O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 4-3-3 (2019)

Permitting livestock to run at large or stray

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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No owner shall permit livestock to run at large on or to stray upon the public roads of this state or any property not belonging to the owner of the livestock, except by permission of the owner of such property.

History

(Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 380, § 3; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 395, § 4.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Cruelty to animals, § 16-12-4.

Law reviews. - For survey article on torts, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS going upon the lands of others, including a railroad right-of-way, are trespassers, and the duty owed them by the landowner or the railroad company is not willfully or wantonly to injure them. Tennessee, Ala. & Ga. Ry. v. Andrews, 117 Ga. App. 164, 159 S.E.2d 460 (1968). Testimony as to defendant’s care in maintaining his pasture fence does not demand a verdict in his favor. Green v. Heard Milling Co., 119 Ga. App. 116, 166 S.E.2d 408 (1969). No evidence of owners’ negligence. - There was no evidence of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 4-3-3, and summary judgment for owners was proper in a driver’s claim arising out of an accident in which the driver struck a cow because, inter alia, the evidence showed that the fencing surrounding the pasture where the cows were kept was in good repair and the gates were closed at the time of the driver’s accident; evidence was presented that the fencing was sufficient to confine the cattle, that the owners monitored the fences regularly, and that, after leaving the scene of the accident, one of the owners confirmed that all of the gates were closed and that the fences remained in good condition. The driver did not present any admissible evidence to challenge these claims and accordingly there was no evidence of negligence committed by the owners, but only impermissible speculation. West v. West, 299 Ga. App. 643, 683 S.E.2d 153 (2009). Charging that violation of section is negligence per se. - Charging jury to the effect that a violation of this section is negligence per se was reversible error. Lovell v. Howard, 182 Ga. App. 891, 357 S.E.2d 600 (1987). Cited in Law v. Hulsey, 109 Ga. App. 379, 136 S.E.2d 161 (1964); Jackson v. State, 120 Ga. App. 417, 170 S.E.2d 751 (1969); Binford v. Bush, 125 Ga. App. 704, 188 S.E.2d 883 (1972); Caldwell v. Hunnicutt, 159 Ga. App. 102, 282 S.E.2d 665 (1981); Johns v. Marlow, 252 Ga. App. 79, 555 S.E.2d 756 (2001).

Inference of owner’s negligence from livestock running at large. - The mere fact that livestock is running at large permits an inference that the owner is negligent in permitting the livestock to stray; but when the owner introduces evidence that he has exercised ordinary care in the maintenance of the stock, that permissible inference disappears. Green v. Heard Milling Co., 119 Ga. App. 116, 166 S.E.2d 408 (1969); Wilkins v. Beverly, 124 Ga. App. 842, 186 S.E.2d 436 (1971). O.C.G.A. § 4-3-3 is not a penal statute. - Appellate court held that O.C.G.A. § 4-3-3 was not a penal statute and it reversed the trial court’s judgment convicting defendant and defendant’s spouse of violating that statute. Cotton v. State, 263 Ga. App. 843, 589 S.E.2d 610 (2003). Owner of a pasture who allowed her son to keep his horse in the pasture was not an ‘‘owner’’ of the horse as that term is defined in O.C.G.A. § 4-3-2(2) and, therefore, under no obligation to prevent the horse from escaping. Supchak v. Pruitt, 232 Ga. App. 680, 503 S.E.2d 581 (1998). Evidence of ownership required. - Grant of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff ’s claim for damages after his car hit a cow was proper because plaintiff failed to show that defendant owned the cow. Taylor v. Thompkins, 242 Ga. App. 789, 531 S.E.2d 360 (2000). Negligence per se. - Where an owner through his negligence permits his livestock to stray or run at large upon the public highways of this state, he is not guilty of negligence per se. Porier v. Spivey, 97 Ga. App. 209, 102 S.E.2d 706 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 62-601). Liability for injury to livestock running at large. - Livestock running at large on a public road are trespassers, and a motorist is liable only for willful and wanton negligence in injuring the animal. Green v. Heard Milling Co., 119 Ga. App. 116, 166 S.E.2d 408 (1969). Since the abolition of the open range by adoption of this section, loose livestock

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Date: 06/14/13 Time: 10:43:52

GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Prohibition against free ranging of cattle. - The result of the prohibition of this section is the prohibiting of the free

ranging of cattle. 1960-61 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Animals, § 34 et seq. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms. - 1C Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Animals, § 68. C.J.S. - 3B C.J.S., Animals, §§ 263 et seq., 293, 295, 306, 313. ALR. - Liability of interurban railroad for killing or injuring livestock running at large, 2 ALR 98; 25 ALR 1506. Liability for trespass or damage by fowls, 14 ALR 745. Liability of agister to owner for damages from escape of animals, 23 ALR 265. Presumption and burden of proof in agistment cases, 23 ALR 276. Liability for injury to trespassing stock from poisonous substances or other conditions on the premises, 33 ALR 448. Scienter as condition of liability for damage by trespassing animals other than dogs, 33 ALR 1305. Rights and remedies as to chattels cast upon riparian land, 41 ALR 1015.

What constitutes willful trespass by stock on land not inclosed by legal fence, 158 ALR 375. Owner’s liability, under legislation forbidding domestic animals to run at large on highways, as dependent on negligence, 34 ALR2d 1285. Liability of person, other than owner of animal or owner or operator of motor vehicle, for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 21 ALR4th 132. Liability of owner or operator of vehicle for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 21 ALR4th 159. Liability of owner of animal for damage to motor vehicle or injury to person riding therein resulting from collision with domestic animal at large in street or highway, 29 ALR4th 431.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1987–2022 · leading case: Supchak v. Pruitt, 503 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
Supchak v. Pruitt, 503 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 4-3-3. Consequently, Ruth Pruitt and Boyce Pruitt Livestock & Feed could be liable for the damages incurred by the Supchaks only if they were owners of the horse involved in the collision.”
Eshleman v. Key, 774 S.E.2d 96 (Ga. 2015). · cites it 2× “, “Liability of Owner of Animal for Damage to Motor Vehicle or Injury to Person Riding Therein Resulting from Collision with Domestic Animal at Large in Street or Highway,” 29 ALR4th 431 § 4 [a] (1984); M.”
Pouncey v. Adams, 424 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Likewise, in arriving at a verdict, the jury from facts proved (in this instance from proof of the mere fact of the running at large of the animal beyond the owner’s property, such conduct being contrary to the duty established by OCGA § 4-3-3), may infer the existence of other…”
New Star Realty, Inc. v. Jungang Pri USA, LLC., 816 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “And, the negligence claim in Johns was predicated on a statute (OCGA § 4-3-3 ) that imposed a duty on owners to keep their livestock off of the public roads.”
West v. West, 683 S.E.2d 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 4-3-3 provides that no owner of livestock “shall permit livestock to run at large on or to stray upon the public roads of this state.”
Morris Et Al. v. Pope., 806 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 4-3-3 states that no owner of livestock shall permit livestock "to run at large on or to stray upon the public roads of this state.”
Johns v. Marlow, 555 S.E.2d 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 4-3-3 provides that “[n]o owner shall permit livestock to run at large on or to stray upon the public roads of this state.”
Lovell v. Howard, 357 S.E.2d 600 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “Appellants first enumerate as error the trial court’s jury instruction to the effect that a violation of OCGA § 4-3-3, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o owner shall permit livestock to .”
Evancho v. Baker, 397 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “Section 4-3-3 of the Georgia Code prohibits an “owner” from permitting livestock to run at large or to stray onto public roads.”
Taylor v. Thompkins, 531 S.E.2d 360 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “The evidence in the record shows that this case arose when Taylor struck a cow that was in the road, injuring himself and killing the cow.”
Hortman v. Guy, 529 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “” [OCGA § 4-3-3.] Tennessee, Ala. &c. R. Co.”
Cotton v. State, 589 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 14× “Contending the evidence was not sufficient to support their convictions and that the trial court erred by sentencing them pursuant to OCGA § 4-3-3, the Cottons assert several enumerations of error.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.