O.C.G.A. § 40-2-8 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. Jurisdiction over offenses under this Code section, § 40-13-22. Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 1995, p. 809, § 22, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Any local law enacted pursuant to Code Section 40-2-21, which is in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall stand repealed on the effective date of this Act.” The act became effective January 1, 1997. Ga. L. 1996, p. 1118, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Any local Act enacted pursuant to Code Section 40-2-21 which is in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall stand repealed on the effective date on this Act;

REGISTRATION/LICENSING OF MOTOR VEH.

provided, however, that any local Act enacted in 1996 pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 40-2-21 as enacted by Act No. 385, Ga. L. 1995, which local Act provides for a four-month staggered registration period for a county, shall not be repealed by the provisions of this Act, but the registration period for such county shall be as provided by subparagraph (a)(1)(B) of Code Section 40-2-21 as enacted by this Act and not as provided in such local Act.” Ga. L. 1996, p. 1118, § 18, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “Those

parts of Act No. 385, Ga. L. 1995, an act amending Chapter 2 of Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to registration and licensing of motor vehicles, and amending Article 10 of Chapter 5 of Title 48 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to ad valorem taxation of motor vehicles and mobile homes, approved April 19, 1995, in conflict with this Act are repealed.” Law reviews. For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 215 (1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Jurisdiction of federal court. - O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-1, 9-5-1, 40-2-8, 40-3-6, 40-3-21, and 48-2-59 provide plaintiff challenging automobile “title transfer fee” with “plain, speedy and efficient” pre-tax and post-tax remedies by which a taxpayer could challenge the constitutional validity of a state tax, and so satisfied the criteria of the Tax Injunction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, so as to bar jurisdiction of the federal court. Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Vehicle in custody not subject to levy and sale. - Vehicle being in custody of the law while held pursuant to former Code 1933, §§ 68-214 and 68-9901 (see O.C.G.A. § 40-2-8), a levy of execution by a sheriff was void and no valid sale could be made pursuant thereto. Oxford v. Sanders, 217 Ga. 820, 125 S.E.2d 483, 1962 Ga. LEXIS 404 (1962). Investigatory stops for registration law violations. - Stopping a car with a drive-out tag solely to ascertain whether the driver was complying with Georgia’s vehicle registration laws is not authorized; Burtts v. State, 211 Ga. App. 840, 440 S.E.2d 727 (1994) is expressly overruled along with any other cases which would authorize a traffic stop solely because a vehicle was being operated with a dealer’s drive-out tag. Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 563 S.E.2d 527, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 439 (2002). Investigative stop justified. - Police officer was justified in approaching

defendant to determine if the operation of defendant’s vehicle with an expired out-of-state tag was in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-8. Jordan v. State, 223 Ga. App. 176, 477 S.E.2d 583, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1042 (1996), cert. denied, No. S97C0238, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 234 (Ga. Feb. 14, 1997). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress as the search was valid under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII; the officer stopped the defendant based on a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving with an invalid drive-out tag in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-8, and the defendant’s tag was suspicious because the tag did not have a strip on the bottom to prevent tampering with the expiration date. Green v. State, 282 Ga. App. 5, 637 S.E.2d 498, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1285 (2006). State need not prove period of residence. - Allegation that the defendant had resided in the state for a period of 30 days or more was mere surplusage, and failure to prove the allegation did not constitute a fatal variance. Gibson v. State, 187 Ga. App. 769, 371 S.E.2d 413, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 857 (1988). State need not prove current owner of vehicle. - State presented sufficient evidence that the defendant had operated a motor vehicle with an expired Mississippi tag on a public street of Georgia in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-8(a). Although the evidence did not show to whom the vehicle had been

MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAFFIC

registered in Mississippi or whether the defendant had recently purchased the vehicle, the statute did authorize a finding that, regardless of who the current owner of the vehicle might actually be, the vehicle was not an automobile which was otherwise exempt from the requirement of registration in this state. Keyser v. State, 187 Ga. App. 95, 369 S.E.2d 309, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 582 (1988). Traffic stop for compliance not unreasonably prolonged. - As an officer’s questioning of the defendant after a traffic stop about the defendant’s length of time in Georgia was done to determine whether the defendant was in compliance with O.C.G.A. §§ 40-2-8(a) and 40-5-20(a), and did not unreasonably prolong the stop, the defendant’s rights under U.S. Const., amend. IV were not violated. Therefore, methamphetamine seized from the defendant’s purse during the stop did not have to be suppressed. Sommese v. State, 299 Ga. App. 664, 683 S.E.2d 642, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 925 (2009). Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction. - Because the defendant

admittedly lacked a driver’s license, the tag on the car being driven was expired, and the defendant produced no evidence that the car had been recently purchased, and thus fell within the initial 30-day registration period during which a numbered license plate was not required, defendant’s convictions were upheld on appeal. Arellano v. State, 289 Ga. App. 148, 656 S.E.2d 264, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 22 (2008). Evidence insufficient for conviction of driving without current license plate. - Testimony by officers that defendant’s car had a temporary dealer tag was insufficient to support the charge of driving without a current license plate because the state presented no evidence that the tag on the car was not a valid temporary tag issued by a dealer at the time of sale. Brackins v. State, 249 Ga. App. 788, 549 S.E.2d 775, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 630 (2001).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Vehicles registered in another state required to obtain Georgia use permit. - Vehicles traveling in Georgia, registered in another state where the fees imposed are of such a nature as to be considered merely registration fees, should be required to obtain a Georgia highway use permit and identification tags and stickers pertinent thereto. 1954-56 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. 477.

Mail order applicant not penalized until April 2, or 15 days after money order issued. - Mail order applicant cannot be subjected to civil penalties until April 2, or until the expiration of 15 days after the date of a proper money order receipt issued on or before April 1, whichever is later. 1958-59 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. 209.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 60, 67, 84, 256 et seq. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 1, 5, 19, 26 et seq. C.J.S. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 196, 282. 61A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 1628 et seq. ALR. Civil rights and liabilities as affected by failure to comply with regulations as to

registration of automobile or motorcycle, or licensing of operator, 16 A.L.R. 1108; 35 A.L.R. 62; 38 A.L.R. 1038; 43 A.L.R. 1153; 54 A.L.R. 374; 58 A.L.R. 532; 61 A.L.R. 1190; 78 A.L.R. 1028; 87 A.L.R. 1469; 111 A.L.R. 1258; 163 A.L.R. 1375. Applicability of motor vehicle regulations to public officials or employees, 23 A.L.R. 418. Improper use of automobile license plates as affecting liability or right to

REGISTRATION/LICENSING OF MOTOR VEH.

recover for injuries, death, or damages in consequence of automobile accident, 99 A.L.R.2d 904. What constitutes plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy under Tax Injunction

Act (28 USCS § 1341), prohibiting federal district courts from interfering with assessment, levy, or collection of state business taxes, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.