O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Code Sections 40-6-200, 40-6-202, and 40-6-203 shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the roadway in such a manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position.
History
(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, § 90; Code 1933, § 68A-1001, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5.)
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1938, p. 295 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Standard for determining emergency stop. - Standard to be applied in determining whether the operator has made an emergency stop on the public highway is whether an ordinarily prudent man, under the same or similar circumstances, and with the same information available to the operator as to conditions to be considered in determining where the stop should be made, would have acted in the same manner. Smith v. Nelson, 123 Ga. App. 712, 182 S.E.2d 332 (1971). Positioning vehicle in lawful area. - Although there may be no sufficient space at the immediate point of the emergency, yet if the vehicle can consistently
with law and common prudence be moved to some other area where lawful space may be had, the driver should under the law pursue the latter course. Potts v. Sessions, 77 Ga. App. 259, 48 S.E.2d 561 (1948) (decided under Ga. L. 1939, p. 295). Section applicable where driver indicates brakes unsafe. - Charging the jury on O.C.G.A. § 40-6-204 was proper after the driver of a truck indicated that the condition of the driver’s brakes made it impossible for the driver to effect a safe stop. Grogan v. Bennett, 208 Ga. App. 102, 430 S.E.2d 94 (1993). Cited in Wallace v. Ener, 521 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975); Fabian v. Vincent, 155 Ga. App. 464, 270 S.E.2d 858 (1980); Blake v. Continental S.E. Lines, 161 Ga. App. 869, 289 S.E.2d 551 (1982); Brown v. Shiver, 183 Ga. App. 207, 358 S.E.2d 862 (1987); Robinson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 197 Ga. App. 628, 399 S.E.2d 252 (1990); Dial v. Natalizi, 246 Ga. App. 97, 539 S.E.2d 617 (2000). RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 759. ALR. - Negligence or contributory
negligence of driver or occupant of motor vehicle parked or stopped on highway without flares, 67 A.L.R.2d 12.
Notes of Decisions
Swinney v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
· cites it 8× “However, both statutes are modified by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-204, which limits their application to situations where the vehicle is not disabled “in such a manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position.”
Phillips v. South West Mech. Contractors, Inc., 561 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “Appellants contend that South West violated OCGA §§ 40-6-200 (d) (proper parking) and 40-6-203 (a) (1) (I) (prohibited parking), but under OCGA § 40-6-204, these Code sections “shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the roadway in such a manner…”
Morris v. DeLong, 358 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 4× “" We agree with appellees that "stop" necessarily includes the act of stopping and that the evidence presented an inference from which the jury could have found that appellant was in the process of stopping or had come to a rolling stop at the time of the collision.”
Robinson v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 399 S.E.2d 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 4× “OCGA § 40-6-203 (a) (1) (I) prohibits stopping a vehicle on a controlled-access highway; however, OCGA § 40-6-204 provides an exception for disabled vehicles from the mandate of OCGA § 40-6-203 (a) (1) (I).”
Brown v. Shiver, 358 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 40-6-204. Therefore, defendant was not in violation of any statute and no evidence existed by which a jury could find him negligent per se.”
Grogan v. Bennett, 430 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 4× “Evidence was presented at trial regarding the circumstances of the accident which caused the truck to overturn and obstruct the roadway.”
McCubbin v. Bryant, 399 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 2× “See OCGA §§ 40-6-204 and 32-6-2 (4). Judgment affirmed.”
Strickland v. Brown, 487 S.E.2d 105 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 4× “Strickland sued Brown and Cop-page for damages on the theory that Brown violated OCGA § 40-6-203 (a) (1) (I), which forbids stopping a vehicle on a controlled-access highway.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.