Definition of "motor vehicle" does not apply to

§ 33-24-51(b). - In determining if a county waived the county's sovereign immunity through the voluntary purchase of liability insurance under the second sentence of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), a trial court erred in considering the definition of "motor vehicle" provided in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1; rather, "any motor vehicle" was defined as a vehicle that was capable of being driven on the public roads that was covered by a liability insurance policy purchased by the county. Glass v. Gates, 311 Ga. App. 563, 716 S.E.2d 611 (2011), aff'd, 291 Ga. 350, 729 S.E.2d 361 (2012).

Motor vehicle.

- When a local entity purchases automobile liability insurance in an amount greater than the prescribed limits set forth for a waiver of sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1 et seq., the entity waives sovereign immunity to the extent of the entity's insurance coverage as required by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), and the broad definition of "any motor vehicle" set forth in § 33-24-51 applies. Therefore, in a wrongful death and survivor case, a county waived sovereign immunity to the extent of the county's insurance coverage as required by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), and the Georgia legislature did not intend to apply a narrow definition of motor vehicle under O.C.G.A. § 36-92-1 in a case involving an injury caused by a bush hog and a tractor. Gates v. Glass, 291 Ga. 350, 729 S.E.2d 361 (2012).

School district waived immunity to extent of insurance covering school bus accident.

- In a parent's action against a school district for the death of the parent's child as the child tried to board a school bus, although the district had sovereign immunity, the district waived sovereign immunity to the extent of the district's purchase of liability insurance pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b); the exclusion from the waiver of sovereign immunity for school districts in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2(a) did not extend to the second sentence of § 33-24-51(b). Tift County Sch. Dist. v. Martinez, 331 Ga. App. 423, 771 S.E.2d 117 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1084, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 458 (Ga. 2015).

"Local government entity" includes sheriffs' offices.

- Term "local government entity" should not be construed so narrowly as to exclude sheriffs' offices, which though separate from a county itself, nevertheless, clearly performs governmental services on a local level. Davis v. Morrison, 344 Ga. App. 527, 810 S.E.2d 649 (2018).

Summary judgment was properly granted to the deputy as the deputy was not subject to liability for the automobile accident and the plaintiff's claims against the deputy were barred because the term "local government entity" included sheriffs' offices; any local government officer or employee who committed a tort involving the use of a covered motor vehicle while in the performance of the employee's official duties was not subject to lawsuit or liability; and the deputy was employed as a county sheriff's deputy and the deputy was driving a county-owned vehicle en route to the sheriff's office's evidence room where the deputy worked as an evidence custodian when the accident with the plaintiff occurred. Davis v. Morrison, 344 Ga. App. 527, 810 S.E.2d 649 (2018).

Cited in Hewell v. Walton County, 292 Ga. App. 510, 664 S.E.2d 875 (2008); Strength v. Lovett, 311 Ga. App. 35, 714 S.E.2d 723 (2011); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Johnson, 311 Ga. App. 867, 717 S.E.2d 272 (2011); City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 769 S.E.2d 320 (2015).