O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-14-8 (2019)

When case may be made and conviction had

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) No county, city, or campus officer shall be allowed to make a case based on the use of any speed detection device, unless the speed of the vehicle exceeds the posted speed limit by more than ten miles per hour and no conviction shall be had thereon unless such speed is more than ten miles per hour above the posted speed limit.

(b) The limitations contained in subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply in properly marked school zones one hour before, during, and one hour after the normal hours of school operation or programs for care and supervision of students before school, after school, or during vacation periods as provided for under Code Section 20-2-65, in properly marked historic districts, and in properly marked residential zones. For purposes of this chapter, thoroughfares with speed limits of 35 miles per hour or more shall not be considered residential districts. For purposes of this Code section, the term ‘‘historic district’’ means a historic district as defined in paragraph (5) of Code Section 44-10-22 and which is listed on the Georgia Register of Historic Places or as defined by ordinance adopted pursuant to a local constitutional amendment.

History

(Ga. L. 1968, p. 425, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 435, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2254, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 771, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 586, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 30; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1257, § 1; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1057, § 7/HB 978.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Application to prosecution for driving under the influence. - City police officer’s testimony that the defendant was exceeding the speed limit by 10 miles per hour as shown by radar could not be used with evidence of a positive urine sample to support the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence of drugs. Webb v. State, 223 Ga. App. 9, 476 S.E.2d 781 (1996). No application to state troopers. - Although a defendant was only traveling 10 miles per hour above the posted speed limit when the defendant’s vehicle was stopped by a state police trooper for speeding, since O.C.G.A. § 40-14-8(a) did not apply to state troopers, the stop was valid; § 40-14-8(a) only applied to county, city, or campus officers. Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. App. 724, 665 S.E.2d 422 (2008). Stop of vehicle justified. - Even

though an officer, mistaken as to the speed limit where the radar operation was established, was prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 40-14-8 from making a case against a vehicle going only nine miles per hour over the limit, nothing prevented the officer from stopping the vehicle for speeding. Freeland v. State, 223 Ga. App. 326, 477 S.E.2d 633 (1996). When an officer clocked the defendant driving 10 miles per hour over the speed limit, this provided the officer with a legal reason to stop the defendant to warn the defendant of exceeding the speed limit, even though, under O.C.G.A. § 40-14-8(a), the defendant could not be convicted of speeding; therefore, it was proper to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of this stop. Berry v. State, 274 Ga. App. 831, 619 S.E.2d 339 (2005).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Proof, by radar or other mechanical or electronic devices, of violation of speed regulations, 47 A.L.R.3d 822.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 4 cases, 1996–2008 · leading case: Berry v. State, 619 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).

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Berry v. State, 619 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 6× “Specifically, Berry contends that, because he was traveling only ten mph over the speed limit, he had not committed a moving violation based on the language of OCGA § 40-14-8. When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we apply the clearly erroneous standard.”

Hayes v. State, 665 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “In support of this argument, Hayes cites OCGA § 40-14-8 (a), which provides: No county, city, or campus officer shall be allowed to make a case based on the use of any speed detection device, unless the speed of the vehicle exceeds the posted speed limit by more than ten miles…”

Freeland v. State, 477 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 6× “See OCGA § 40-14-8 (a). 2 It is undisputed that Freeland was driving nine miles over the posted speed limit.”

Webb v. State, 476 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 40-14-8 (a) provides that “[n]o county, city, or campus officer shall be allowed to make a case based on the use of any speed detection device, unless the speed of the vehicle exceeds the posted speed limit by more than ten miles per hour and no conviction shall be had…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.