Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 37-3-21 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 37 MENTAL HEALTH

Section 3. Examination, Treatment, etc., for Mental Illness, 37-3-1 through 37-3-168.

ARTICLE 2 HOSPITALIZATION AND TREATMENT OF VOLUNTARY PATIENTS

37-3-21. Discharge of voluntary patients upon recovery or termination of need for hospitalization; notice of discharge.

  1. The chief medical officer of the facility shall discharge any voluntary patient who has recovered from his mental illness or who has sufficiently improved that the chief medical officer determines, after consideration of the recommendations of the treatment team, that hospitalization of the patient is no longer necessary, provided that in no event shall any such patient be so discharged if, in the judgment of the chief medical officer of such facility, such discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others.The chief medical officer may designate in writing a physician or psychologist, who may be the attending physician or treating psychologist, to make these discharge decisions.If the decision of the designee is contrary to the recommendations of the treatment team or of a physician or psychologist member of the treatment team, the issue must go to the chief medical officer for final determination.Where there is concurrence, the decision of the designee will be final.
  2. Notice of discharge of patients who have been transferred from involuntary to voluntary status shall be given pursuant to Code Section 37-3-24.

(Ga. L. 1874, p. 91, § 1; Code 1882, § 1344a; Ga. L. 1884-85, p. 61, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 1416; Civil Code 1910, § 1578; Ga. L. 1931, p. 7, § 41; Code 1933, § 35-206; Ga. L. 1952, p. 94, § 2; Ga. L. 1958, p. 697, § 3; Ga. L. 1960, p. 837, § 3; Code 1933, § 88-503, enacted by Ga. L. 1964, p. 499, § 1; Code 1933, § 88-503.2, enacted by Ga. L. 1969, p. 505, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1789, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1059, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1902, § 2.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Primary treating physician acting as chief medical officer.

- It is reasonable to permit a primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of the discharge of his or her patients. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Peeks, 261 Ga. 96, 403 S.E.2d 36 (1991).

When a hospital's chief medical officer appointed a patient's primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of discharging a patient, the officer's failure to make the appointment in writing did not vitiate the appointment. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Peeks, 261 Ga. 96, 403 S.E.2d 36 (1991).

Section inapplicable to discharge of outpatient.

- O.C.G.A. § 37-3-21 applies to inpatients and did not require a chief medical officer to examine an outpatient prior to the patient's discharge from a facility. Ward v. Emanuel County Bd. of Health, 218 Ga. App. 382, 461 S.E.2d 559 (1995).

Section inapplicable to release on pass.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 37-3-21 and37-3-22 did not apply in a negligence action against a hospital based on the hospital's release on a 24-hour pass of a patient who subsequently murdered the patient's mother. Board of Regents v. Riddle, 229 Ga. App. 15, 493 S.E.2d 208 (1997).

Cited in J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Liability of one releasing institutionalized mental patient for harm he causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 37-3-21

Total Results: 1  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Peeks, 403 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 7, 1991 | 261 Ga. 96

...Several provisions of Chapter 3 of Title 37 are relevant to this case. [1] Under OCGA § 37-3-4, Dr. Patel is entitled to immunity in this civil action if he acted in good faith compliance with the discharge provisions of Chapter 3 of Title 37. OCGA § 37-3-21 provides that the chief medical officer of a state hospital may discharge voluntary patients under certain conditions....
...Siedlecki's *37 conduct was consistent with a policy of the hospital to allow a primary treating physician to discharge his or her patients. The Court of Appeals found a question of fact whether Dr. Patel acted in good faith with the discharge provisions of § 37-3-21, first, because Dr. Patel did not appoint Dr. Siedlecki in writing to act as chief medical officer for purposes of discharging Crawford, and, second, because the Court of Appeals interpreted § 37-3-21 to preclude a primary treating physician such as Dr....
...Patel acted in good faith compliance with the discharge provisions of Chapter 3 of Title 37. 1. First, we address whether a primary treating physician may act as a chief medical officer for purposes of discharging a patient. The Court of Appeals interpreted § 37-3-21 to require "an administrative determination that [a patient's] discharge would be safe for the public as well as the patient." Peeks, supra, 196 Ga.App. at 565. The Court thus interpreted § 37-3-21 as precluding the chief medical officer from appointing a patient's primary treating physician to make that patient's discharge determination. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' interpretation. No provision in Chapter 3 of Title 37 expressly prevents a treating physician from acting as chief medical officer for purposes of discharging his or her patients. In fact, § 37-3-21, read in pari materia with § 37-3-1(1), permits such a designation....
...patient's primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of discharging a patient. Moreover, as a primary treating physician would be the best qualified physician at a hospital to make the discharge determination required by § 37-3-21, we conclude it is reasonable to permit a primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of the discharge of his or her patients....