CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 23, 2009 | 286 Ga. 245, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3663
...as used in article on emission inspection and maintenance, "`[m]otor vehicle' means any contrivance propelled by power other than muscular power, used for transportation of persons or property on highways, and not operated exclusively upon tracks");
36-92-1 (6)(as used in chapter on local government entities, "`[m]otor vehicle' means any automobile, bus, motorcycle, truck, trailer, or semitrailer, including its equipment, and any other equipment permanently attached thereto, designed or licensed...
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 2, 2012 | 729 S.E.2d 361, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2152
...563 (716 SE2d 611) (2011), and posed this question: Whether the definition of “any motor vehicle” in OCGA §
33-24-51 (a) continues to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, 1 notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA §
36-92-1....
...and provided coverage of up to $1,000,000. The county asserted that by revising OCGA §
33-24-51 (b) in 2002, effective January 1, 2005, the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of “motor vehicle” found in OCGA §
36-92-1 (6)5 in determining whether a local *352government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that the.county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog can be deemed a “motor vehicle” under OCGA §
36-92-1....
...re, the county waived sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance policies providing coverage for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. 6 We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and affirm its judgment.
An examination of OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq., as well as the earlier and revised versions of OCGA §
33-24-51 (a) and (b), demonstrates an intent on the part of the legislature to create a two-tier scheme within which local governments are deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with regard to accidents arising from the operation of their motor vehicles. The first tier, established under OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq., requires local entities to waive sovereign immunity — up to certain prescribed limits — for incidents involving motor vehicles regardless of whether they procure automobile liability insurance.7 The second tier, enacted by OCG...
...exceeding the *353limits prescribed in OCGA §
36-92-2. It follows that, where, as here, a local entity purchases automobile liability insurance in an amount greater than the prescribed limits set forth for a waiver of sovereign immunity under OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq., the entity waives sovereign immunity to the extent of its insurance coverage as required by OCGA §
33-24-51 (b) — and the broad definition of “any motor vehicle” set forth in OCGA §
33-24-51 applies. That is because, as the Court of Appeals observed,8 in enacting OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq., the legislature expressly defined terms, including the definition of “motor vehicle,” which were to be....
...ailer, including its equipment, and any other equipment permanently *352attached therto, designed or licensed for use on the public streets, roads, and highways of the state.” This definition applies to terms “used in this chapter,” i.e., OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq.
The parties disagree as to whether the county’s policies provide that coverage....
...ctions brought in the courts of this state! This chapter shall not be construed to affect any claim or cause of action otherwise permitted hy law and for which the defense of sovereign immunity is not available.
Glass.v. Gates, supra at 572.
OCGA§
36-92-1.
OCGA §
36-92-2 (b).
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 11, 2023
...sheriff]. She claimed that the incident arose from the
deputies’ negligent use of a motor vehicle, as
contemplated by OCGA §
36-92-2, and that the patrol car
was a “covered vehicle,” as that phrase is used in OCGA
§§
33-24-51;
36-92-1; and
36-92-2....
...Scarbrough was a member of an Interlocal Risk Management Agency; that a
policy of automobile insurance covering the sheriff and his deputies was in full
force and effect; and that the patrol car was a “covered motor vehicle” as that
phrase is used in OCGA §§
33-24-51,
36-92-1 and
36-92-2....
...4 We do not address whether the patrol car at issue is a “covered motor
vehicle” as required by OCGA §
36-92-2 (a) (emphasis supplied). Scarbrough
has admitted that the patrol car was a covered motor vehicle as that phrase is
used in OCGA §§
33-24-51,
36-92-1, and
36-92-2.
12
narrowly to avoid a waiver of sovereign immunity....
...set financial limits on the extent of the waiver for losses “arising out
of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.” Neither
provision defines the word “use,” nor is the word defined elsewhere
in Chapter 92 of Title 36. See OCGA §
36-92-1 (definitions).
In ascertaining the ordinary meaning of a word that is not
defined in a statute, it is often helpful to consult dictionaries that
were in use when the statutes were enacted....
...determinant of meaning.” (Citation omitted.) State v. SASS Group,
315 Ga. 893, 898-899 (2) (a) (885 SE2d 761) (2023). Nevertheless,
they do provide a useful starting point.
Code Section
33-24-51 was enacted in 1960 and amended in
1985 and 2002.5 Code Section
36-92-1 was enacted in 2002.6 From
1960 through 2002, the meaning of the word “use” has remained
constant....
...at 900 (2) (b) (“When we determine the
meaning of a particular word or phrase in a constitutional provision
9 See footnote 3.
17
or statute, we consider text in context, not in isolation.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). See also OCGA §
36-92-1 (definitions).
Scarbrough, however, has not identified any statutory text that
supports a construction excluding any “use” beyond active
transportation, and we see nothing in the chapter that suggests that
“use” has a qualified or narrower meaning than its ordinary
meaning. For example, a “covered” motor vehicle is defined as any
motor vehicle owned, leased, or rented by the local government
entity. See OCGA §
36-92-1 (2) (A), (B)....
...“‘Motor vehicle’ means any
automobile, bus, motorcycle, truck, trailer, or semitrailer, including
its equipment, and any other equipment permanently attached
thereto, designed or licensed for use on the public streets, roads, and
highways of the state.” OCGA §
36-92-1 (6)....
...“claim” is defined in the chapter as “any demand against a local government
entity for money for a loss caused by negligence of a local government entity,
officer, or employee using a covered motor vehicle while carrying out his or her
official duties or employment.” OCGA §
36-92-1 (1)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 15, 2022
...ion, purchased commercial
liability insurance in excess of $700,000 that covers the claim at
issue.8
8 We have described the statutory scheme established by the 2002 law
as having two tiers:
The first tier, established under OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq., requires
local entities to waive sovereign immunity — up to certain
prescribed limits — for incidents involving motor vehicles
regardless of whether they procure automobile liability insurance.
The...
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2020 | 310 Ga. 114
...the county, is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his deputies.
Id. at 816-818.8
8 This last statement by the majority, while amply supported by Court
of Appeals’ precedent, creates significant confusion when read in conjunction
with OCGA §§
36-92-1 to
36-92-5, which regulate claims (like Mendez’s claim)
for the negligent use of a “covered motor vehicle” (a vehicle owned, leased, or
rented by a “local government entity”)....
...defined as “any county, municipal corporation, or consolidated city-county
government of this state[,]” and “local government officer or employee” was
defined as “[a]n officer, agent, servant, attorney, or employee of a local
government entity.” Former OCGA §
36-92-1 (3), (4). In Davis, the Court of
Appeals – relying on this Court’s statements equating sheriffs and counties in
Gilbert – interpreted former §
36-92-1 (3)’s definition of “local government
entity” to include sheriff’s offices, even though they were not expressly
defined as such, and held that the plaintiff’s negligence claims against the
sheriff’s deputy in that case were bar...
...so the statute
App. at 530-531. The Court of Appeals followed that holding in Division 1 of
its opinion in this case. See Moats,
349 Ga. App. at 813-814.
In May 2019, shortly after the decision in Moats, the General Assembly
amended OCGA §
36-92-1 (4) to expressly include “[a] sheriff, deputy sheriff,
or other agent, servant, or employee of a sheriff’s office” in the definition of
“local government officer or employee.” See Ga. L. 2019, p. 781, § 1 (codified
as OCGA §
36-92-1 (4) (B))....
...Through a series of actions by the General Assembly to
amend our Code provisions regarding such claims, and our appellate
courts’ attempts to elucidate and harmonize them, we find ourselves
11 If the General Assembly clarifies OCGA §
36-11-1, it should also make
that statute consistent with the text of OCGA §§
36-92-1 to
36-92-5....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 16, 2011 | 289 Ga. 319, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1501
...has committed "an act for which the local government entity is liable under this chapter." The selected phrase is merely a description of when the government entity should replace the employee. If the government entity would not be liable under OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq., as where the employee committed the tort using an uncovered motor vehicle, then the government entity is not "liable under this chapter" and need not be substituted....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 17, 2024
...Clayton County and its Board of Commissioners, Collington failed
to submit timely notice of her claims to the Sheriff pursuant to
OCGA §
36-11-1.
In response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Collington
conceded that, because OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq. was amended after
the subject collision occurred,5 her claims against Deputy Curney in
his individual capacity were improper and should be dismissed. See
OCGA §
36-92-3 (a). Collington further asserted that the
amendments to OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq., as well as then-Presiding
Justice Nahmias’s concurrence in Mendez v....
...114, 124
(3) (a) (852 SE2d 816) (2020) (Nahmias, P. J., concurring), suggested
that Clayton County may be a proper party to be sued. Finally,
—————————————————————
5 The amendments to OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq....
...In vacating the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s
claims against Clayton County, the Court of Appeals noted that, in
responding to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the trial court,
Collington contended that Clayton County might be the proper party
to be sued if the 2019 amendments to OCGA §
36-92-1 et seq....
...against county officials, as well. See OCGA §
36-11-1.
The general rule articulated in Roberts also applies to official-
capacity claims filed against a county sheriff for losses arising from
the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. See OCGA §
36-92-1 et
18
seq....
...Additionally, local government entities —
including counties — are subject to liability for losses caused by the
“negligence of a local government entity officer or employee using a
covered motor vehicle while carrying out his or her official duties or
employment.” OCGA §
36-92-1 (1). And “[a] sheriff, deputy sheriff,
or other agent, servant, or employee of a sheriff’s office” is defined
as a “[l]ocal government officer or employee” for purposes of this
statute. OCGA §
36-92-1 (4) (B)....
...ted costs
arising out of losses caused by covered motor vehicles. See OCGA §
36-92-4 (a). And, here, the record reflects that Clayton County
owned the vehicle Deputy Curney was driving when the motor
vehicle accident at issue occurred. See OCGA §
36-92-1 (2) (A)
19
(providing that “[c]overed motor vehicle means: ....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 17, 2024
...o
Clayton County and its Board of Commissioners, Collington failed
to submit timely notice of her claims to the Sheriff pursuant to
OCGA §
36-11-1.
In response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Collington
conceded that, because OCGA §
36-92-1, et seq. was amended after
the subject collision occurred,5 her claims against Deputy Curney in
his individual capacity were improper and should be dismissed. See
OCGA §
36-92-3 (a). Collington further asserted that the
amendments to OCGA §
36-92-1, et seq., as well as then-Presiding
—————————————————————
government officer or employee is individually named for an act
for which the local government entity is liable under this chapter,
the local government entity for which the local government officer
or employee was acting shall be substituted as the party
defendant.
OCGA §
36-92-3 (a) and (b).
5 The amendments to OCGA §
36-92-1, et seq....
...In vacating the trial court’s dismissal of Collington’s
claims against Clayton County, the Court of Appeals noted that, in
responding to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the trial court,
Collington contended that Clayton County might be the proper party
to be sued if the 2019 amendments to OCGA §
36-92-1, et seq., were
applicable in the present case....
...official capacity claims against county officials, as well. See OCGA
§
36-11-1.
The general rule articulated in Roberts also applies to official-
capacity claims filed against a county sheriff for losses arising from
the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. See OCGA §
36-92-1,
et seq....
...Additionally, local government entities—
including counties—are subject to liability for losses caused by the
“negligence of a local government entity officer or employee using a
covered motor vehicle while carrying out his or her official duties or
employment.” OCGA §
36-92-1 (a). And “[a] sheriff, deputy sheriff,
or other agent, servant, or employee of a sheriff’s office” is defined
as a “[l]ocal government officer or employee” for purposes of this
statute. OCGA §
36-92-1 (4) (B)....
...d costs
arising out of losses caused by covered motor vehicles. See OCGA §
36-92-4 (a). And, here, the record reflects that Clayton County
owned the vehicle Deputy Curney was driving when the motor
vehicle accident at issue occurred. See OCGA §
36-92-1 (2) (A)
(providing that “[c]overed motor vehicle means: ....
