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Call Now: 904-383-7448Any hospital or any physician, psychologist, peace officer, attorney, or health official, or any hospital official, agent, or other person employed by a private hospital or at a facility operated by the state, by a political subdivision of the state, or by a hospital authority created pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 7 of Title 31, who acts in good faith in compliance with the admission and discharge provisions of this chapter shall be immune from civil or criminal liability for his or her actions in connection with the admission of a patient to a facility or the discharge of a patient from a facility; provided, however, that nothing in this Code section shall be construed to relieve any hospital or any physician, psychologist, peace officer, attorney, or health official, or any hospital official, agent, or other person employed by a private hospital or at a facility operated by the state, by a political subdivision of the state, or by a hospital authority created pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 7 of Title 31, from liability for failing to meet the applicable standard of care in the provision of treatment to a patient.
(Code 1933, § 88-502.18, enacted by Ga. L. 1969, p. 505, § 1; Code 1933, § 88-502.23, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 1789, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 996, § 3; Ga. L. 2011, p. 346, § 2/HB 343.)
The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, inserted "hospital or any" near the beginning, inserted "or her", near the middle, and added the proviso at the end.
- Liability of law enforcement officers for actions taken at scene of emergency, § 35-1-7.
Employment and training of peace officers, T. 35, C. 8.
Physicians generally, T. 43, C. 34.
Psychologists generally, T. 43, C. 39.
- For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 339 (2010).
- O.C.G.A. § 37-3-4 was inapplicable in an action involving a facility entitled to sovereign immunity since enactment of the Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., eliminated any other avenue for pursuing the state in a tort action. Northwest Ga. Regional Hosp. v. Wilkins, 220 Ga. App. 534, 469 S.E.2d 786 (1996).
- Trial court erred in construing Count II of the Third Complaint as a medical malpractice claim as the failure to comply with statutory notification and discharge requirements, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 37-3-4,37-3-24, and37-3-95, did not involve the exercise of professional judgment or the care or treatment of the patient and, thus, that count was not subject to the medical malpractice statute of repose or the expert affidavit statute. Curles v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 343 Ga. App. 719, 808 S.E.2d 237 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0519, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 181 (Ga. 2018); cert. denied, No. S18C0520, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 182 (Ga. 2018).
- When the treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of "control" over the patient by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others, an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient. Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982).
- Doctor did not act in good faith compliance with the admission and discharge provisions by failing to detain suicidal son against the son's will when the doctor knew or should have known that the son posed a serious threat to himself. Purcell v. Breese, 250 Ga. App. 472, 552 S.E.2d 865 (2001).
- Trial court did not err in denying a psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment in a patient's medical malpractice action because whether the psychiatrist breached duties arising from the psychiatrist-patient relationship was an issue of fact; under O.C.G.A. §§ 37-3-4 and51-1-27, the psychiatrist could be held liable if the treatment of the patient fell below the requisite standard of care, and that failure proximately caused the patient's injury. Peterson v. Reeves, 315 Ga. App. 370, 727 S.E.2d 171 (2012).
Cited in Roberts v. Grigsby, 177 Ga. App. 377, 339 S.E.2d 633 (1985).
This Code section evidences a legislative intent to shield peace officers from liability in those situations where their action is taken in good faith and where there are reasonable grounds to believe: (1) that the individual arrested was suffering from mental illness; and (2) that imminent danger existed (a) that the individual would harm oneself or others if not immediately hospitalized, or (b) that one was incapable of caring for one's physical health and safety. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-49 (see O.C.G.A. § 37-3-4).
This Code section evidences an intent to immunize those actions of a peace officer which are authorized by statute in a nonnegligent manner. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-49 (see O.C.G.A. § 37-3-4).
- Liability for malicious prosecution predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 455.
Liability for false imprisonment predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 523.
Liability of one releasing institutionalized mental patient for harm he causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699.
Liability of mental care facility for suicide of patient or former patient, 19 A.L.R.4th 7.
Malpractice liability based on prior treatment of mental disorder alleged to relate to patient's conviction of crime, 28 A.L.R.4th 712.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1991-03-07
Citation: 403 S.E.2d 36, 261 Ga. 96, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 119
Snippet: Title 37 are relevant to this case.[1] Under OCGA § 37-3-4, Dr. Patel is entitled to immunity in this civil
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1899-07-25
Citation: 108 Ga. 384, 34 S.E. 2, 1899 Ga. LEXIS 262
Snippet: v. State, 95 Ga. 468; Carroll v. State, 99 Ga. 37. 3, 4. The law gave Taylor the right to make a statement