Guilty plea under First Offender Act.

- Defendant's pleas of guilty to traffic offenses under the First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 et seq., were properly considered to be a final disposition under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-3 requiring reporting to the Department of Public Safety. Salomon v. Earp, 190 Ga. App. 405, 379 S.E.2d 217 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Pender v. Witcher, 196 Ga. App. 856, 397 S.E.2d 193 (1990).

Demand for speedy trial.

- Defendant's demand for a speedy trial upon receipt of a uniform traffic citation and complaint form was not premature since such a citation itself contains the accusation, the preferring of which is a prerequisite to a demand for speedy trial. Majia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 432, 330 S.E.2d 171, aff'd, 254 Ga. 660, 333 S.E.2d 834 (1985).

Filing accusation not commencement of new prosecution.

- Filing of an accusation in no way constituted commencement of a new prosecution and, therefore, the prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations. Davis v. State, 208 Ga. App. 845, 432 S.E.2d 229 (1993).

Validity of citation.

- That an indictment of a defendant was later necessary under O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-70(a) and40-13-3 did not destroy the validity of a formerly issued uniform traffic citation; the citation for felony vehicular homicide was not void, but expired and was superseded. State v. Perkins, 276 Ga. 621, 580 S.E.2d 523 (2003).

Commencement of prosecution.

- Indictment filed in superior court was not the "commencement" of a new prosecution against the defendant for statute of limitations purposes as the indictment was issued in the superior court after the defendant had the defendant's case involving misdemeanor traffic charges transferred from the county probate court to the superior court; rather, the Uniform Traffic Citation issued to the defendant on the day the alleged offenses occurred commenced the prosecution against the defendant, and, thus, the prosecution against the defendant was brought within the two-year limitations period applicable to the defendant's case. Bishop v. State, 261 Ga. App. 445, 582 S.E.2d 571 (2003).

Cited in Holland v. State, 151 Ga. App. 189, 259 S.E.2d 187 (1979); Stone v. State, 151 Ga. App. 531, 260 S.E.2d 405 (1979); Boss v. State, 152 Ga. App. 169, 262 S.E.2d 527 (1979); Collins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 651, 269 S.E.2d 509 (1980); McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 273 S.E.2d 847 (1981); Weaver v. State, 179 Ga. App. 641, 347 S.E.2d 295 (1986).

Section applies to recorders' court.

- Recorders' court, being a court with jurisdiction over traffic offenses, must comply with the reporting requirements of Ga. L. 1972, p. 1148, §§ 2 and 4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-3). 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-18.

First-offender treatment immaterial to administrative handling of report of conviction.

- Upon receipt of report of conviction, i.e., finding of guilt or entry of plea of guilty, or plea of nolo contendere, the Department of Public Safety should administratively handle the report as it would any other report of conviction notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was able to lessen any harsh criminal consequences of the defendant's actions by availing oneself of first offender treatment. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-64.

Nolo contendere plea.

- Once the Department of Public Safety is in receipt of a report of "an accepted plea of nolo contendere", the Department should administratively handle the nolo contendere plea as provided for in O.C.G.A. Ch. 5, T. 40 without regard to whether a fine was or was not imposed by the trial court. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-64.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 921 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 1504 et seq.