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(3.1) "Clinical evaluation" means an evaluation under Chapter 7 of Title 37 at a facility to diagnose an individual's substance abuse or dependence and, if indicated, to refer the individual to appropriate treatment.
(9.1) "For-hire license endorsement" means an endorsement to a driver's license pursuant to Code Section 40-5-39 that authorizes the holder of the license to operate a motor vehicle for the purpose of transporting passengers in this state for compensation or donation as a limousine carrier, ride share network or driver, or taxi service as such terms are defined in Code Section 40-1-190.
(13.5) "Personal information" means any information that identifies a person, including but not limited to an individual's fingerprint, photograph, or computerized image, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (other than five-digit ZIP Code), telephone number, and medical or disability information.
provided, however, that no person shall be considered a resident for purposes of this chapter unless such person is either a United States citizen or an alien with legal authorization from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(16.01) "Ride share driver" means an individual who uses his or her personal passenger car, as defined in paragraph (41) of Code Section 40-1-1, to provide transportation for passengers arranged through a ride share network service.
(16.02) "Ride share network service" means any person or entity that uses a digital network or Internet network to connect passengers to ride share drivers for the purpose of prearranged transportation for hire or for donation. The term "ride share network service" shall not include any corporate sponsored vanpool or exempt rideshare as such terms are defined in Code Section 40-1-100, provided that such corporate sponsored vanpool or exempt rideshare is not operated for the purpose of generating a profit.
(16.1) "Singularly or in combination" means that the department, in determining whether or not a person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways is to be revoked as a habitual violator, is to treat each charge for which a conviction was obtained as a separate transaction when determining whether or not a person has the requisite convictions which mandate such a revocation.
(16.2) "Substance abuse treatment program" means a program of treatment under Chapter 7 of Title 37 at a facility authorized to provide services designed to meet an individual's substance abuse treatment needs based upon the results of a clinical evaluation performed by a provider other than the provider of the treatment program for such individual.
(Code 1933, § 68B-101, enacted by Ga. L. 1975, p. 1008, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 519, § 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1154, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 4; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1886, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 40; Ga. L. 1994, p. 514, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 920, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1250, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 40; Ga. L. 1997, p. 760, § 8; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1446, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 731, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 5-1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 17-1/HB 501; Ga. L. 2010, p. 9, § 1-78/HB 1055; Ga. L. 2010, p. 932, § 1/HB 396; Ga. L. 2011, p. 355, § 1/HB 269; Ga. L. 2014, p. 710, § 1-6/SB 298; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1262, § 5/HB 225; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 40/HB 323.)
The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "United States Immigration and Naturalization Service" for "U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service" in the undesignated paragraph at the end of paragraph (15).
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, the terms defined in this Code section were placed in alphabetical order and redesignated accordingly and at the end of the introductory language of paragraph (15) the quotation marks around "resident" were deleted.
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2001, "ZIP Code" was substituted for "ZIP code" in paragraph (13.5).
- Ga. L. 1997, p. 760, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Teen-age and Adult Driver Responsibility Act'."
Ga. L. 1997, p. 760, § 27, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment made by the Act to this Code section shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1997, and shall not apply to offenses committed prior to that date.
- For article on the effect of nolo contendere plea on conviction, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1979). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 196 (1997). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 203 (1997). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 213 (2015).
- Definition of "conviction" clearly evidenced the legislature's intention that a bond forfeiture arising from driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs committed prior to the enactment of former Code 1933, § 68B 308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58), was considered a "conviction" for the purpose of that section. Cofer v. Crowell, 146 Ga. App. 639, 247 S.E.2d 152 (1978).
Neither state nor federal procedural due process bars General Assembly from defining "conviction" in former Code 1933, § 68B-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1) to include forfeiture of bail or collateral. Haley v. Hardison, 247 Ga. 750, 279 S.E.2d 712 (1981).
Statutory definition of "conviction" does not carve out an exception for entries of pleas of guilty or the payment of a fine in a first offender situation. Nor does the definition require an adjudication of guilt. Salomon v. Earp, 190 Ga. App. 405, 379 S.E.2d 217 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Pender v. Witcher, 196 Ga. App. 856, 397 S.E.2d 193 (1990).
Definition of "conviction" found in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1(6) is limited to traffic violation charges. Entry of a guilty plea to a charge other than a traffic violation charge does not fit within the expansive definition of "conviction." Priest v. State, 261 Ga. 651, 409 S.E.2d 657 (1991).
- Reading paragraph (15) of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1 and O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a) in pari materia shows that the intention of the General Assembly was not to exempt undocumented aliens from the requirement of obtaining a Georgia driver's license but to permit visitors with no intention of becoming "residents" to drive here without obtaining a Georgia license. Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 537 S.E.2d 784 (2000).
Defendant was not a "resident" required to obtain a Georgia driver's license even though the defendant was instructed to do so by police, because the defendant testified that the defendant was not living as a resident in Georgia, was there temporarily for job training, and owned a house and resided in Florida. Williams v. State, 336 Ga. App. 442, 784 S.E.2d 808 (2016).
- Statutes barring illegal aliens residing in Georgia from obtaining a Georgia driver's license does not deprive the illegal aliens of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
Cited in Martines v. Worley & Sons Constr., 278 Ga. App. 26, 628 S.E.2d 113 (2006); Garcia-Carrillo v. State, 322 Ga. App. 439, 746 S.E.2d 137 (2013); Barrow v. Mikell, 298 Ga. 429, 782 S.E.2d 439 (2016).
- Who is "owner" within statute making owner responsible for injury or death inflicted by operator of automobile, 74 A.L.R.3d 739.
Validity of state statutes, regulations, or other identification requirements restricting or denying driver's licenses to illegal aliens, 16 A.L.R.6th 131.
Total Results: 4
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-01
Citation: 298 Ga. 429, 782 S.E.2d 439, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 109
Snippet: the resolution of this case. According to OCGA § 40-5-1 (16), when a license is “revoked,” the “license
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-03-25
Citation: 292 Ga. 755, 740 S.E.2d 583, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 768, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 294
Snippet: person who is not a resident of this state.”), 40-5-1 (15) (“[N]o person shall he considered a resident
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1993-02-05
Citation: 425 S.E.2d 641, 262 Ga. 769, 18 A.L.R. 5th 1051, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 489, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 188
Snippet: vehicle on the public highways. See OCGA §§ 40-1-1; 40-5-1 (16), (17). Since the right to drive is not a fundamental
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1991-11-01
Citation: 409 S.E.2d 657, 261 Ga. 651, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 865
Snippet: "conviction" a very broad construction. OCGA § 40-5-1(6). "Conviction" is defined to include "a forfeiture