R. D. Brown Contractors, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 626 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 13, 2006 | 280 Ga. 210, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 443

...MARTA, 273 Ga. 280, 281(1), 539 S.E.2d 811 (2000). Public works bidding is regulated by Chapter 91 of Title 36 of the Official Code of Georgia. Determining whether the Board's action was lawful involves the interplay of three statutes therein. Under OCGA § 36-91-21(b)(4), such a "contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder whose bid meets the requirements and criteria set forth in the invitation for bids. ..." OCGA § 36-91-2(12) defines "responsive bidder" as "a person or entity that has submitted a bid or proposal that conforms in all material respects to the requirements set forth in the invitation for bids or request for proposals." [4] Finally, OCGA § 36-91-20(c) states that "[g]overnmental entities shall have the authority to reject any and all bids or proposals and to waive technicalities and informalities." "`This Court is to construe [statutes] to give sensible and intelligent effect to all of [their] provisions and to refrain from any interpretation which renders any part of the statute[s] meaningless.' [Cit.]" Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier, 278 Ga. 52, 53(1), 597 S.E.2d 367 (2004). The statement in OCGA § 36-91-21(b)(4) that the contract go to one who "meets the requirements and criteria set forth in the invitation for bids" cannot mean that every statement in the invitation for bids must be met precisely and without deviation; such a reading would render superfluous OCGA § 36-91-21(b)(4)'s specification that the recipient also meet the definition of a "responsive bidder," and thus would render meaningless the definition of a responsive bidder as one whose bid "conforms in all material respects to the requirements set forth in the invitation for bids...." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 36-91-2(12). The reference to "material respects" must be honored. Similarly, the provision of OCGA § 36-91-20(c) that governments "have the authority to reject any and all bids or proposals and to waive technicalities and informalities," must be given effect; to read OCGA § 36-91-21(b)(4) to mean that all terms stated in the invitation for bids must be met precisely would curtail the authority governmental entities are specifically given....
...governmental entity retains its statutorily granted power to waive technicalities. See Letchas v. Sims Asphalt Co., 250 Ga.App. 179, 180-181, 550 S.E.2d 721 (2001). Rather, the key to giving effect to each of the three relevant Code sections is OCGA § 36-91-2(12)'s *475 definition of a "[r]esponsive bidder" as one whose bid conforms to the invitation for bids "in all material respects." Clearly, some provisions of a bid may be considered immaterial, and constitute the sort of "technicalities and informalities" that the governmental entity can waive under OCGA § 36-91-20(c)....
...Assuming that this appeal is moot, it falls into that class of cases which are capable of repetition yet evade judicial review. See Collins v. Lombard Corp., 270 Ga. 120, 508 S.E.2d 653 (1998). [4] There is no dispute that both Brown and McKnight are "responsible bidders" as defined in OCGA § 36-91-2(11)....
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Duty Free Air & Ship Supply Co. v. City of Atlanta, 646 S.E.2d 48 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 14, 2007 | 282 Ga. 173, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1462

...The Construction Law explicitly contemplates the joint application of its terms with local law and ordinances. It states unequivocally: "Municipalities and consolidated governments shall execute and enter into contracts in the manner provided in applicable local legislation or by ordinance. " (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 36-91-20(a). Accordingly, an award which might be made to the most responsible and responsive offeror of an RFP pursuant to OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C) would remain subject, under OCGA § 36-91-21(a), to requirements of local law governing the City's execution and entry into any contract emanating from the initial award....
...o the level of a creating a mockery because "the City . . . arbitrarily refuses to prepare, and the Mayor refuses to sign [the] contract." These accusations are both inappropriate and wholly unnecessary given the explicit legislative mandate of OCGA § 36-91-20(a)....
...ion, but it did not. Instead, the City proceeded to make that written determination which made its award of the contract to the best offeror mandatory under the Construction Law. At that point, the award of the contract was complete pursuant to OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C), and the City and its officials no longer had the discretion to refuse to accomplish remaining formalities....
...Indeed, the City defended its selection of DFASS for well over a year during the pendency of the appeals process, although this fact is ignored by the majority. The only provision of the Construction Law, OCGA §§ 36-91-1 et seq., other than OCGA § 36-91-20(a), that the majority even mentions is OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C), which it summarily treats as subordinate to OCGA § 36-91-20(a)....
...ls, "shall . . . [m]ake an award to the responsible and responsive offeror whose proposal is determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the governmental entity, taking into consideration the evaluation factors set forth in the [RFP]." OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C)....
...Because the City has, in writing, selected DFASS as the responsible and responsive offeror whose proposal is most advantageous, the City "shall . . . [m]ake an award" to DFASS. This mandatory, substantive language is not vitiated by the fact that, in OCGA § 36-91-20(a), the Construction Law permits local legislation or ordinances to provide for the manner of execution and entry into public works construction contracts....
...the substantive formation of the agreement itself. At the end of its opinion, the majority makes the unsupported assumption that the Construction Law was merely intended to complement local laws. Unlike the majority opinion, however, nothing in OCGA § 36-91-20(a) authorizes ordinances to conflict with or prevail over the Construction Law, or to control formation of the contract....
...Under the plain terms of the City Code, the Chief Procurement Officer is the appropriate official to solicit and enter into construction contracts, and to select the most responsible and responsive offeror. City Code §§ 2-1138(a), 2-1189(d). Under OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C), the actual preparation of a formal document and the signing of it by the Mayor, after completion of competitive selection procedures, are not prerequisites to the formation of a binding contract....
...scretionary. Common Cause/Ga. is completely different from this case in every respect and is not, therefore, remotely applicable authority for the majority's holding. The bidding in Common Cause/Ga. took place in 1999, prior to the enactment of OCGA § 36-91-21. Moreover, that statute would not apply to contracts, like the one in Common Cause/Ga., which deal solely with the management of existing facilities. OCGA § 36-91-2(10). Therefore, completely unlike Common Cause/Ga., this case is governed by OCGA § 36-91-21. That critical distinction is lost on the majority. By its unambiguous terms, OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C) mandates award of the contract to the selected offeror....
...of its rights to the completed contract by the City's purported cancellation. Several provisions of law refer to the routine reservation of the right to reject all proposals or cancel an invitation prior to official acceptance of any proposal. OCGA § 36-91-20(c); City Charter § 6-402(c); City Code § 2-1194....
...[Cits.]" 10 McQuillin, supra. See also Northeast Miss. Community College Dist. v. Vanderheyden Constr. Co., supra; Donahue v. Bd. of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee Dist., 413 So.2d 488, 492 (La.1982). Once the City accepted DFASS's proposal in accordance with OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C), the reserved right to reject all *53 bids or cancel the solicitation "had not been exercised and it was no longer operative....
...Vanderheyden Constr. Co., supra at 1402. Under the Construction Law, the City has a responsibility to obtain any revisions in competitive sealed proposals prior to selection of the responsible and responsive proponent with the most advantageous proposal. OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(2)....
...See also City Code § 2-1189(f). After those revisions, the City still is not obligated to make any selection, and may reject all proposals or cancel the solicitation when such action is in the City's best interests. However, once a proponent is selected as contemplated by OCGA § 36-91-21(c)(1)(C), the award of a contract is complete, and the highest ranked offeror cannot be put through either another competitive solicitation process or a second round of negotiations, offers and counter-offers....