O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-14-1 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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As used in this chapter, the term: (1) ‘‘Campus’’ means the grounds owned or occupied by a college or university. (2) ‘‘Campus law enforcement agency’’ means the campus agency charged with the enforcement of the laws of this state.

(3) ‘‘College or university’’ means an accredited public or private educational institution of higher learning. (4) ‘‘Speed detection device’’ means, unless otherwise indicated, that particular device designed to measure the speed or velocity of a motor vehicle and marketed under the name ‘‘Vascar’’ or any similar device operating under the same or similar principle and any devices for the measurement of speed or velocity based upon the Doppler principle of radar or the speed timing principle of laser. All such devices must meet or exceed the minimum performance specifications established by the Department of Public Safety.

History

(Ga. L. 1968, p. 425, § 3; Ga. L. 1970, p. 435, § 3; Ga. L. 1984, p. 502, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 586, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1281, §§ 4, 5.)

Annotations

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1985, ‘‘principle’’ was substituted for ‘‘principal’’ preceding ‘‘of radar’’ in the first sentence of paragraph (4).

Law reviews. - For review of 1996 use of radar speed detection devices legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 244 (1996).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Laser-based devices. - Inclusion of laser-based devices in the definition of ‘‘speed detection devices,’’ without more, does not vitiate the state’s burden of satisfying the requirements applicable to ‘‘novel scientific evidence.’’ Izer v. State, 236 Ga. App. 282, 511 S.E.2d 625 (1999). Failure to prove that the radar was used in accordance with the required prerequisites did not require approval of the defendant’s motion to suppress when

the officer testified at trial that the officer stopped the defendant’s car because the officer first observed the defendant driving in excess of the posted speed limit and then confirmed this observation through the use of radar. Green v. State, 239 Ga. App. 617, 521 S.E.2d 441 (1999). Evidentiary foundation properly laid. - See Brooker v. State, 206 Ga. App. 563, 426 S.E.2d 39 (1992).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Definition of ‘‘speed detection device.’’ - Definition of ‘‘speed detection device’’ found in O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2(11) does not conflict with the definition for the same device found in O.C.G.A. § 40-14-1. 1981 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 81-77. O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2(11) does not bring in any additional types of devices not considered under the definition found in O.C.G.A. § 40-14-1. 1981 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 81-77.

Stopwatch. - Although not normally thought to be a ‘‘speed detection device,’’ a stopwatch does meet that definition under O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2(11) when the stopwatch is used in traffic enforcement. 1981 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 81-77. Stopwatch is a similar mechanism to ‘‘Vascar.’’ In actuality, ‘‘Vascar’’ is a type of stopwatch combined with a computer which handles the mathematical functions. 1981 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 81-77.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 947 et seq.

T.40, C.14, A.2 USE OF SPEED DETECTION DEVICES, ETC.

ARTICLE 2 SPEED DETECTION DEVICES Cross references. - Speed Detection Devices, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Driver Services, Chapter 570-7.

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2001, p. 770, § 4 designated Code Sections 40-14-2 through 40-14-17 as Article 2 of this chapter.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 5 cases, 1992–1999 · leading case: Brown v. State, 485 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. 1997).

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Brown v. State, 485 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 2× “business’ within the meaning of [OCGA § 24-3-14] because the regular course of the ‘business’ of the Department of Public Safety includes the keeping of records of departmental compliance with [OCGA § 40-14-1] et seq. [Cit.]” Id. We found that “[i]n the usual circumstance, the…”

Izer v. State, 511 S.E.2d 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 4× “That the legislature included laser-based devices in the definition of “[s]peed detection device [s]” does not mean that evidence obtained from laser-based devices is not, at the same time, “novel scientific evidence.”

Green v. State, 521 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “Green contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based upon the state’s alleged failure to prove that the use of a radar speed detection device was in accordance with OCGA § 40-14-1 et seq. This contention lacks merit.”

Brooker v. State, 426 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 4× “Appellant enumerates this ruling as error, contending that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admission of the evidence in accordance with the requirements of OCGA § 40-14-1 et seq. County, municipal, and campus law enforcement officers “may use speed detection…”

Taylor v. State, 421 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Defendant, appearing pro se, first argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of speed obtained by a radar detection device because the State did not present evidence of each of the conditions imposed by OCGA § 40-14-1 et seq. for the admission of such evidence.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.