O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 37-3-21 (2019)

Discharge of voluntary patients upon recovery or termination of need for hospitalization; notice of discharge

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) The chief medical officer of the facility shall discharge any voluntary patient who has recovered from his mental illness or who has sufficiently improved that the chief medical officer determines, after consideration of the recommendations of the treatment team, that hospitalization of the patient is no longer necessary, provided that in no event shall any such patient be so discharged if, in the judgment of the chief medical officer of such facility, such discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others. The chief medical officer may designate in writing a physician or psychologist, who may be the attending physician or treating psychologist, to make these discharge decisions. If the decision of the designee is contrary to the recommendations of the treatment team or of a physician or psychologist member of the treatment team, the issue must go to the chief medical officer for final determination. Where there is concurrence, the decision of the designee will be final. (b) Notice of discharge of patients who have been transferred from involuntary to voluntary status shall be given pursuant to Code Section

History

Ga. L. 1874, p. 91, § 1; Code 1882, § 1344a; Ga. L. 1884-85, p. 61, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 1416; Civil Code 1910,

§ 1578; Ga. L. 1931, p. 7, § 41; Code 1933, § 35-206; Ga. L. 1952, p. 94, § 2; Ga. L. 1958, p. 697, § 3; Ga. L. 1960, p. 837, § 3;

Code 1933, § 88-503, enacted by Ga. L. 1964, p. 499, § 1; Code 1933, § 88-503.2, enacted by Ga. L. 1969, p. 505, § 1; Ga. L.

1978, p. 1789, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1059, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1902, § 2.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Primary treating physician acting as chief medical officer. - It is reasonable to permit a primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of the discharge of his or her patients. Georgia Dep’t of Human Resources v. Peeks, 261 Ga. 96, 403 S.E.2d 36 (1991). When a hospital’s chief medical officer appointed a patient’s primary treating physician to act as chief medical officer for purposes of discharging a patient, the officer’s failure to make the appointment in writing did not vitiate the appointment. Georgia Dep’t of Human Resources v. Peeks, 261 Ga. 96, 403 S.E.2d 36 (1991). Section inapplicable to discharge of outpatient. - O.C.G.A. § 37-3-21 ap-

plies to inpatients and did not require a chief medical officer to examine an outpatient prior to the patient’s discharge from a facility. Ward v. Emanuel County Bd. of Health, 218 Ga. App. 382, 461 S.E.2d 559 (1995). Section inapplicable to release on pass. - O.C.G.A. §§ 37-3-21 and 37-3-22 did not apply in a negligence action against a hospital based on the hospital’s release on a 24-hour pass of a patient who subsequently murdered the patient’s mother. Board of Regents v. Riddle, 229 Ga. App. 15, 493 S.E.2d 208 (1997). Cited in J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Liability of one releasing institutionalized mental patient for harm he causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 7 cases, 1990–2019 · leading case: Purcell v. Breese, 552 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).

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Purcell v. Breese, 552 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 8× “Pursuant to OCGA § 37-3-21 (a), no voluntary patient shall be discharged if, in the judgment of the chief medical officer of the facility, such discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others.”

Etheridge v. Charter Peachford Hosp., Inc., 436 S.E.2d 669 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 19× “) Thus, appellant’s contention that she was entitled to have the child discharged within three days or on her request is contrary to law.”

Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Peeks, 403 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 37-3-21 provides that the chief medical officer of a state hospital may discharge voluntary patients under certain conditions.”

Ward v. Emanuel Cnty. Bd. of Health, 461 S.E.2d 559 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 4× “Held: Appellant contends OCGA § 37-3-21 (a) placed a duty on appellee Crouch to examine Tommie Ward prior to discharging him from Ogeechee.”

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. v. Riddle, 493 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4× “” Riddle argues that the hospital employees violated OCGA §§ 37-3-21 and 37-3-22 in releasing Newsome and therefore the question of their good faith, and thus their entitlement to immunity under OCGA § 37-3-4, is a jury issue.”

Peeks v. Dep't of Human Resources, 396 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 7× “As chief medical officer of the hospital, he had a direct statutory responsibility to oversee the patient’s discharge pursuant to OCGA § 37-3-21, which specifies that “in no event shall any such patient be .”

Fulton-dekalb Hosp. Auth. Et Al. v. Hickson., 830 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). “In fact, [OCGA] § 37-3-21, read in pari materia with [OCGA] § 37-3-1 (1), permits such a designation.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.