O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-11-1 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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As used in this article, the term: (1) ‘‘Abandoned motor vehicle’’ means a motor vehicle or trailer: (A) Which has been left by the owner or some person acting for the owner with an automobile dealer, repairman, or wrecker service for repair or for some other reason and has not been called for by such owner or other person within a period of 30 days after the time agreed upon; or within 30 days after such vehicle is turned over to such dealer, repairman, or wrecker service when no time is agreed upon; or within 30 days after the completion of necessary repairs;

(B) Which is left unattended on a public street, road, or highway or other public property for a period of at least five days and when it reasonably appears to a law enforcement officer that the individual who left such motor vehicle unattended does not intend to return and remove such motor vehicle. However, on the state highway system, any law enforcement officer may authorize the immediate removal of vehicles posing a threat to public health or safety or to mitigate congestion; (C) Which has been lawfully towed onto the property of another at the request of a law enforcement officer and left there for a period of not less than 30 days without anyone having paid all reasonable current charges for such towing and storage; (D) Which has been lawfully towed onto the property of another at the request of a property owner on whose property the vehicle was abandoned and left there for a period of not less than 30 days without anyone having paid all reasonable current charges for such towing and storage; or (E) Which has been left unattended on private property for a period of not less than 30 days. (2) ‘‘Motor vehicle’’ or ‘‘vehicle’’ means a motor vehicle or trailer. (3) ‘‘Owner’’ or ‘‘owners’’ means the registered owner, the owner as recorded on the title, lessor, lessee, security interest holders, and all lienholders as shown on the records of the Department of Revenue or the records from the vehicle’s state of registration.

History

(Ga. L. 1972, p. 342, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 253, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 995, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 469, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 548, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1265, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 370, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 7-1; Ga. L. 2002, p. 415, § 40; Ga. L. 2002, p. 563, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 21-1/HB 501; Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 40/HB 142; Ga. L. 2011, p. 777, § 1/HB 114.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 266 (2002). JUDICIAL DECISIONS Mobile home. - Abandoned Motor Vehicle Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-11-1 et seq., did not apply in an action for a writ of possession of a mobile home brought by a creditor against a towing service since the mobile home was not ‘‘abandoned’’ as outlined by O.C.G.A. § 40-11-1. Coweta County Impound & Storage, Inc. v. Secu-

rity Pacific Fin. Servs., 216 Ga. App. 664, 455 S.E.2d 370 (1995). Failure to provide notice. - Because an operator of a towing service provided no written notification to a lienholder as required by O.C.G.A. § 40-11-1 et seq., the operator forfeited any fees that the statute may have provided for towing and

storing. Purser Truck Sales, Inc. v. Horton, 276 Ga. App. 17, 622 S.E.2d 405 (2005). Notice not given for vehicle left at repair shop. - Trial court erred by conditioning a finance company’s writ of possession upon the payment of a repair company’s storage fees because the repair company failed to provide the notice required by the Abandoned Motor Vehicle Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-11-2(f ); thus, it was prevented from recovery of any storage fees. Further, the trial court erred by finding that the vehicle had not been abandoned since neither the finance com-

pany nor the title owner of the vehicle had called for the vehicle within 30 days after the vehicle was left with the repair company. Transworld Fin. Corp. v. Coastal Tire & Container Repair, LLC, 298 Ga. App. 286, 680 S.E.2d 143 (2009). Cited in Miller v. Self, 137 Ga. App. 717, 224 S.E.2d 823 (1976); Shaw v. Wheat St. Baptist Church, 141 Ga. App. 883, 234 S.E.2d 711 (1977); Atlanta Truck Serv., Inc. v. Associates Com. Corp., 146 Ga. App. 170, 246 S.E.2d 2 (1978); Walker v. Crane, 243 Ga. App. 838, 534 S.E.2d 520 (2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property,

§§ 3, 4. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 1, 2, 9.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases, 1988–2009 · leading case: Transworld Fin. Corp. v. Coastal Tire & Container Repair, LLC, 680 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
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Transworld Fin. Corp. v. Coastal Tire & Container Repair, LLC, 680 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 10× “Transworld appeals, arguing that Coastal Tire was not entitled to storage fees because it failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Aban *287 doned Motor Vehicle Act (the Act), OCGA § 40-11-1 et seq. We agree and reverse.”
Purser Truck Sales, Inc. v. Horton, 622 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 6× “1 OCGA§ 40-11-1 et seq. 2 OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq.”
Atl. Steel Credit Union v. Shephard, 419 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 10× “(Jenkins) pursuant to OCGA § 40-11-1 et seq. On appeal, ASCU contends that its right to foreclosure on and possession of the vehicle was not subject to the abandoned motor vehicle lien.”
Crider v. Zurich Ins., 474 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “1 (2) (Anti-motor Vehicle Hijacking Act); OCGA § 16-8-82 (2) (Motor Vehicle Chop Shop & Stolen & Altered Property Act); OCGA § 40-5-142 (19) (Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act); OCGA § 40-11-1 (2) (Abandoned Motor Vehicles Title); OCGA § 43-13-2 (4) (Driver Training School…”
Gearing v. Complete Wrecker Serv., Inc., 370 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 10× “Approximately three months later, when appellees had not been paid, they proceeded under OCGA § 40-11-1 et seq. to acquire and foreclose a lien on the truck as an abandoned vehicle.”
Mays v. Lampkin, 429 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 4× “” OCGA § 40-11-1 (l). 2 Here, Lampkin made repeated and timely claims to his vehicle.”
Green v. Sheppard (In Re Sheppard), 173 B.R. 799 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994). · cites it 2× “Pursuant to the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-11-1, et seq., A Wrecker Co.”
Walker v. Crane, 534 S.E.2d 520 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “Under OCGA § 40-11-1 (1) (A), both Gabriel and Crane believed in good faith that the men in possession of the truck and trailer either were the owners or had lawful possession and had left the vehicle on Gabriel’s property for 30 days without reclaiming it.”
Horner v. Robinson, 682 S.E.2d 578 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “Following Horner’s partial motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, the trial court held that Horner, through his company, failed to comply with the requisite notice provisions contained within the Abandoned Motor Vehicles Act, OCGA § 40-11-1 et seq., and ordered…”
Coweta Cnty. Impound & Storage, Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., 455 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 8× “In its first two enumerations of error, Coweta contends the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence that mobile homes are motor vehicles under the Abandoned Motor Vehicle Act (OCGA § 40-11-1 et seq.) and refusing to allow Coweta to assert its rights under *665 that…”
Danco Fin., Inc. v. Mauldin Body Shop, Inc., 677 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “2 Strictly construing the lien statute as we must, Mauldin’s failure to timely notify Danco of the abandoned vehicle resulted in a forfeiture of the fees that the abandoned motor vehicle statute might have provided.”
— 40-11-1(2) — 1 case
Crider v. Zurich Ins., 474 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “1 (2) (Anti-motor Vehicle Hijacking Act); OCGA § 16-8-82 (2) (Motor Vehicle Chop Shop & Stolen & Altered Property Act); OCGA § 40-5-142 (19) (Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act); OCGA § 40-11-1 (2) (Abandoned Motor Vehicles Title); OCGA § 43-13-2 (4) (Driver Training School…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.