Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, § 1770 and former Code 1933, § 68-301 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Constitutionality.

- While O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180 standing alone does not meet the constitutional certainty requirements of the due process clause, that statute furnishes sufficient criteria to meet constitutional criteria when read in conjunction with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181. Bilbrey v. State, 254 Ga. 629, 331 S.E.2d 551 (1985).

Requirements for valid indictment, accusation, or citation.

- For an indictment, accusation, or citation to meet due process standards in too-fast-for-conditions cases where the accused is traveling slower than the maximum limit in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-181, it must allege the speed of the vehicle and the hazard or condition which made that speed "greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions." Bilbrey v. State, 254 Ga. 629, 331 S.E.2d 551 (1985).

Negligence per se.

- Violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180 is negligence per se. Parr v. Pinson, 182 Ga. App. 707, 356 S.E.2d 740 (1987).

"Failure to keep vehicle under control."

- Accusation charging the defendant with "failure to keep vehicle under control" would not put the defendant on notice to appear prepared to defend oneself as to the offense of driving "too fast for conditions." Cottongim v. City of East Point, 167 Ga. App. 21, 306 S.E.2d 30 (1983).

Since the year 1975, the offense of "failure to keep vehicle under control" has been nonexistent. Cottongim v. City of East Point, 167 Ga. App. 21, 306 S.E.2d 30 (1983).

"Actual and potential hazards then existing" under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180 include pedestrians or other traffic in the roadway. Hamby v. State, 256 Ga. App. 886, 570 S.E.2d 77 (2002).

Driver must reduce speed in approaching intersection.

- Driver must reduce the speed of a driver's vehicle in approaching an intersection so as to bring the vehicle's immediate control within the driver's power and render the vehicle safe to go into the intersection at the reduced rate of speed. Smith v. Hardy, 144 Ga. App. 168, 240 S.E.2d 714 (1977).

Evidence showing that both a police officer and the defendant were forced to take evasive action to avoid a collision was sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant was not operating the defendant's vehicle at a reasonable speed upon approaching an intersection. Bass v. State, 185 Ga. App. 666, 365 S.E.2d 509 (1988).

Cancellation not required for conviction for driving too fast.

- Conviction for driving too fast for conditions is not a conviction which singularly, or in combination with any other offense or offenses, statutorily requires the cancellation, suspension, or revocation or authorizes a court or the department to impose suspension or revocation of a driver's license. Hardison v. Shepard, 246 Ga. 196, 269 S.E.2d 458 (1980).

Circumstantial evidence on speed.

- Although evidence may be entirely circumstantial as to the rate of speed of an automobile, it may be sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion reached by the jury on the issue of negligence. Smith v. Hardy, 144 Ga. App. 168, 240 S.E.2d 714 (1977).

Evidence of the force of the impact of a collision, or as to the distance which the automobile that caused the injury traveled from the point of the collision until the vehicle stopped, may of itself, and in connection with other circumstances, be sufficient to warrant a finding of the jury of negligence as to speed. Smith v. Hardy, 144 Ga. App. 168, 240 S.E.2d 714 (1977).

Purpose of section.

- Purpose of former Code 1910, § 1770(5) was to protect pedestrians and others lawfully on the highways of this state against the consequences of the negligent and improper operation of automobiles. Elsbery v. State, 12 Ga. App. 86, 76 S.E. 779 (1912) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Section's general penal provision incapable of enforcement.

- So much of former Code 1910, § 1770(5) as undertakes to make penal the operation of an automobile on one of the highways of this state at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and use of the highway, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person or the safety of any property, was too uncertain and indefinite in its terms to be capable of enforcement. Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (1912); Holland v. State, 11 Ga. App. 769, 76 S.E. 104 (1912); Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Misdemeanor provision enforceable.

- So much of former Code 1910, § 1770(5) as makes it a misdemeanor to operate an automobile at a rate of speed greater than six miles per hour upon approaching a crossing of intersecting highways was sufficiently definite and certain in the statute's terms to be capable of enforcement. Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (1912); Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 141 Ga. 413, 81 S.E. 120 (1914) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Former Civil Code 1910, § 1770(5) was sound as a rule of civil conduct. Quarles v. Gem Plumbing Co., 18 Ga. App. 592, 90 S.E. 92 (1916) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Violation of section negligence.

- It is negligence to run the machine at a greater rate of speed than six miles per hour as provided in former Civil Code 1910, § 1770(5) and without giving the warning which the law requires. Fuller v. Inman, 10 Ga. App. 690, 74 S.E. 287 (1912) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Section not different from ordinary care rule.

- Indeed, in most respects, it is not greatly different from the rule of ordinary care which would apply in the absence of a statute. Strickland v. Whatley, 142 Ga. 802, 83 S.E. 856 (1914) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Statutory duties are cumulative.

- Statutory duties are cumulative, and do not destroy the common-law duties of drivers of automobiles relative to persons and property using the highway. The duty at common law of a driver of an automobile, relative to persons and property on the highway, is to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring them. What will amount to ordinary care will depend upon the circumstances of the case. Giles v. Voiles, 144 Ga. 853, 88 S.E. 207 (1916) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Persons other than pedestrians protected.

- Former Civil Code 1910, § 1770(5) was sufficiently clear and definite in the statute's terms as to persons and property protected, and did not provide that the only persons intended to be protected are pedestrians. Holland v. State, 11 Ga. App. 769, 76 S.E. 104 (1912) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Section exhaustive in scope.

- Former Code 1910, § 1770(3) should be exhaustive of entire subject of regulating speed of auto vehicles and automobiles, and should operate as a substitute for former Code 1910, § 1770(5). Hardy v. State, 25 Ga. App. 287, 103 S.E. 267 (1920) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(30)).

Former Code 1910, § 1770(30) was unconstitutional. Jones v. State, 151 Ga. 502, 107 S.E. 765 (1921) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(30)).

Intersecting streets.

- Former Civil Code 1910, § 1770(51) did not apply to intersecting streets of a city, and any contrary ruling is overruled. Shannon v. Martin, 164 Ga. 872, 139 S.E. 671, 54 A.L.R. 1246 (1927) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(51)).

Section cumulative to common law.

- Former Civil Code 1910, § 1770(51) imposed certain statutory duties upon drivers of automobiles with reference to persons and property using the highway. These are cumulative and do not destroy the common-law duties of drivers relative to such persons and property using the highway. At common law, the driver owes the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury. Davies v. West Lumber Co., 32 Ga. App. 460, 123 S.E. 757 (1924) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(51)).

"Immediate control" construed.

- "Immediate control" does not mean speed enabling an operator to bring a vehicle to a stop "within vision" of a railroad crossing or short curve, and this without reference as to whether the weather was clear or rainy. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Burton, 33 Ga. App. 199, 125 S.E. 868 (1924) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(51)).

Section furnishes rule of civil conduct.

- Portion of former Code 1933, § 68-301 which provided that no person should operate a motor vehicle upon any public street or highway at a speed greater than was reasonable and safe, having regard to the conditions then existing, was too indefinite to be capable of enforcement, but not too indefinite to furnish a rule of civil conduct. Willis v. Jones, 89 Ga. App. 824, 81 S.E.2d 517 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

Whether driver grossly negligent determined by jury.

- Former subsection (a) of former Code 1933, § 68-301, providing that no person should operate a motor vehicle upon any public street or highway at a speed greater than was reasonable and safe, having due regard to the conditions then existing, did not define any speed as being "greater than is reasonable and safe," and whether or not the driver was grossly negligent in operating the automobile at a dangerous rate of speed, under the conditions and circumstances alleged, was an issue of fact which should be determined by a jury. Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 50 S.E.2d 850 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

It was not error for a court to charge former Code 1933, § 68-301 as: there were allegations to the effect that under the circumstances a violation of applicable speed laws was gross negligence; it was not charged that a violation of the speed laws in itself was gross negligence when "gross negligence" was defined by the judge in the judge's charge to the jury; and it was made clear to the jury that recovery must be predicated on a finding of gross negligence on the part of the driver of the automobile. Kimberly v. Reed, 79 Ga. App. 137, 53 S.E.2d 208 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

Exercise of due care required.

- All drivers of vehicles using the highways are held to the exercise of due care. Harper v. Plunkett, 122 Ga. App. 63, 176 S.E.2d 187 (1970) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Negligence per se.

- While a violation of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 has been called negligence per se, before a negligent act can be found to be negligence per se, a finding of ordinary negligence must in reality first be made. Dowis v. McCurdy, 109 Ga. App. 488, 136 S.E.2d 389, cert. dismissed, 220 Ga. 415, 139 S.E.2d 294 (1964) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

To find violation is negligence per se, finding of common-law negligence must first be made. Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga. App. 398, 154 S.E.2d 803 (1967) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Violation by a driver of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 is negligence per se, and this is true whether the negligence charged is ordinary negligence or gross negligence. Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 176 S.E.2d 715 (1970); But see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

No absolute duty on driver to avoid a collision.

- All the circumstances and conditions at the time and place, including the conduct of other drivers, must be taken into account. Flanigan v. Reville, 107 Ga. App. 382, 130 S.E.2d 258 (1963) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Neither Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, nor any other provision of law, places an absolute duty on any driver to avoid a collision. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

No absolute duty is imposed by Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 upon the driver of a following vehicle to avoid colliding with the automobile immediately ahead of that driver, by the control of speed or otherwise, but all the facts and circumstances are to be taken into consideration so it may be determined where the negligence lies. Harper v. Plunkett, 122 Ga. App. 63, 176 S.E.2d 187 (1970) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Legal position of leading vehicle.

- Leading vehicle has no absolute legal position superior to that of vehicle following. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Speed to be controlled with regard to all highway conditions.

- Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 requires that a driver shall control the driver's speed with regard to all conditions of highway. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co. v. Hollingsworth, 104 Ga. App. 154, 121 S.E.2d 388 (1961) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Reduced speed required in approaching intersection.

- Driver must reduce speed in approaching an intersection to bring the vehicle's immediate control within the driver's power and render the vehicle safe to go into the intersection at the reduced rate of speed. Wells v. Alderman, 117 Ga. App. 724, 162 S.E.2d 18 (1968) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Reasonable and prudent speed standard.

- Gist of violation of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 is driving at speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under all the circumstances. Phillips v. Howard, 109 Ga. App. 404, 136 S.E.2d 473 (1964) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Informant's tip provided police with additional basis to observe and stop defendant.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, despite a claim that an informant used to apprehend the defendant was not previously known to police and had never provided any information until helping in the prosecution of the defendant, because the informant's tip predicted some aspects of the defendant's future behavior and contained information not available to the general public that was corroborated by the observations of officers; moreover, the defendant's reckless driving and flight from a congested parking lot, which caused a short high-speed chase to ensue, and the fact that the police learned that the defendant often carried a gun, provided the officers with an additional basis to stop the defendant and make an arrest. Patton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 18, 650 S.E.2d 733 (2007).

Cited in Gilbert v. Parks, 140 Ga. App. 550, 231 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Dozier v. Brackett, 148 Ga. App. 110, 251 S.E.2d 101 (1978); Dunn v. Dunn, 150 Ga. App. 592, 258 S.E.2d 274 (1979); Maddox v. Thomas, 151 Ga. App. 477, 260 S.E.2d 355 (1979); Reed v. Dixon, 153 Ga. App. 604, 266 S.E.2d 286 (1980); Exum v. Long, 157 Ga. App. 592, 278 S.E.2d 13 (1981); Avant Trucking Co. v. Stallion, 159 Ga. App. 198, 283 S.E.2d 7 (1981); Mercer v. Burnette, 662 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1981); Walker v. State, 163 Ga. App. 638, 295 S.E.2d 574 (1982); U-Haul Co. v. Ford, 171 Ga. App. 744, 320 S.E.2d 868 (1984); Harper v. Dooley, 221 Ga. App. 715, 472 S.E.2d 461 (1996); Worthy v. Kendall, 222 Ga. App. 324, 474 S.E.2d 627 (1996); Thomas v. CSX Transp., Inc., 233 Ga. App. 178, 503 S.E.2d 662 (1998); Stokes v. Cantrell, 238 Ga. App. 741, 520 S.E.2d 248 (1999); Moore v. Pitt-DesMoines, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 676, 538 S.E.2d 155 (2000); State v. Lockett, 259 Ga. App. 179, 576 S.E.2d 582 (2003); King v. State, 262 Ga. App. 37, 584 S.E.2d 652 (2003); Smith v. State, 270 Ga. App. 759, 608 S.E.2d 35 (2004); Purvis v. Steve, 284 Ga. App. 116, 643 S.E.2d 380 (2007); Heller v. City of Atlanta, 290 Ga. App. 345, 659 S.E.2d 617 (2008).

Indictment based on section incapable of enforcement.

- An indictment charging the defendant with a misdemeanor in driving and operating a truck on a public highway in such a manner as to endanger the lives and property of certain named persons due to the circumstances and conditions by driving the truck at excessive speed back and forth across the road was too indefinite in the indictment's terms to be capable of enforcement. Phillips v. State, 60 Ga. App. 622, 4 S.E.2d 698 (1939) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(30)).

General allegation of negligence good against demurrer.

- An allegation that the defendant was negligent in operating an automobile at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and safe in violation of former Code 1933, § 68-301 was good as against general demurrer. Eubanks v. Akridge, 91 Ga. App. 243, 85 S.E.2d 502 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

Venue.

- In the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, a criminal offense under former Code 1933, § 68-301 must be prosecuted in the county or district in which the offense was committed, unless the venue was changed. Hall v. State, 73 Ga. App. 616, 37 S.E.2d 545 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

Nonresident not amenable to service.

- Former state resident who is nonresident when service is attempted is not amenable to service. Parham v. Edwards, 346 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 470 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1973) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Every public thoroughfare is a "highway."

- Every thoroughfare which is used by the public and is common to all the public, and which the public has the right to use, is a "highway." Southern Ry. v. Combs, 124 Ga. 1004, 53 S.E. 508 (1906); Hines v. Wilson, 25 Ga. App. 63, 102 S.E. 646, cert. denied, 25 Ga. App. 840, S.E. (1920) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

"Crossing of intersecting highways" construed.

- Street or highway extending to, but not beyond, another highway, crosses and intersects such highway within the meaning of former Code 1910, § 1770(5). Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (1912) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

"Crossing of intersecting highways" is an intersection or meeting of public thoroughfares as distinguished from private ways. Laing v. Perryman, 31 Ga. App. 239, 120 S.E. 646 (1923) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

"Descent" defined.

- Construing the word "descent," as used in former Code 1910, § 1770(5), in the light of the statutory's context and the declared purpose of that section, it will be held to mean a declivity in the highway over which, from ordinary human experience and observation, it would be deemed more dangerous to operate an automobile at an excessive rate of speed than upon level ground. Elsbery v. State, 12 Ga. App. 86, 76 S.E. 779 (1912) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Railroads.

- Provisions of former Civil Code 1910, § 1770(51) applied to railroad crossings in a city. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. West, 38 Ga. App. 300, 143 S.E. 785 (1928) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(51)).

No exception for police on sharp curve speed limitations.

- Speed limitation of motor vehicles approaching sharp curve contains no exception in favor of police officers. Hudson v. Carton, 37 Ga. App. 634, 141 S.E. 222 (1928) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(51)).

"Intersection" construed.

- Term "intersection" is not limited to intersecting highways. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co. v. Hollingsworth, 104 Ga. App. 154, 121 S.E.2d 388 (1961) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Court need not charge jury with statute in its entirety.

- Conviction for driving too fast for conditions need not be reversed because the trial court failed to charge the jury with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180 in the statute's entirety, as the first sentence of the statute was a correct statement of the new law and did not exclude any elements of the offense charged. Davis v. State, 172 Ga. App. 710, 324 S.E.2d 559 (1984).

Jury charge not precluded by fact speed within posted limit.

- Fact that a driver's rate of speed is within the posted speed limit at the scene of a collision does not preclude a jury charge on Ga. L. 1975, p. 582, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180). Cohran v. Douglasville Concrete Prods., Inc., 153 Ga. App. 8, 264 S.E.2d 507 (1980).

Even assuming that the defendant was traveling within the posted speed limit prior to and at the time of a collision, the propriety of the charge to the jury on traveling too fast for conditions is unaffected. Keenan v. State, 168 Ga. App. 51, 308 S.E.2d 26 (1983); Franklin v. Hennrich, 196 Ga. App. 372, 395 S.E.2d 859 (1990).

Jury instruction upheld.

- In action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when the plaintiff was thrown from the defendant's truck's running board, where plaintiff had been standing at the defendant's request to keep the truck from toppling over as defendant drove the truck out of a ditch, since the direct and circumstantial evidence authorized the finding that the truck was being operated in the public road at the time the plaintiff contends the plaintiff was injured, an instruction with reference to the violations of the sections regulating the driving of automobiles on public roads was justified. Bramlett v. Hulsey, 98 Ga. App. 39, 104 S.E.2d 614 (1958).

Charge which states that no person shall drive a vehicle on a street or highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing; that in every event, speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal compliance and the duty of all persons to use due care is proper. Bowen v. State, 100 Ga. App. 487, 111 S.E.2d 651 (1959).

Court did charge that portion of Ga. L. 1957, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 as follows: "In every event speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway," which was proper, in that the petition charged negligence per se "in failing to slow speed of his vehicle to avoid colliding with petitioner." Collins v. Porterfield, 102 Ga. App. 294, 116 S.E.2d 105 (1960).

Trial court did not err in instructing the jury that Ga. L. 1975, p. 1582, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180) does not define precisely what constitutes driving at a prudent speed and merely furnishes a general rule of conduct. Forehand v. Pace, 146 Ga. App. 682, 247 S.E.2d 192 (1978).

Trial court properly charged the jury on the parties' duty under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180 that every person was required to drive at a reasonable and prudent speed when approaching and crossing an intersection and, thus, the trial court did not err in not giving the charge on the same subject requested by the injured driver and spouse. Hefner v. Maiorana, 259 Ga. App. 176, 576 S.E.2d 580 (2003).

Jury instruction properly denied.

- Trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested jury charge containing references to several situations or conditions the existence of which was not reasonably raised by the evidence, including a non-existing railroad crossing and speculative references to special pedestrian hazards. Campbell v. Cozad, 207 Ga. App. 175, 427 S.E.2d 515 (1993).

Trial court properly refused to give a requested charge which simply quoted O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180 and contained matters irrelevant to the evidence presented in the case. Shilliday v. Dunaway, 220 Ga. App. 406, 469 S.E.2d 485 (1996).

Duty of jury in case involving pedestrian collision.

- It is for the jury to determine, from the evidence, in any case of a collision between an automobile and a pedestrian, whether it was the duty of the driver to have stopped the automobile, whether the driver endeavored to do so, and whether the failure to stop in the particular case was due to negligence. O'Dowd v. Newnham, 13 Ga. App. 220, 80 S.E. 36 (1913) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Jury charge upheld.

- Charge of the court, "if this chauffeur was driving the automobile, as it approached N. street, at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour, that would, by virtue of the law itself, constitute negligence," is a correct statement of the law. Ware v. Lamar, 16 Ga. App. 560, 85 S.E. 824 (1915); Ware v. Lamar, 18 Ga. App. 673, 90 S.E. 364 (1916) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

For a proper charge under the evidence on the speed approaching a crossing, see Elberton & E.R.R. v. Thornton, 32 Ga. App. 259, 122 S.E. 795 (1924) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Error to charge that ordinary care requires ability to stop instantly.

- It would have been error under former Code 1910, § 1770(5) for the judge to say in the judge's charge that ordinary care in crossing a railroad should have included the additional element of ability to stop the automobile instantly. Davis v. Whitcomb, 30 Ga. App. 497, 118 S.E. 488 (1923); Elberton & E.R.R. v. Thornton, 32 Ga. App. 259, 122 S.E. 795 (1924) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Jury instruction upheld.

- Trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the law requires motor vehicles while in use upon the public streets to be equipped with efficient and serviceable brakes, and that the operation of the truck without that equipment along the public streets constituted negligence per se. Orange Crush Bottling Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132 S.E. 259 (1926) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(51)).

Charge to the effect that whenever the operator of any vehicle along a public highway shall meet a vehicle approaching from an opposite direction, the operator of the first vehicle shall turn to the right was held applicable to the conduct of the plaintiff. Hornbrook v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 425, 133 S.E. 264 (1926) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(51)).

Whether driver grossly negligent determined by jury.

- Former subsection (a) of former Code 1933, § 68-301, providing that no person should operate a motor vehicle upon any public street or highway at a speed greater than was reasonable and safe, having due regard to the conditions then existing, did not define any speed as being "greater than is reasonable and safe," and whether or not the driver was grossly negligent in operating the automobile at a dangerous rate of speed, under the conditions and circumstances alleged, was an issue of fact which should be determined by a jury. Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 50 S.E.2d 850 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

It was not error for a court to charge former Code 1933, § 68-301 as: there were allegations to the effect that under the circumstances a violation of applicable speed laws was gross negligence; it was not charged that a violation of the speed laws in itself was gross negligence when "gross negligence" was defined by the judge in the judge's charge to the jury and it was made clear to the jury that recovery must be predicated on a finding of gross negligence on the part of the driver of the automobile. Kimberly v. Reed, 79 Ga. App. 137, 53 S.E.2d 208 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

Determination of reasonable and prudent speed for jury.

- It is jury question as to whether the defendant was driving at a reasonable and prudent speed at the time of a collision. Hill v. Rosser, 102 Ga. App. 776, 117 S.E.2d 889 (1960) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Determination of the reasonableness of speed is necessarily for the jury. Phillips v. Howard, 109 Ga. App. 404, 136 S.E.2d 473 (1964) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Jury question as to exercise of reasonable diligence.

- Evidence was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether the defendant exercised reasonable diligence under the circumstances and did not demand a finding that the plaintiff was negligent in driving 40 miles per hour through the weather conditions that prevailed at the time of the collision. Ellison v. Robinson, 96 Ga. App. 882, 101 S.E.2d 902 (1958) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Consideration of conditions in each case by jury.

- Jury should consider the conditions obtaining in each case in determining whether there should have been a further slowing on approaching an intersection to render the speed "appropriate." Traffic rules and traffic control must be sensible and realistic. Wells v. Alderman, 117 Ga. App. 724, 162 S.E.2d 18 (1968) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).

Summary judgment appropriate.

- When the plaintiff testified that the defendant was driving safely, had control over the vehicle both were riding in prior to the accident, admitted there was nothing defendant could have done to avoid an on-coming car other than to swerve off the road and hit a parked car from which the plaintiff received injuries, and answered in the negative when asked if the defendant had done anything wrong relative to the accident, summary judgment was appropriate. Hendrix v. Sexton, 223 Ga. App. 466, 477 S.E.2d 881 (1996).

Necessity for jury to specify offense serving as foundation for finding.

- After the jury found the appellant guilty of three misdemeanors - driving too fast for conditions, improper driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol so as to make the driver a less safe driver - but the jury did not reveal which of the included offenses served as the jury's foundation for finding the defendant to have been a less safe driver, the defendant's convictions for both included offenses had to be stricken, and the defendant could not be sentenced for either of the included offenses. Howard v. State, 182 Ga. App. 403, 355 S.E.2d 772 (1987).

Sufficient evidence to show unsafe speed.

- When the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the defendant drove the defendant's parents' vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under conditions existing at the time of the collision, the trial court did not err in failing to grant a new trial on the plaintiff's claims against the defendants. Thompson v. Hardy Chevrolet-Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 499, 417 S.E.2d 358 (1992).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of driving too fast for conditions pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-180 and vehicular homicide based on the violation since the defendant: (1) was speeding; (2) had 350 feet of sight distance in which to see the victim; and (3) did not brake, slow down, or sound the defendant's horn prior to striking the victim. Hamby v. State, 256 Ga. App. 886, 570 S.E.2d 77 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for driving under the influence, vehicular homicide, reckless driving, unsafe speed, and other charges as the evidence showed that the defendant was caught trying to take merchandise from a store, and then struck and killed the victim with the defendant's van as the defendant left the store parking lot and turned on to a highway at a time when the defendant admittedly was under the influence of drugs. Cromartie v. State, 275 Ga. App. 209, 620 S.E.2d 413 (2005).

Recovery for negligent train operation.

- It was not the legislative scheme that the operator of a machine owed a statutory duty to the railroad company to keep the machine under control and not to cause the machine to run more than six miles an hour so as to prevent running into a hole or down a declivity, if the company should negligently leave one on the company's right of way, but not immediately on the crossing of the tracks, by failing to comply with the company's statutory duty as to keeping the public road crossing in repair. Western & A.R.R. v. Smith, 145 Ga. 276, 88 S.E. 983 (1916) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

That an automobile approaches a railroad at an unlawful rate of speed will not necessarily preclude recovery for negligent operation of a train. Payne v. Wells, 28 Ga. App. 29, 109 S.E. 926 (1921) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1770(5)).

Extension of criminal activity into adjoining county.

- When a driver voluntarily and criminally begins operating the driver's automobile in excess of the speed limit and voluntarily, continuously, and uninterruptedly extends the driver's criminal act into an adjoining county, the driver violates former Code 1933, § 68-301 in each county. A conviction for violating that section in one county, under such circumstances, will be no bar to a prosecution in the adjoining county. Hall v. State, 73 Ga. App. 616, 37 S.E.2d 545 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

If way ahead not clear to pass, driver authorized to reduce speed.

- When the facts alleged showed that both a truck and a car were approaching the crest of a hill, where the way ahead was not clear for the truck to pass the car, the circumstances authorized the driver of the car to reduce the car's speed in some degree at the time and place. Young v. Truitt, 93 Ga. App. 143, 91 S.E.2d 115 (1955).

Speed allowing stopping within headlight range often required.

- Under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 which requires a reasonable and prudent speed under existing conditions and hazards, a speed which allows stopping within the range of headlights will often be required, but not always, e.g., a well-lighted, limited access highway in clear weather and light traffic. Ruffin v. Bristol, 125 Ga. App. 367, 187 S.E.2d 577 (1972).

Inability to see over hill.

- Fact that the defendant was traveling an upgrade and would not have been able to see the plaintiff until the defendant reached the crossing did not relieve the defendant of the duty to keep the defendant's vehicle under proper control at all times. Broadnax v. Nunn, 97 Ga. App. 864, 104 S.E.2d 553 (1958).

When municipal ordinance establishing maximum speed limit becomes effective.

- Clear import of the language of Ga. L. 1957, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 is that a municipal ordinance seeking to establish a maximum speed limit different from the maximum state speed limits permitted is effective to accomplish that purpose only when it is implemented by the placement of appropriate signs publishing the limit. Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga. App. 398, 154 S.E.2d 803 (1967).

Official signs afford same protection as official devices.

- Official traffic control signs, such as "Men Working," "Watch for Mowers," and "Survey Party," afford the same legal protection that is afforded by other official traffic control devices. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-55.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 274.

C.J.S.

- 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 671 et seq.

ALR.

- Excuse for exceeding speed limit for automobiles, 29 A.L.R. 883.

Right of way at street or highway intersections, 37 A.L.R. 493; 47 A.L.R. 595.

Driving automobile at speed which prevents stopping within range of vision as negligence, 97 A.L.R. 546.

Liability of state, municipality, or public agency for vehicle accident occurring because of accumulation of water on street or highway, 61 A.L.R.2d 425.

Necessity and propriety of instruction as to prima facie speed limit, 87 A.L.R.2d 539.

Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity, 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.

Opinion testimony as to speed of motor vehicle based on skid marks and other facts, 29 A.L.R.3d 248.

Automobiles: sudden emergency as exception to rule requiring motorist to maintain ability to stop within assured clear distance ahead, 75 A.L.R.3d 327.

Motor vehicle operator's liability for accident occurring while driving with vision obscured by smoke or steam, 32 A.L.R.4th 933.

Criminal liability for street racing (drag racing), 89 A.L.R.6th 565.