O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 38-3-62 (2019)

Suspension or tolling of deadlines and time schedules in event of judicial emergency; statutory speedy trial requirements defined

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) An authorized judicial official in an order declaring a judicial emergency, or in an order modifying or extending a judicial emergency order, is authorized to suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from deadlines or other time schedules or filing requirements imposed by otherwise applicable statutes, rules, regulations, or court orders, whether in civil or criminal cases or administrative matters, including, but not limited to:

(1) A statute of limitation;

(2) The time within which to issue a warrant;

(3) The time within which to try a case for which a demand for speedy trial has been filed;

(4) The time within which to hold a commitment hearing;

(5) A deadline or other schedule regarding the detention of a juvenile;

(6) The time within which to return a bill of indictment or an accusation or to bring a matter before a grand jury;

(7) The time within which to file a writ of habeas corpus;

(8) The time within which discovery or any aspect thereof is to be completed;

(9) The time within which to serve a party;

(10) The time within which to appeal or to seek the right to appeal any order, ruling, or other determination; and

(11) Such other legal proceedings as determined to be necessary by the authorized judicial official.

(b)(1) As used in this subsection, the term ‘‘statutory speedy trial requirements’’ means all speedy trial deadlines, time schedules, or filing requirements imposed by Code Section 17-7-170 or 17-7-171.

(2)(A) A chief judge of a Georgia superior court judicial circuit or a chief judge of a Georgia state court may suspend, toll, extend, modify, or otherwise grant relief from statutory speedy trial requirements following a judicial emergency if compliance with such requirements is impracticable, subject to the requirements under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.

(B) Relief under this subsection shall be authorized if a chief judge certifies that under the totality of the circumstances arising from the preceding judicial emergency, compliance with statutory speedy trial requirements is impracticable in the applicable county or court following a judicial emergency due to the following factors:

(i) A pending criminal case volume that is substantially above the average pending criminal case volume at the end of each of the three full calendar years preceding the judicial emergency;

(ii) An annualized criminal case clearance rate in the current calendar year that is substantially below the average criminal case clearance rate for each of the three full calendar years preceding the judicial emergency;

(iii) The number of speedy trial demands pending within one month of the date of certification;

(iv) The number of jury trials held during the last full term of court;

(v) Ongoing space limitations or other health or safety concerns regarding the use of the facilities available to conduct criminal trials and related activities;

(vi) The limited availability of judges, courtroom personnel, prosecutors, public defenders, expert witnesses, forensic analysis, law enforcement officers, or other relevant persons;

(vii) The extent of efforts made by prosecuting attorneys and the court to reduce the number of criminal defendants held in custody awaiting trial; and

(viii) Other relevant facts that justify ongoing relief from statutory speedy trial requirements, if any.

(3) An order granting relief under this subsection shall be accompanied by a certification that compliance with statutory speedy trial requirements is impracticable in the applicable county or court. Each time a chief judge issues an order granting relief under this subsection, he or she shall:

(A) Certify that compliance with statutory speedy trial requirements is impracticable in the applicable county or court; or

(B) Attach such certification provided by either:

(i) A majority of the superior court judges in his or her judicial circuit pursuant to paragraph (6) of this subsection; or

(ii) A majority of the state court judges in his or her county pursuant to paragraph (8) of this subsection.

(4) Each certification issued pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection shall include the following:

MILITARY, EMERG. & VET. AFFAIRS

(A) Supporting statistical data and findings of fact to justify relief under paragraph (2) of this subsection; and

(B) A plan to resolve cases in which a statutory speedy trial demand has been filed as expeditiously as possible. The plan shall establish an order of priority in which such cases will be called for trial, giving highest priority to such cases of defendants who have been held in custody for the longest time as a result of the charges in the case. The plan shall also state the number of trial weeks scheduled for each judge in the applicable county or court during the period of relief granted under this subsection.

(5) A chief judge of a superior court judicial circuit acting under this subsection:

(A) May act independently of any emergency declared by the Governor;

(B) May grant relief from statutory speedy trial requirements in a superior court for a county in his or her judicial circuit;

(D) Shall act upon the request of a majority of the active superior court judges in his or her judicial circuit pursuant to paragraph (6) of this subsection.

(6) A chief judge of a superior court judicial circuit shall grant relief from speedy trial requirements in a superior court for a county in his or her judicial circuit if such action is requested by a majority of the active superior court judges in his or her judicial circuit. Any such request shall be in writing and be accompanied by the certification required in paragraph (3) of this subsection.

(7) A chief judge of a state court acting under this subsection:

(A) May act independently of any emergency declared by the Governor;

(B) May grant relief from statutory speedy trial requirements in his or her state court;

(D) Shall act upon the request of a majority of the active state court judges in his or her county pursuant to paragraph (8) of this subsection.

(8) A chief judge of a state court shall grant relief from speedy trial requirements in his or her state court if such action is requested by a majority of the active state court judges in his or her county. Any such request shall be in writing and be accompanied by the certification required in paragraph (3) of this subsection.

(9) Each period of relief granted under this subsection:

(A) Shall not exceed a total of eight months; and

(B) Shall end on the last day of a term of court.

(10) Each time a chief judge issues an order granting relief under this subsection, he or she shall provide notice of such action to judicial officials and the public in the same manner provided in Code Section 38-3-63, except that such notice shall also include the certification required under paragraph (3) of this subsection.

(11) The Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court may, by order and in his or her sole discretion, reinstate any statutory speedy trial requirement subject to an order granting relief under this subsection. The Chief Justice shall provide notice of such action to judicial officials and the public in the same manner provided in Code Section

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 24 cases (20 in the last 5 years), 2018–2026 · leading case: Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Mgmt., Inc, 904 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2024).

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Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Mgmt., Inc, 904 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2024). · cites it 90× “In response to the pandemic, former Chief Justice Melton issued the March 14 Order, citing as the basis of his authority, OCGA § 38-3-62. As pertinent here, the March 14 Order provided: Pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-62, during the period of this Order, the undersigned hereby suspends,…”

Garrison v. State, 905 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. 2024). · cites it 8× “OCGA § 38-3-62. Given this background, orders issued under the Judicial Emergency Act do not resemble either a tolling exception similar to those under OCGA §§ 17-3-2 to 17-3-2.”

Smith v. Smith, 829 S.E.2d 886 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 4× “ng that Smith was not entitled to any relief from the protective order, the superior court revealed its rationale by reciting the following: 3 Due to inclement weather, the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Cobb County issued an Order/Declaration of Judicial Emergency…”

Vendrel v. State, 897 S.E.2d 751 (Ga. 2024). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 38-3-62 (a) (10). Pursuant to the Chief Justice’s July 10, 2020 Fourth Order Extending Declaration of Statewide Judicial Emergency, such deadlines were reimposed effective July 14, 2020.”

Mobuary v. State, 312 Ga. 337 (Ga. 2021). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 38-3-62 (a) (10). Pursuant to the Chief Justice’s July 10, 2020 Fourth Order Extending Declaration of Statewide Judicial Emergency, such deadlines were reimposed effective July 14, 2020.”

Jami Lynn Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. d/b/a Floyd Med. Ctr. (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 16× “OCGA § 38-3-62 (a) (1) provides that [a]n authorized judicial official in an order declaring a judicial emergency, or in an order modifying or extending a judicial emergency order, is authorized to suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from deadlines or other time…”

John Timothy Copeland, Sr. v. Jennifer Copeland (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 6× “3 Nevertheless, he requested that the 30-day hearing deadline on ex parte petitions set out in OCGA § 19-13-3 (c) be reinstated and that the court conduct 3 On March 14, 2020, pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-62 and citing the public health emergency presented by the COVID-19 pandemic,…”

Arco design/build, LLC v. Savannah Green I Owner, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 6× “The Chief Justice also issued the following directive: Pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-62, during the period of this Order, the undersigned hereby suspends, tolls, extends, and otherwise grants relief from any deadlines or other time schedules or filing requirements imposed by otherwise…”

Prince v. Rawls., 816 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 4× “" 4 Further, under OCGA § 38-3-62, the judicial emergency order may provide for the suspension or tolling of filing deadlines to account for the restricted access to the court during regular business hours.”

Jonathan Eric Smith v. Jennifer Michelle Smith (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 4× “, and the trial court ruled on that argument,” the issue was “raised and ruled on in the court below, [such that] we may consider this claim 3 Due to inclement weather, the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Cobb County issued an Order/Declaration of Judicial Emergency…”

Autumn Leggat v. Navicent Health, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 4× “Before this suit began, [o]n March 14, 2020, pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-62 and citing the public health emergency presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, Supreme Court of Georgia Chief Justice Harold Melton issued an order declaring a statewide judicial emergency.”

Harper v. State (Ga. 2021). · cites it 2× “” See OCGA § 38-3-62 (10). Appellant’s notice of appeal, which was filed on April 13, 2020, was therefore timely.”

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