O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-16 (2019)

Procedure for passing certain stationary vehicles

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) This Code section shall be known and may be cited as the ‘‘Spencer Pass Law.’’ (b) The operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying flashing yellow, amber, white, red, or blue lights shall approach the authorized emergency vehicle with due caution and shall, absent any other direction by a peace officer, proceed as follows: (1) Make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle if possible in the existing safety and traffic conditions; or (2) If a lane change under paragraph (1) of this subsection would be impossible, prohibited by law, or unsafe, reduce the speed of the motor vehicle to a reasonable and proper speed for the existing road and traffic conditions, which speed shall be less than the posted speed limit, and be prepared to stop. (c) The operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stationary towing or recovery vehicle, a stationary highway maintenance vehicle, or a stationary utility service vehicle that is utilizing traffic cones or displaying flashing yellow, amber, white, or red lights shall approach the vehicle with due caution and shall, absent any other direction by a peace officer, proceed as follows: (1) Make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the towing, recovery, highway maintenance, or utility service vehicle if possible in the existing safety and traffic conditions; or (2) If a lane change under paragraph (1) of this subsection would be impossible, prohibited by law, or unsafe, reduce the speed of the

motor vehicle to a reasonable and proper speed for the existing road and traffic conditions, which speed shall be less than the posted speed limit, and be prepared to stop. (d)(1) Violation of subsection (b) of this Code section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500.00. (2) Violation of subsection (c) of this Code section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $250.00. (e) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) ‘‘Utility service vehicle’’ means any vehicle being used by an employee or contractor of any entity, including, but not limited to, a political subdivision of this state or a local authority or commission related thereto, an electric cooperative, or a public or private corporation, in connection with the provision of utility services. (2) ‘‘Utility services’’ means and includes electric, natural gas, water, waste-water, cable, telephone, or telecommunication services or the repair, location, relocation, improvement, or maintenance of utility poles, transmission structures, pipes, wires, fibers, cables, easements, rights of way, and associated infrastructure.

History

(Code 1981, § 40-6-16, enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 427, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 231, § 2/SB 64; Ga. L. 2011, p. 593, § 1/HB 156; Ga. L. 2016, p. 61, § 1/HB 767.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Payment of indemnification or disability of emergency personnel or prison guards, § 45-9-85. Law reviews. - For note on the 2003 enactment of this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 213 (2003).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Violation of statute warranted investigative stop. - Because the defendant’s apparent violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-16(a) (now subsection (b)) gave the investigating officer a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant and inquire further, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress a refusal to take a breath test

in connection with DUI charges; moreover, the trial court erroneously concluded that the defendant could have had an innocent explanation for a last-minute swerve to avoid hitting the officer’s patrol car as the issue went to the question of guilt or innocence and was not the dispositive question on a motion to suppress. State v. Rheinlander, 286 Ga. App.

625, 649 S.E.2d 828 (2007). Evidence sufficient for conviction. - Defendant’s motion for directed verdict of acquittal on a violation of Georgia’s ‘‘move-over’’ statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-16(a) (now subsection (b)), was properly denied because a reasonable jury could find that, although a patrol car was moving at the time the defendant nearly struck the car, the car had been stationary with lights flashing, and the defendant had failed to slow down or move over. Van Auken v. State, 304 Ga. App. 802, 697 S.E.2d 895 (2010).

Evidence that the defendant passed the officer in a lane adjacent to the officer while the officer conducted a traffic stop and had the officer’s blue emergency lights activated, and that the defendant had room to move out of the adjacent lane and safely into a farther lane was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for violation of the Spencer Pass Law, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-16. Pierce v. State, 322 Ga. App. 145, 743 S.E.2d 438 (2013). Cited in Stevenson v. City of Doraville, 294 Ga. 220, 751 S.E.2d 845 (2013).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 11 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 2007–2025 · leading case: State v. Rheinlander, 649 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).

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State v. Rheinlander, 649 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 16× “OCGA § 40-6-16 (a). By failing to change lanes and then approaching so closely as to have to swerve abruptly to avoid the officer’s car, the defendant appears to have violated this Code section, regardless of whether he kept control of his car or left his lane.”

Van Auken v. State, 697 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 10× “OCGA § 40-6-16 (a). The trial court denied the motion, concluding that while Van Auken technically had not committed a “move-over” violation, the officer had articulable suspicion to make the stop because he had a good faith belief that an unlawful act had occurred.”

Stevenson v. City of Doraville, 751 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “He found this especially likely in light of the requirements of Georgia’s “move-over” law, OCGA § 40-6-16. 4 There is no record evidence, however, which shows Mahar’s lights caused any vehicle to change lanes.”

Pierce v. State, 743 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 40-6-16 (b), the Spencer Pass Law, provides as follows: The operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying flashing .”

Durlav Rijal v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 12× “2 See OCGA § 40-6-16 (a), (b). Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,3 the record shows that around 2:00 a.”

Abigail Patrice James v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 8× “After a bench trial, Abigail James was convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (OCGA § 40-6-395), unlawfully approaching a stationary emergency vehicle (OCGA § 40-6-16), and obstructing a law enforcement officer (OCGA § 16-10-24).”

Cynthia Mack Pierce v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “The officer’s 1 OCGA § 40-6-16 (a) & (b). 2 See Short v. State, 234 Ga.”

Matthew Robert Kraskey v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “Following a bench trial, the Dooly County Probate Court convicted Matthew Kraskey of violating the Spencer Pass Law, OCGA § 40-6-16, a misdemeanor traffic offense.”

Parrish v. Georgia State Patrol (S.D. Ga. 2023). · cites it 2× “See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-16 et seq. Moreover, Plaintiff admitted to Officer Spires that he drank beer and took psych medicine.”

Lewis v. Medford (N.D. Ga. 2025). · cites it 2× “195-4]; then citing Borzendowski Dep. 54:1–4; and then citing Lewis Dep.”

Pamela Cecile Williams v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “Pamela Cecile Williams was charged with violating OCGA § 40-6-16, the “Move Over Law.” She pled nolo contendre, and the disposition was entered on April 25, 2013.”

— 40-6-16(a) — 1 case

State v. Rheinlander, 649 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). “OCGA § 40-6-16 (a). By failing to change lanes and then approaching so closely as to have to swerve abruptly to avoid the officer’s car, the defendant appears to have violated this Code section, regardless of whether he kept control of his car or left his lane.”

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