O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-13-3 (2019)

Traffic offenses triable on complaint without indictment except in superior courts; report of disposition

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Except for offenses tried in the superior courts, all other courts having jurisdiction of the offense may proceed with the adjudication of the offenses contained within the complaint without the necessity of filing an indictment or other accusation in order to bring the accused to trial. The judge or clerk of each court before whom a person accused of such an offense is brought shall promptly report the final disposition of the case to the Department of Driver Services. Notwithstanding the reporting requirements of this Code section, the Department of Driver Services may by rule or regulation relieve the judge or clerk of each such court of the responsibility of reporting those offenses which do not result in convictions or adjudications of guilt or pleas of nolo contendere.

History

(Ga. L. 1972, p. 1148, §§ 2, 4; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1118, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 29; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 7A-1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 22-2/HB 501.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Trial of misdemeanor motor vehicle violations upon ci-

tation, § 17-7-71. Trial upon citation in municipal court, § 36-32-10.2.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Guilty plea under First Offender Act. - Defendant’s pleas of guilty to traffic offenses under the First Offender Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 et seq., were properly considered to be a final disposition under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-3 requiring reporting to the Department of Public Safety. Salomon v. Earp, 190 Ga. App. 405, 379 S.E.2d 217 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Pender v. Witcher, 196 Ga. App. 856, 397 S.E.2d 193 (1990). Demand for speedy trial. - Defendant’s demand for a speedy trial upon receipt of a uniform traffic citation and complaint form was not premature since such a citation itself contains the accusation, the preferring of which is a prerequisite to a demand for speedy trial. Majia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 432, 330 S.E.2d 171, aff ’d, 254 Ga. 660, 333 S.E.2d 834 (1985). Filing accusation not commencement of new prosecution. - Filing of an accusation in no way constituted commencement of a new prosecution and, therefore, the prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations. Davis v. State, 208 Ga. App. 845, 432 S.E.2d 229 (1993). Validity of citation. - That an indictment of a defendant was later necessary under O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-70(a) and 40-13-3 did not destroy the validity of a formerly

issued uniform traffic citation; the citation for felony vehicular homicide was not void, but expired and was superseded. State v. Perkins, 276 Ga. 621, 580 S.E.2d 523 (2003). Commencement of prosecution. - Indictment filed in superior court was not the ‘‘commencement’’ of a new prosecution against the defendant for statute of limitations purposes as the indictment was issued in the superior court after the defendant had the defendant’s case involving misdemeanor traffic charges transferred from the county probate court to the superior court; rather, the Uniform Traffic Citation issued to the defendant on the day the alleged offenses occurred commenced the prosecution against the defendant, and, thus, the prosecution against the defendant was brought within the two-year limitations period applicable to the defendant’s case. Bishop v. State, 261 Ga. App. 445, 582 S.E.2d 571 (2003). Cited in Holland v. State, 151 Ga. App. 189, 259 S.E.2d 187 (1979); Stone v. State, 151 Ga. App. 531, 260 S.E.2d 405 (1979); Boss v. State, 152 Ga. App. 169, 262 S.E.2d 527 (1979); Collins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 651, 269 S.E.2d 509 (1980); McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 273 S.E.2d 847 (1981); Weaver v. State, 179 Ga. App. 641, 347 S.E.2d 295 (1986).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Section applies to recorders’ court. - Recorders’ court, being a court with jurisdiction over traffic offenses, must comply with the reporting requirements of Ga. L. 1972, p. 1148, §§ 2 and 4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-3). 1973 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 73-18. First-offender treatment immaterial to administrative handling of report of conviction. - Upon receipt of report of conviction, i.e., finding of guilt or entry of plea of guilty, or plea of nolo contendere, the Department of Public Safety should administratively handle the report as it would any other report of

conviction notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was able to lessen any harsh criminal consequences of the defendant’s actions by availing oneself of first offender treatment. 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 82-64. Nolo contendere plea. - Once the Department of Public Safety is in receipt of a report of ‘‘an accepted plea of nolo contendere’’, the Department should administratively handle the nolo contendere plea as provided for in O.C.G.A. Ch. 5, T. 40 without regard to whether a fine was or was not imposed by the trial court. 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 82-64.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 921 et seq.

C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 1504 et seq.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case: State v. Rustin, 430 S.E.2d 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Rustin, 430 S.E.2d 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 8× “Pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-3, Rustin’s case could not be tried in the superior court without a formal accusation, and for that reason, on November 19, 1991, the state filed an accusation against Rustin charging him with driving under the influence of alcohol (OCGA § 40-6-391 (a)…”
State v. Spence, 347 S.E.2d 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 8× “" This ruling is consistent with the language of OCGA § 40-13-3, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Except for offenses tried in the superior courts, all other courts having jurisdiction of the offense shall proceed with the adjudication of the offenses contained…”
State v. Hicks, 359 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 4× “at 752; see OCGA § 40-13-3].” We do not agree with the reasoning of the trial court that the holding of the Spence case is applicable here.”
State v. Gerbert, 467 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 8× “Finally, the State argues that there is no conflict between OCGA § 40-13-3 and Section 8 of the local statute creating the State Court of Rockdale County.”
State v. Lester, 317 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 4× “As a result of the nolle prosequi action, notification to the Department of Public Safety was not accomplished for its consideration of the traffic violation and the purpose of OCGA § 40-13-3 ostensibly was thwarted. As to Count IV, Judge Lester is accused of accepting pleas of…”
State v. Doyal, 361 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 4× “) OCGA § 40-13-3. In such a prosecution, the form must comply with all requirements applicable to a formal accusation, including satisfaction of any applicable affidavit requirement established by OCGA § 17-7-71 (a).”
Bishop v. State, 582 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “, required by OCGA § 40-13-3 before the matter could be tried in the superior court, in no way constituted commencement of a new prosecution.”
State v. Gerbert, 475 S.E.2d 621 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 2× “7 OCGA § 40-13-3; see Weaver v. State, 179 Ga.”
Salomon v. Earp, 379 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “*408 Appellant argues that inasmuch as there is no adjudication of guilt under the First Offender Act, there is no “final disposition” for reporting purposes under the statute.”
Shire v. State, 483 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “However, under OCGA § 40-13-3, the state is required to file an indictment or other accusation to proceed on a traffic offense in superior courts.”
State v. Perkins, 580 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, the issuance of a uniform traffic citation and complaint form charging Perkins with felony vehicular homicide clearly triggered the jurisdictional limitations in OCGA § 40-6-376 (d).”
Davis v. State, 432 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 4× “Pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-3, the appellant’s case could not be tried in the superior court without a formal accusation, and on July 25, 1991, an accusation was filed charging the appellant with the same offense for which he was originally tried and convicted.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.