Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 68-301 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Setting speed limits was quasi-legislative activity.

- In a case in which a parent filed a wrongful death action against the Georgia Department of Transportation alleging that the Department's negligence in choosing to set the speed limit along a certain stretch of highway at 50 miles per hour led to the death of the parent's child, the trial court erred in denying the Department's motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(5) given that: (1) O.C.G.A. § 40-6-182 provided that the Georgia Commissioner of Public Safety and the Commissioner of the Georgia Transportation Department could set the speed limit on any part of the state highway system based on the conditions in that area; (2) the Department's participation in setting the speed limit pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-182 was quasi-legislative action, as it entailed adopting rules and was analogous to the legislative activity of making of laws; and (3) pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(5), the Department could not be held liable for losses resulting from such quasi-legislative action. DOT v. Watts, 260 Ga. App. 905, 581 S.E.2d 410 (2003).

School zones outside municipal limits.

- There is no statutory provision authorizing the establishment of school zones, as such, or restricting the speed of motor vehicles therein, outside the corporate limits of municipalities. Whitley Constr. Co. v. Price, 89 Ga. App. 352, 79 S.E.2d 416 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301).

Factors in determining whether speed limit reduced.

- Whether the speed limit has been reduced depends upon whether action has been taken by a governing authority and proper notice posted on the highway. Harper v. Brown, 122 Ga. App. 316, 176 S.E.2d 621 (1970).

Signs designating zones need not be erected personally by commissioners.

- There is no requirement that the physical erection of the signs giving notice of designated speed zones be done by the commissioner of public safety or the commissioner of transportation personally, rather than through an agent. Munday v. Brissette, 113 Ga. App. 147, 148 S.E.2d 55, rev'd on other grounds, 222 Ga. 162, 149 S.E.2d 110 (1966).

Sufficient evidence to find defendant drivers negligent.

- Under an application of the rules of law to the facts, the jury was authorized to find from the evidence adduced upon the trial, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, that the defendant drivers were grossly negligent in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Lawrence v. Hayes, 92 Ga. App. 778, 90 S.E.2d 102 (1955).

Cited in Frasard v. State, 322 Ga. App. 468, 745 S.E.2d 716 (2013).

Section constitutional.

- Permitting the Department of Public Safety (now Commissioner of Public Safety) to fix special speed restrictions, within an authorized maximum, on any segment of a public street or highway, based upon an engineering or traffic survey, is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 408.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 265 et seq.

ALR.

- Right of way at street or highway intersections, 37 A.L.R. 493; 47 A.L.R. 595.

Necessity and propriety of instruction as to prima facie speed limit, 87 A.L.R.2d 539.