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(5.1) "Automated driving system" means the hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing the entire dynamic driving task on a sustained basis, regardless of whether it is limited to a specific operational design domain.
(6.1) "Bicycle lane" means a portion of the roadway that has been designated by striping, pavement markings, or signage for the exclusive or preferential use of persons operating bicycles. Bicycle lanes shall at a minimum, unless impracticable, be required to meet accepted guidelines, recommendations, and criteria with respect to planning, design, operation, and maintenance as set forth by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials.
(6.2) "Bicycle path" means a right of way under the jurisdiction and control of this state or a local political subdivision thereof designated for use by bicycle riders.
(6.3) "Bicycle trailer" means every device pulled by a bicycle and designed by the manufacturer of such device to carry human passengers.
(8.01) "Class I all-terrain vehicle" means a motorized, off-highway recreational vehicle 50 inches or less in width with a dry weight of 1,200 pounds or less that travels on three or more nonhighway tires and is designed for or capable of cross-country travel on or immediately over land, water, sand, snow, ice, marsh, swampland, or other natural terrain.
(8.1) "Class II all-terrain vehicle" means a motorized, off-highway recreational vehicle which is not a class I all-terrain vehicle and which is 65 inches or less in width with a dry weight of 2,000 pounds or less that travels on four or more nonhighway tires and is designed for or capable of cross-country travel on or immediately over land, water, sand, snow, ice, marsh, swampland, or other natural terrain.
(8.2) "Class III all-terrain vehicle" means any motor vehicle that:
(8.3) "Commercial motor vehicle" means any self-propelled or towed motor vehicle used on a highway in intrastate and interstate commerce to transport passengers or property when the vehicle:
(15.1) "DUI Alcohol or Drug Use Risk Reduction Program" means a program certified by the Department of Driver Services in accordance with subsection (e) of Code Section 40-5-83.
(15.2) "Dynamic driving task" means all of the real-time operational and tactical functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints, including without limitation:
(15.3) "Electric assisted bicycle" means a device with two or three wheels which has a saddle and fully operative pedals for human propulsion and also has an electric motor. For such a device to be considered an electric assisted bicycle, it shall meet the requirements of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, as set forth in 49 C.F.R. Section 571, et seq., and shall operate in such a manner that the electric motor disengages or ceases to function when the brakes are applied. The electric motor in an electric assisted bicycle shall:
(15.4) "Electric personal assistive mobility device" or "EPAMD" means a self-balancing, two nontandem wheeled device designed to transport only one person and having an electric propulsion system with average power of 750 watts (1 horsepower) and a maximum speed of less than 20 miles per hour on a paved level surface when powered solely by such propulsion system and ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds.
(17.1) "Former military motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle which operates on the ground, including a trailer, that was manufactured for use in any country's military forces and is maintained to represent its military design, regardless of the vehicle's size, weight, or year of manufacture. Such term shall not include motor vehicles armed for combat or vehicles owned or operated by this state, the United States, or any foreign government.
(17.2) "Fully autonomous vehicle" means a motor vehicle equipped with an automated driving system that has the capability to perform all aspects of the dynamic driving task without a human driver within a limited or unlimited operational design domain and will not at any time request that a driver assume any portion of the dynamic driving task when the automated driving system is operating within its operational design domain.
(17.3) "Golf car" or "golf cart" means any motorized vehicle designed for the purpose and exclusive use of conveying one or more persons and equipment to play the game of golf in an area designated as a golf course. For such a vehicle to be considered a golf car or golf cart, its average speed shall be less than 15 miles per hour (24 kilometers per hour) on a level road surface with a 0.5% grade (0.3 degree) comprising a straight course composed of a concrete or asphalt surface that is dry and free from loose material or surface contamination with a minimum coefficient of friction of 0.8 between tire and surface.
(18.1) "Hazardous material" means a substance or material as designated pursuant to the Federal Hazardous Materials Law, 49 U.S.C. Section 5103(a).
(21.1) "Infant sling" means every device which is designed by the manufacturer to be worn by a person for the purpose of carrying an infant either on the chest or back of the wearer.
(24.1) "Lightweight commercial vehicle" means a motor vehicle which does not meet the definition of a commercial motor vehicle and which, in the furtherance of a commercial enterprise:
(24.2) "Limousine" has the same meaning as provided in paragraph (4) of Code Section 40-1-151.
(25.1) "Low-speed vehicle" means any four-wheeled electric vehicle whose top speed attainable in one mile is greater than 20 miles per hour but not greater than 25 miles per hour on a paved level surface and which is manufactured in compliance with those federal motor vehicle safety standards for low-speed vehicles set forth in 49 C.F.R. Section 571.500 and in effect on January 1, 2001.
(25.2) "Managed lane" means a designated lane or series of designated lanes which utilize tolls payable to the State Road and Tollway Authority and which may use other lane management strategies in order to manage the flow of traffic. Such additional lane management strategies may include, but are not limited to, value pricing, vehicle occupancy requirements, or vehicle type restrictions, or any combination thereof.
(26.1) "Manufacturer headquarters" means the headquarters operation of:
(27.1) "Minimal risk condition" means a low-risk operating mode in which a fully autonomous vehicle operating without a human driver achieves a reasonably safe state, such as bringing the vehicle to a complete stop, upon experiencing a failure of the vehicle's automated driving system that renders the vehicle unable to perform the entire dynamic driving task.
(28.1) "Motor carrier" shall have the same meaning as provided for in Code Section 40-2-1, and the terms "carrier" and "motor carrier" are synonymous.
(33.1) "Multipurpose off-highway vehicle" means any motorized vehicle having features specifically intended for utility use and having the following characteristics:
(37.1) "Operational design domain" means a description of the specific operating domains in which an automated driving system is designed to effectively operate, including but not limited to geographic limitations, roadway types, speed range, and environmental conditions such as weather and limited visibility.
(42.1) "Pedestrian hybrid beacon" means a special type of hybrid beacon used to warn and control traffic at locations without a traffic-control signal to assist pedestrians in crossing a street or highway at a marked crosswalk.
(43.1) "Personal transportation vehicle" or "PTV" means:
The term does not include mobility aids, including electric personal assistive mobility devices, power wheelchairs, and scooters, that can be used indoors and outdoors for the express purpose of enabling mobility for a person with a disability. The term also does not include any all-terrain vehicle or multipurpose off-highway vehicle.
(43.2) "Personal transportation vehicle path" or "PTV path" means a right of way under the jurisdiction and control of this state or a local political subdivision thereof designated for use by personal transportation vehicle drivers.
(50.01) "Recreational off-highway vehicle" means a motorized vehicle designed for off-road use which is equipped with four or more nonhighway tires and which is 65 inches or less in width.
(50.1) "Regulatory compliance inspection" means the examination of facilities, property, buildings, vehicles, drivers, employees, cargo, packages, records, books, or supporting documentation kept or required to be kept in the normal course of business or enterprise operations.
(56.1) "Shared use path" means a pathway physically separated from motorized vehicular traffic by an open space or barrier and either within the highway right of way or within an independent right of way and used by bicycles, pedestrians, manual and motorized wheelchairs, and other authorized motorized and nonmotorized users.
(63.1) "Taxicab" means a motor vehicle for hire which conveys passengers between locations of their choice and is a mode of public transportation for a single passenger or small group for a fee. Such term shall also mean taxi or cab, but not a bus or school bus, limousine, passenger car, or commercial motor vehicle.
(Ga. L. 1927, p. 226, § 2; Code 1933, § 68-101; Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 1-9, 11, 13-21; Ga. L. 1966, p. 183, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 586, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 595, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 598, § 1; Code 1933, § 68A-101, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1483, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2241, §§ 1, 3, 4; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 40; Ga. L. 1983, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 691, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1893, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1792, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 518, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 40; Ga. L. 1996, p. 236, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 419, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 334, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 4, § 40; Ga. L. 2002, p. 506, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 512, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 2002, p. 660, § 4; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1259, § 11; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1378, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 308, §§ 1, 2, 3; Ga. L. 2004, p. 67, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 746, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 428, § 1/HB 654; Ga. L. 2007, p. 652, § 1/HB 518; Ga. L. 2010, p. 143, § 1/HB 1005; Ga. L. 2010, p. 442, § 4/HB 1174; Ga. L. 2011, p. 247, § 1/SB 240; Ga. L. 2011, p. 426, § 1/HB 101; Ga. L. 2011, p. 479, §§ 6, 7, 8/HB 112; Ga. L. 2012, p. 726, §§ 1, 2, 3/HB 795; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 40/HB 79; Ga. L. 2014, p. 409, § 1/SB 392; Ga. L. 2014, p. 710, § 1-5/SB 298; Ga. L. 2014, p. 745, § 1/HB 877; Ga. L. 2015, p. 5, § 40/HB 90; Ga. L. 2015, p. 60, § 4-1/SB 100; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1058, § 4/SB 125; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1219, § 1/HB 202; Ga. L. 2017, p. 549, § 1/SB 219.)
The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, added paragraphs (5.1) and (15.2); redesignated former paragraphs (15.2) and (15.3) as present paragraphs (15.3) and (15.4), respectively; added paragraph (17.2); redesignated former paragraph (17.2) as present paragraph (17.3); substituted "(0.3 degree)" for "(0.3 degrees)" in the second sentence of paragraph (17.3); added paragraphs (27.1) and (37.1); and added "or who causes a fully autonomous vehicle to move or travel with the automated driving system engaged" at the end of paragraph (38).
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, a hyphen was deleted from "motor driven" in paragraphs (28), (30), and (41).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1989, "side" was substituted for "sides" in paragraph (2).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1993, paragraph (6.3) was redesignated as paragraph (21.1) to place it in alphabetical order.
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, "or" was inserted following the semicolon at the end of subparagraphs (10)(A) and (62)(A) and "49 C.F.R. Section 571, et seq." was substituted for "49 CFR 571 et seq." in paragraph (15.5) (now paragraph (15.3)).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1997, a comma was deleted following "another person" in the second sentence of paragraph (39).
The amendment of this Code section by Ga. L. 2002, p. 506, § 2, irreconcilably conflicted with and was treated as superseded by Ga. L. 2002, p. 512, § 2. See County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921).
Both Ga. L. 2014, p. 409, § 1/SB 392 and Ga. L. 2014, p. 745, § 1/HB 877 enacted a new paragraph (17.1). Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, the paragraph enacted by Ga. L. 2014, p. 745, § 1/HB 877 has been redesignated as paragraph (17.2).
- Ga. L. 2015, p. 60, § 6-1/SB 100, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "Section 4-9 of Part IV of this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2016, and all other parts of this Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date."
- Provisions concerning the Transportation of Hazardous Materials are codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.
- For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of insurance from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 105 (1978). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 215 (1997). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2017). For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 198 (2003).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 10-13, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
§ 40-1-1(57). - Definition of "public sidewalk" found in City of Forest Park, Ga., Ordinance § 9-8-45(f) is not unconstitutional as conflicting with state law because nothing in § 9-8-45 impairs the operation of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(57); by the statute's specific terms, § 40-1-1(57), is not intended to be a definition of general application, but defines the term "sidewalk" in the context of Title 40 of the Georgia Code, which is labeled "Motor Vehicles and Traffic," and it does not appear that the definition set forth in § 40-1-1(57) would apply elsewhere in the Code in which the word "sidewalk" is used in other contexts. Braley v. City of Forest Park, 286 Ga. 760, 692 S.E.2d 595 (2010).
- Because a police officer was directing traffic and this activity necessarily is a police function, the officer was acting in the officer's official capacity at the time of a traffic accident, and the officer was entitled to assert official immunity as a defense to a claim of negligent conduct. Sommerfield v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 375, 509 S.E.2d 100 (1998).
- Georgia Court of Appeals concludes that the parking restrictions in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202 do not apply within a business district and because a business district is comprised of the territory contiguous to and including a highway, the parking restrictions in § 40-6-202 cannot be read to apply to roadways within areas meeting the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(8). Granger v. MST Transp., LLC, 329 Ga. App. 268, 764 S.E.2d 872 (2014).
Cited in Tiller v. Georgia Power Co., 68 Ga. App. 224, 22 S.E.2d 623 (1942); Casteel v. Anderson, 89 Ga. App. 68, 78 S.E.2d 831 (1953); Horne v. GEICO, 132 Ga. App. 230, 207 S.E.2d 636 (1974); Avera v. State, 133 Ga. App. 469, 211 S.E.2d 417 (1974); Prince v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 512, 239 S.E.2d 198 (1977); State v. Williams, 156 Ga. App. 813, 275 S.E.2d 133 (1980); Lott v. Smith, 156 Ga. App. 826, 275 S.E.2d 720 (1980); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Statiras, 157 Ga. App. 169, 276 S.E.2d 853 (1981); McJunkin v. State, 160 Ga. App. 30, 285 S.E.2d 756 (1981); Blake v. Continental S.E. Lines, 161 Ga. App. 869, 289 S.E.2d 551 (1982); Tolbert v. Murrell, 253 Ga. 566, 322 S.E.2d 487 (1984); Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. King, 174 Ga. App. 716, 331 S.E.2d 41 (1985); Pierce County Sch. Dist. v. Greene, 185 Ga. App. 269, 363 S.E.2d 825 (1987); Metheny v. State, 197 Ga. App. 882, 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990); Brannan v. State, 261 Ga. 128, 401 S.E.2d 269 (1991); Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 401 S.E.2d 516 (1991); Bailey v. Hall, 199 Ga. App. 602, 405 S.E.2d 579 (1991); Pryor v. Phillips, 222 Ga. App. 116, 473 S.E.2d 535 (1996); Conley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 841, 637 S.E.2d 438 (2006); Hite v. Anderson, 284 Ga. App. 156, 643 S.E.2d 550 (2007); Barron v. State, 291 Ga. App. 494, 662 S.E.2d 285 (2008).
- Charges regarding the use of the blood to alcohol ratio have been held to be harmless so long as those charges are given in conjunction with a qualifying instruction regarding the inconclusiveness of the ratio. Therefore, the burden of proof is not shifted to the defendant. Walker v. State, 204 Ga. App. 559, 420 S.E.2d 17, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 420 S.E.2d 17 (1992).
Charging the statutory definition of alcohol concentration was not error since the trial court charged the jury that the jury could give the breath test results the weight that the jury deemed fit, including no weight at all. Rindone v. State, 210 Ga. App. 639, 437 S.E.2d 338 (1993).
- Since the defendant was charged with a crime wherein the "alcohol concentration" of defendant's blood was an element of the offense, and the trial court charged the jury on the statutory definition of "alcohol concentration," the trial court did not err in so charging the jury on the definition of "alcohol concentration." Close v. State, 195 Ga. App. 652, 394 S.E.2d 563 (1990).
- Person has actual physical control of a vehicle which is unable to move under the vehicle's own power while guiding the vehicle down a road as the vehicle operates under the force of gravity. Harris v. State, 97 Ga. App. 495, 103 S.E.2d 443 (1958), overruled on other grounds, New v. State, 171 Ga. App. 392, 319 S.E.2d 542 (1984) and Luke v. State, 177 Ga. App. 518, 340 S.E.2d 30 (1986) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 10-13).
- Testing officer's failure to explain the officer's testimony that the defendant's test results were .121 and .116, in terms of the "alcohol concentration" definitions of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1, did not require reversal since the officer also testified that the machine tested specifically for alcohol and the jury was properly instructed on statutory definitions. Banks v. State, 235 Ga. App. 701, 509 S.E.2d 63 (1998).
Evidence supports a verdict of drunken "driving" since, at the time the troopers arrived at the scene of the alleged crime, the defendant was sitting under the steering wheel of the automobile and attempting to get the car in gear, the motor of the automobile was running, and the automobile rolled backwards when the witness started to get out of the patrol car. Echols v. State, 104 Ga. App. 695, 122 S.E.2d 473 (1961) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 10-13).
- Acceptance of any definition of an unmarked "crosswalk" other than that in Ga. L. 1953, Nov.- Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21, or holding that simply because people do cross, even "normally," in order to get to a place of business on the opposite side of a crosswalk would, in effect, make the whole roadway a "crosswalk." If there is to be one other than at the intersection, it must be marked in some manner so that motorists may know of it. Wells v. Alderman, 117 Ga. App. 724, 162 S.E.2d 18 (1968) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
A "T" intersection did not qualify as an unmarked crosswalk for purposes of a negligence suit brought by pedestrians who were struck at the intersection. McKenzie v. Detenber, 226 Ga. App. 742, 487 S.E.2d 497 (1997).
- Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40-6-92(a) as it was undisputed that there was no marked crosswalk where the defendant was crossing the road, that the defendant was crossing other than at either a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk, and that the defendant entered the roadway when it was not safe to do so, given the traffic and weather conditions, and failed to yield to motor vehicle traffic. Hill v. State, 341 Ga. App. 409, 801 S.E.2d 87 (2017).
- "Highways" are created by legislative authority by dedication, or by prescription. The construction of the term "highway," when used in a statute, depends upon the legislative intent, and no fixed rule in regard to the word's meaning can be given. Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 101 S.E.2d 113 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
Every thoroughfare which is used by the public, and, in the language of the English books, is common to all the king's subjects, is a "highway." Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 101 S.E.2d 113 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
Road which leads only to the residence of a single individual may be a "highway." Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 101 S.E.2d 113 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
Since the term "highway" meant the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof was open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel, the term "highway" included the city streets on which defendant was traveling when it was discovered by police that the defendant was driving without a license; thus, the defendant's conviction for that offense had to be upheld. Scott v. State, 254 Ga. App. 728, 563 S.E.2d 554 (2002).
- O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(53) defines the term "roadway" as "that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder. In the event a highway includes two or more separate roadways, the term 'roadway' shall refer to any such roadway separately, but not to all such roadways collectively." The statutory definition excludes the berm or shoulder from being a part of the roadway. Nelson v. State, 317 Ga. App. 527, 731 S.E.2d 770 (2012).
- Highway is not open for travel until there has been extended to public an invitation, express or implied, to use the highway. When a highway is open for travel may, under certain circumstances, be a question of law for the court; on the other hand, cases may arise where it would be a question of fact for the jury to determine under all the circumstances of the particular case. Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 101 S.E.2d 113 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
- For a highway under construction to be a "public highway," it would be necessary to show only that the highway was publicly maintained, and that the part in question was open for vehicular traffic. Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 101 S.E.2d 113 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
- Area within which private driveway or private way joins with public road is not "intersection" as defined by law. Howard v. Hall, 112 Ga. App. 247, 145 S.E.2d 70 (1965) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
- Under an application of the rules of law to the facts, the jury was authorized to find from the evidence adduced upon the trial, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, that the two defendant drivers were grossly negligent in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Lawrence v. Hayes, 92 Ga. App. 778, 90 S.E.2d 102 (1955) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
- General Assembly, in providing license taxes, separated "motorcycles" from the general class of "motor vehicles." Bullard v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 178 Ga. 673, 173 S.E. 855, answer conformed to, 49 Ga. App. 27, 174 S.E. 256 (1934).
Trail bike is a "motorcycle." Addison v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Ga. App. 536, 271 S.E.2d 674 (1980).
- Paragraph defining "motor vehicle" includes only those vehicles operated or drawn by their own self-propelled power. Thompson v. Georgia Power Co., 73 Ga. App. 587, 37 S.E.2d 622 (1946).
- Tractor comes within the definition of a "motor vehicle" under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1. Browning v. State, 207 Ga. App. 547, 428 S.E.2d 441 (1993).
- Since a golf cart was a "motorized vehicle" under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(33), (75), the defendant had to have a driver's license when driving the golf cart on a highway; the motorized cart statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-330 and40-6-331(b), (c), authorized licensing of the vehicle, not the driver. Coker v. State, 261 Ga. App. 646, 583 S.E.2d 498 (2003).
Because: (1) O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), by the statute's plain language, applied to any moving vehicle, and, a golf cart was a "vehicle" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(75); (2) the defendant stipulated at trial to driving the golf cart in Fayette County, making such a "moving vehicle" within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), and to being under the influence of alcohol while doing so; and (3) under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(3), the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 applied anywhere in Georgia, whether on a street, highway, or private property, the defendant's DUI conviction was upheld on appeal. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849 (2006).
Evidence regarding theft of a four-wheeler from a dealership was sufficient for a jury to determine that the four-wheeler fit within the definition of a self-propelled vehicle within O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(33); further, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft by taking a motor vehicle after a witness saw two men loading the four-wheeler into the back of a truck, the dealership's door looked like the door was pried open or kicked in, and defendant and others were stopped with the four-wheeler, bolt cutters, and a crowbar in the back of the truck. Norwood v. State, 265 Ga. App. 862, 595 S.E.2d 537 (2004).
Named driver exclusion endorsement precluded coverage since the term "motor vehicle," which does not include all-terrain vehicles, was limited to the policy provisions providing coverage, the language used in the endorsement encompassed the all-terrain vehicle involved in the accident, and since the insured exercised the insured's right to reject uninsured motorist coverage for the named driver. Fountain v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 204 Ga. App. 165, 419 S.E.2d 67 (1992).
- Turns should be made from the roadway, but, more particularly, in compliance with the patterns established by the markings ("official traffic control devices") on the road. State v. Williams, 156 Ga. App. 813, 275 S.E.2d 133 (1980).
- Properly erected no-parking sign within a municipality is an "official traffic-control device." Fabian v. Vincent, 155 Ga. App. 464, 270 S.E.2d 858 (1980).
Natural person, not business, found to be "owner" of vehicle. Purcell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 863, 310 S.E.2d 530 (1983).
- Defining "pedestrian" under motor vehicle accident insurance provisions involves an examination of the primary purpose or design of the vehicle involved in the accident. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Statiras, 157 Ga. App. 169, 276 S.E.2d 853 (1981).
- Pedestrian and person with an automobile each have the right to use the public highway; but the right of an operator of an automobile upon the highways is not superior to the right of the pedestrian, and it is the duty of each to exercise their right with due regard to the corresponding rights of the other. Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 103 S.E.2d 745 (1958) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
- Driver of an automobile is bound to use reasonable care and to anticipate the presence on the streets of other persons having equal rights with the driver to be there; and a pedestrian, when lawfully using the public highways, is not bound to be continually looking and listening to ascertain if auto cars are approaching, under the penalty that if the pedestrian fails to do so, and is injured, it must be conclusively presumed that the pedestrian was negligent. Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 103 S.E.2d 745 (1958) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 14-21).
- At a particular time or place a pedestrian may not have the "right of way" to travel over or across the highway. Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 103 S.E.2d 745 (1958).
Pattern charges on yielding the right of way and the duty to yield when entering or crossing a roadway from a private road were proper since, although the defendant did not at first see the plaintiff approaching, the defendant continued into the roadway after the defendant saw the plaintiff. Claxton v. Lee, 229 Ga. App. 357, 494 S.E.2d 80 (1997).
- Bus otherwise being operated as a common carrier for hire is not converted into a school bus simply because school children are incidental passengers thereon. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Tuck, 163 Ga. App. 132, 292 S.E.2d 878 (1982).
- Caterpillar 977L Traxcavator does not fall under the definition of "motor vehicle" found either in O.C.G.A. § 10-1-31(a)(4) or general definition of "motor vehicle" under paragraph (29) (now paragraph (33)) of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1 but does fit the definition of "special mobile equipment" under paragraph (54) (now paragraph (59)) of § 40-1-1. Battle v. Yancey Bros. Co., 157 Ga. App. 277, 277 S.E.2d 280 (1981).
- Landfill compactor is not a "motor vehicle" as that term is defined in O.C.G.A. § 33-34-2. Pate v. Turner County, 162 Ga. App. 463, 291 S.E.2d 400 (1982).
Motor cranes propelled by the separate motor on a truck are not special mobile equipment within the meaning of paragraph (54) (now paragraph (59)) of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Georgia Steel, Inc., 25 Bankr. 796 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982).
- Term "motor vehicle," as used in former Code 1933, § 68-101, (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1), did not include a trailer without motive power not hitched to or being drawn by a motor vehicle. O'Steen v. Boone, 117 Ga. App. 174, 160 S.E.2d 229 (1968).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- City street which has been closed to the public for purposes of an officially sanctioned activity (such as a drag race) ceases to be a "highway" as defined by paragraph (16) (now paragraph (19)) of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-53.
- Municipalities are not prohibited by Georgia's Constitution or laws from enacting ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2000-7.
All-terrain vehicles operating on the highways of the State of Georgia are governed by the Uniform Rules of the Road, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq. 2007 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-3.
- Motor scooter came within the definition of a "motor vehicle" under former Code 1933, § 68-101. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 471 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1).
- Golf cart was a vehicle other than a tractor, not operated upon a track, and propelled by other than muscular power; it thus fell within the definition of "motor vehicle" set out in former Code 1933, § 68-101 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1); if the golf cart was to be operated upon a public road, the operator must comply with all registration, inspection, and equipment requirements. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-78.
- When the exclusive use and possession of a "motor vehicle" is donated to a municipality or political subdivision for use in a driver education program for a period of more than 30 days, the municipality or political subdivision is entitled to purchase, for use on that vehicle, a governmental license plate. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-246.
- Any state-owned vehicle, including maintenance or construction-type vehicles, comes within definition of term "motor vehicle." 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-448.
Go-cart is a "motor vehicle," and the operator of a go-cart must be licensed; the go-cart must be registered, inspected annually, and equipped with headlights, stop lights, and turn signals. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-194.
- Since neither tanks which are mounted on four wheels and used to haul anhydrous ammonia (liquid fertilizer) over public highways nor four-wheel trailers used to haul cotton over public highways to farms can qualify as "tractors," the tanks must be registered and have license plates. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-149.
Trailer cannot qualify for sales tax exemption under former Code 1933, § 91A-4503 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-8-3). 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-164.
Air compressor mounted on wheels and drawn by another vehicle is a "trailer." 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 211.
Classification of a "vehicle" depends upon the object's use, rather than upon the method by which the owner is compensated for the use, or the ownership of the vehicle. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 484.
Both a truck and a trailer are included in the use of the word "vehicle." 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 188.
- "Log grapple loader" is a truck body with a log loading machine mounted on its back, and the only time that it is used on a highway is in transporting it from one forest to another; if such a "vehicle" is to be operated on the public highways, it must be registered, licensed, and inspected in accordance with the motor vehicle laws. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U73-82.
- Driver declared to be a habitual violator and given notice as provided by law is not guilty of the offense of operating a vehicle after having been declared a habitual violator when the driver operates self-propelled road construction equipment which is not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property so long as such a vehicle is not operated on the highways of this state. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-14.
- When a "vehicle" is under a permanent lease (for more than a 30-day period), the state may hold either the legal title holder or the lessee responsible for registration, but primary liability is upon the lessee-operator. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 305.
- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 1 et seq., 29, 90, 222 et seq., 304, 346. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 811. 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Explosions and Explosives, § 1. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, §§ 1 et seq., 90. 54 Am. Jur. 2d, Mobile Homes and Trailer Parks, § 1. 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Railroads, §§ 2 et seq., 363. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 1.
- 35 C.J.S., Explosives, § 2. 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 1 et seq., 55, 98 et seq., 164. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 819, 827, 839 et seq., 870, 871, 895, 896. 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 949 et seq. 74 C.J.S., Railroads, § 1.
- Injury to one while coasting in the street, 20 A.L.R. 1433; 109 A.L.R. 941.
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles or other vehicles proceeding in the same direction, 24 A.L.R. 507; 47 A.L.R. 703; 62 A.L.R. 970; 104 A.L.R. 485.
Chauffeur in general employment of owner as servant for time being of owner, or of borrower of car, 42 A.L.R. 1446.
Liability for forcing trespasser from moving automobile, 58 A.L.R. 617.
Motorcycle as within contract, statute, or ordinance in relation to motor cars, motor-driven cars, etc., 70 A.L.R. 1253.
Applicability of regulations or rules governing vehicular traffic to driveways or other places not legal highways, 80 A.L.R. 469.
Airplane as within terms "vehicle," "motor vehicle," etc., 165 A.L.R. 916.
What is "motor vehicle" or the like within statute providing for constructive or substituted service of process on nonresident motorists, 48 A.L.R.2d 1283.
What is a "motor vehicle" within statutes making it an offense to drive while intoxicated, 66 A.L.R.2d 1146.
What is "motor vehicle" within automobile guest statute, 98 A.L.R.2d 543.
Who is "owner" within statute making owner responsible for injury or death inflicted by operator of automobile, 74 A.L.R.3d 739.
Who is "pedestrian" entitled to rights and subject to duties provided by traffic regulations or judicially stated, 35 A.L.R.4th 1117.
What is "temporary" building or structure within meaning of restrictive covenant, 49 A.L.R.4th 1018.
Horseback riding or operation of horse-drawn vehicle as within drunk driving statute, 71 A.L.R.4th 1129.
Validity, construction, and effect of statutes or ordinances forbidding automotive "cruising" - practice of driving repeatedly through loop of public roads through city, 87 A.L.R.4th 1110.
Validity, construction, and application of "named driver exclusion" in automobile insurance policy, 33 A.L.R.5th 121.
Total Results: 13
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-08-13
Snippet: not to all such roadways collectively.” OCGA § 40-1-1 (53) (2019) (emphasis supplied). By contrast,
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-03-25
Citation: 292 Ga. 755, 740 S.E.2d 583, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 768, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 294
Snippet: licenses chapter of the Georgia Code. See OCGA §§ 40-1-1 (35) (“ ‘Nonresident’ means every person who is
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-03-22
Citation: 692 S.E.2d 595, 286 Ga. 760, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 860, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 268
Snippet: 608 S.E.2d 639 (2005). Braley argues that OCGA § 40-1-1(57)[5] defines "sidewalk" in a different manner
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2009-11-23
Citation: 686 S.E.2d 777, 286 Ga. 245, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3663, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 735
Snippet: definitions for many vehicle-related terms. See OCGA § 40-1-1. Although those definitions are introduced with
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2002-09-30
Citation: 570 S.E.2d 296, 275 Ga. 635, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2810, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 858
Snippet: alcohol concentration greater than 0.08 grams. OCGA § 40-1-1(1) defines "alcohol concentration," inter alia
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2002-05-13
Citation: 563 S.E.2d 844, 275 Ga. 181, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 1407, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 388
Snippet: at 729, 524 S.E.2d 455. [6] OCGA § 40-1-1(19). [7] OCGA § 40-1-1(53). [8] OCGA § 40-6-50(b). [9] The
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1998-04-13
Citation: 269 Ga. 378, 497 S.E.2d 566
Snippet: definition of that phrase, which is found in OCGA § 40-1-1 (1): “ Alcohol concentration’ means grams of alcohol
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1993-02-18
Citation: 426 S.E.2d 155, 262 Ga. 840, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 665, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 246
Snippet: contends that the scientific assumption in OCGA § 40-1-1 (1) (defining "alcohol concentration") together
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1993-02-05
Citation: 425 S.E.2d 641, 262 Ga. 769, 18 A.L.R. 5th 1051, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 489, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 188
Snippet: operate a vehicle on the public highways. See OCGA §§ 40-1-1; 40-5-1 (16), (17). Since the right to drive is
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1991-02-28
Citation: 401 S.E.2d 269, 261 Ga. 128, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 107
Snippet: disagree. The jury instruction is derived from OCGA § 40-1-1(1) and serves as a legal definition of the term
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1991-02-28
Citation: 401 S.E.2d 516, 261 Ga. 124, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 102
Snippet: in charging the jury with the language of OCGA § 40-1-1(1) regarding "alcohol concentration" and find it
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1990-11-07
Citation: 397 S.E.2d 423, 260 Ga. 506
Snippet: substances." "Stop" is statutorily defined in OCGA § 40-1-1 (57) (B) as meaning *507 any halting, even momentarily
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1984-10-31
Citation: 322 S.E.2d 487, 253 Ga. 566, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 995
Snippet: App. 538 (304 SE2d 750) (1983). See also OCGA § 40-1-1 (34). There is evidence in the record to show that