O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-397 (2019)

Aggressive driving; penalty

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Annotations

Cross references. - Liability of persons rendering emergency care generally, §§ 31-11-8, 51-1-29, 51-1-30, and 51-1-30.1. Regulation of size, weight, and other elements of vehicles and loads on public highways, § 32-6-20 et seq. Liability of law enforcement officers for actions taken while performing duties at scene of emergency, § 35-1-7. Observance of laws by motor carriers, § 40-1-122. Georgia forest products trucking rules, § 46-1-1. Editor’s notes. - Since the purpose of Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, was to ‘‘revise, reorganize, modernize, consolidate, and clar-

ify’’ laws relating to certain aspects of the motor vehicle code, wherever it was possible to do so, other Acts amending Title 40 were construed in conjunction with Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048. This construction particularly includes Acts amending a given Code section when the Code section was later renumbered or redesignated by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048. Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: ‘‘Prosecution for any violation of Sections 4 and 5 of this Act occurring prior to January 1, 1991, is not affected or abated by this Act.’’

Effect of Chapter on Powers of Local Authorities Sec.

Uniform state-wide application of chapter. Powers of local authorities generally. Adoption of chapter by local authorities. Effect of future changes in chapter. Form of adopting ordinance. Citations for violations. Prosecution under this chapter or local ordinance; transfer of charge to state tribunal; double jeopardy. Article 15

Serious Traffic Offenses

JUDICIAL DECISIONS violate the Georgia Constitution by containing matter different from what is expressed in the title. Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 271 S.E.2d 452 (1980). Purpose of chapter. - Statutory purpose of all the regulations codified as the Uniform Rules of the Road, Ga. L. 1974, p.

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under former Code 1933, § 92A-6 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Constitutionality. - Uniform Rules of the Road Act, Ga. L. 1974, p. 633 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.), does not

633 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.), is to promulgate the safe and expeditious movement of vehicular traffic on the highways. Crook v. State, 156 Ga. App. 756, 275 S.E.2d 794 (1980). No conflict with O.C.G.A. § 40-9-3. - Uniform Traffic Regulations Act, Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, is not in irreconcilable conflict with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act, Ga. L. 1951, p. 565, which confers upon the commissioner of public safety the power to cancel drivers’ licenses. Turmon v. Department of Pub. Safety, 222 Ga. 843, 152 S.E.2d 884 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 92A-6). Violation of statute and ordinance. - Any violation of the Uniform Rules of the Road Act, Ga. L. 1974, p. 633 (see O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.) and of a local ordinance may, at the discretion of the local prosecutor, be charged as a violation

of the state statute or the local ordinance. Diamond v. State, 151 Ga. App. 690, 261 S.E.2d 434 (1979). State court jurisdiction. - State court has jurisdiction over all misdemeanor offenses in county including violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road Act, Ga. L. 1974, p. 633 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.). Diamond v. State, 151 Ga. App. 690, 261 S.E.2d 434 (1979). Traffic violation is negligence as a matter of law rather than issuable negligence as a matter of fact. Mathis v. Mangum, 166 Ga. App. 415, 304 S.E.2d 520 (1983). Cited in Mayor of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 249 S.E.2d 224 (1978); Akin v. Hardison, 245 Ga. 57, 262 S.E.2d 814 (1980); Ray v. Parcel Delivery Co., 155 Ga. App. 531, 271 S.E.2d 670 (1980).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, Ch. 68-16 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Purpose of chapter. - Purpose of the Uniform Rules of the Road Act, Ga. L. 1974, p. 633 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 et seq.) is not essentially penal, but remedial and designed to promote public safety. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-117. Suspension and retention of licenses of convicted racers. - Amendment to the Uniform Rules of the Road Act, having been approved by the Governor subsequent to approval of the Drivers Licensing Act, prevails over the Drivers Licensing Act to the extent that there is a conflict between the two statutes; thus, the department should continue to suspend and retain drivers licenses of persons convicted of racing in accordance

with the provisions of the Uniform Rules of the Road Act and disregard the inconsistent provisions of the Drivers Licensing Act which were approved prior to the Uniform Rules of the Road Act. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. 75-117. Permission required before city enacts ordinance. - City cannot enact an ordinance regulating parking on a state highway without first receiving permission of the Department of Transportation. 1971 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U71-3 (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 68-16). Units subject to braking and inspection requirements. - Type of unit which is secured by a flexible, welded joint is a single unified motor vehicle and not two separate vehicles; as such, the unit is subject to the braking and inspection requirements imposed by law on motor vehicles. 1968 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 68-308 (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 68-16).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Driver’s Negligence in Backing Up, 46 POF2d 647. ALR. - Right or duty to turn in viola-

Am. Jur. Proof of Facts. - Driver’s Failure to Maintain Proper Lookout, 40 POF2d 411.

tion of law of road to avoid traveler, or obstacle, 24 A.L.R. 1304; 63 A.L.R. 277; 113 A.L.R. 1328. Regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause, 85 A.L.R. 1136; 109 A.L.R. 1245; 135 A.L.R. 1358.

Power to restrict or interfere with access of abutter by traffic regulations, 73 A.L.R.2d 689. Entrapment to commit traffic offense, 34 A.L.R.4th 1167.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 68-303 are included in the annotations for this article. Motor vehicles operating on ‘‘public roads.’’ - Highway is a public road and the terms ‘‘highways’’ and ‘‘public

highways,’’ as used in the provisions regulating the operating of motor vehicles, mean ‘‘public roads’’ as distinguished from private ways. The meaning is not confined to the public highways which form the state highway system. Powell v. State, 193 Ga. 398, 18 S.E.2d 678 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-303).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 222 et seq. ALR. - Applicability of motor vehicle regulations to public officials or employees, 19 A.L.R. 459; 23 A.L.R. 418.

‘‘Emergency rule’’ as applied to automobile or motorcycle drivers, 79 A.L.R. 1277; 111 A.L.R. 1019.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2003–2021 · leading case: Derrico v. State, 306 Ga. 634 (Ga. 2019).
Derrico v. State, 306 Ga. 634 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 14× “Derrico argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict him of aggressive driving under OCGA § 40-6-397,1 1 OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) provides in relevant part that“[a] person commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the…”
State v. Burrell, 587 S.E.2d 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 10× “In Georgia, the statutory offense of aggressive driving, OCGA § 40-6-397, is a fairly new one. 1 The statute was enacted to address irrational driving behaviors directed at another, i.”
State v. Ogilvie, 734 S.E.2d 50 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “”); OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) (“Aperson commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the intent to annoy, harass, molest, intimidate, injure, or obstruct another person .”
Frasard v. State, 629 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 6× “Michael Frasard appeals his conviction for aggressive driving in violation of OCGA § 40-6-397 (a). 1 Frasard represented himself at trial, but, following his conviction, he retained counsel who filed a motion for new trial.”
Simmons v. State, 743 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 6× “After reviewing the evidence — that Simmons struck Faircloth’s truck four times in rapid succession and then struck it again as he fled the scene — in the light most favorable to the verdict, “we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found [Simmons] guilty of…”
Derrico v. State, 831 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 14× “Deputy Day of the Forsyth County Sheriff's Office responded to the scene and spoke with both Derrico and Ambrosetti on the day of the incident. Deputy Day cited Derrico for aggressive driving, reckless conduct, and improper lane change.”
Adams v. State, 640 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “22 OCGA §40-6-397. 23 Farrier v. State, 273 Ga.”
Patterson v. State, 650 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “As the evidence was insufficient, absent the erroneously-admitted hearsay testimony, to identify Patterson as the driver and support his conviction, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.”
Tyson v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 608 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “The trial court therefore abused its discretion by precluding all discovery in connection with Old Dominion’s internal review of the incident because Old Dominion failed to support its claim that the documents were inadmissible under federal law and because granting the motion…”
Bell v. State, 748 S.E.2d 382 (Ga. 2013). · cites it 2× “on who causes death of another through violation of OCGA § 40-6-390 (a) (reckless driving) “commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three years nor more than 15 years”) and…”
Winn v. State, 660 S.E.2d 883 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “3 OCGA § 40-6-397 (a). 4 Holmes v. State, 120 Ga.”
In the Interest of A. M. A., 596 S.E.2d 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the intent to annoy, harass, molest, intimidate, injure, or obstruct another person.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.