O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 42-1-19 (2019)

Petition for release from registration requirements

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) An individual required to register pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 may petition a superior court for release from registration requirements and from any residency or employment restrictions of this article if the individual: (1) Has completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12; and (A) Is confined to a hospice facility, skilled nursing home, residential care facility for the elderly, or nursing home; (B) Is totally and permanently disabled as such term is defined in Code Section 49-4-80; or (C) Is otherwise seriously physically incapacitated due to illness or injury; (2) Was sentenced for a crime that became punishable as a misdemeanor on or after July 1, 2006, and meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(F) of Code Section 17-106.2; (3) Is required to register solely because he or she was convicted of kidnapping or false imprisonment involving a minor and such offense did not involve a sexual offense against such minor or an attempt to commit a sexual offense against such minor. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “sexual offense” means any offense listed in division (a)(10)(B)(i) or (a)(10)(B)(iv) through (a)(10)(B)(xix) of Code Section 42-1-12; or (4) Has completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 and meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(F) of Code Section 17-10-6.2. (b)(1) A petition for release pursuant to this Code section shall be filed in the superior court of the jurisdiction in which the individual was convicted; provided, however, that if the individual was not convicted in this state, such petition shall be filed in the superior court of the county where the individual resides. (2) Such petition shall be served on the district attorney of the jurisdiction where the petition is filed, the sheriff of the county where the petition is filed, and the sheriff of the county where the individual resides. Service on the district attorney and sheriff may be had by mailing a copy of the petition with a proper certificate of service. (3) If a petition for release is denied, another petition for release

shall not be filed within a period of two years from the date of the final order on a previous petition. (c)(1) An individual who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be considered for release from registration requirements and from residency or employment restrictions. (2) An individual who meets the requirements of paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section may be considered for release from registration requirements and from residency or employment restrictions only if: (A) Ten years have elapsed since the individual completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12; or (B) The individual has been classified by the board as a Level I risk assessment classification, provided that if the board has not done a risk assessment classification for such individual, the court shall order such classification to be completed prior to considering the petition for release. (d) In considering a petition pursuant to this Code section, the court may consider: (1) Any evidence introduced by the petitioner; (2) Any evidence introduced by the district attorney or sheriff; and (3) Any other relevant evidence. (e) The court shall hold a hearing on the petition if requested by the petitioner. (f) The court may issue an order releasing the individual from registration requirements or residency or employment restrictions, in whole or part, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual offense. The court may release an individual from such requirements or restrictions for a specific period of time. The court shall send a copy of any order releasing an individual from any requirements or restrictions to the sheriff and the district attorney of the jurisdiction where the petition is filed, to the sheriff of the county where the individual resides, to the Department of Corrections, to the Department of Community Supervision, and to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.

History

Code 1981, § 42-1-19, enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 168, § 15/HB 571; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-67/HB 310.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall become effec-

tive July 1, 2015, and shall apply to sentences entered on or after such date.” Law reviews. For article on the 2015 amendment of

this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Release from registration requirements proper. - Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in releasing the defendant from the sex offender registration requirements because under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), there was evidence that the underlying child molestation offense consisted of the defendant touching the genitals of the child victim with the defendant’s hands; thus, the sexual offense did not rise to the level of intentional physical harm so as to preclude release from the registration requirements. State v. Randle, 331 Ga. App. 1, 769 S.E.2d 724, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 87 (2015), aff’d, 298 Ga. 375, 781 S.E.2d 781, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 85 (2016). Phrase “intentional physical harm,” as it was used in O.C.G.A. § 17-106.2(c)(1)(D), providing conditions for release from the sex offender registry, meant intentional physical contact that caused actual physical damage, injury, or hurt to the victim; a sex offender registrant was entitled to release from registration because his unwanted touching of a ten-year-old boy’s penis did not constitute such physical damage, injury, or hurt. State v. Randle, 298 Ga. 375, 781 S.E.2d 781, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 85 (2016). Denial of petition for release from requirement to register. - Trial court erred when the court denied the defendant’s petition for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender and failed to determine whether the defendant ever touched a woman who testified at the criminal trial without the woman’s consent, thereby committing a sexual offense; thus, since neither the verdict nor the evidentiary ruling in the defendant’s case conclusively established that the encounter was a “relevant similar transaction,” further proceedings were necessary. Yelverton v. State of Georgia, 300 Ga. 312,

794 S.E.2d 613, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 780 (2016). Trial court was indeed authorized, after denying the petition to be released from the sex offender registration requirement on one specific ground and being reversed on appeal, to deny the petition a second time for a wholly different reason. Royster v. State of Ga., 346 Ga. App. 333, 814 S.E.2d 455, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 313 (2018). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request to be released from the sex offender registration requirements as the record showed that the defendant was convicted of an intentional act of aggravated child molestation which resulted in physical injury to the victim when the defendant placed the defendant’s finger inside the rectum of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent to satisfy the sexual desires of the accused, and which resulted in physical injury to the child. Strickland v. State, 347 Ga. App. 216, 818 S.E.2d 675, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 489 (2018). Second petition for release from registration improperly dismissed. - Because O.C.G.A. § 42-1-19 barred a person on the sex offender registry from filing a second petition for release from registration requirements within two years from a final order on a previous petition, if the first petition for relief was denied, but the defendant’s first petition was not denied as the petition was treated as either a voluntary dismissal or, alternatively, a dismissal for failure to prosecute, neither of which operated as an adjudication on the merits of the first petition, the trial court erred by dismissing the defendant’s second petition for release from sex offender registration requirements as that petition was not filed within two years of the previous petition. Hawkins v. State, 330 Ga. App. 547, 768 S.E.2d 523, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 10 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender registration statutes

concerning level of classification - Claims for downward departure, 66 A.L.R.6th 1.

CHAPTER 2 BOARD AND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Sec.

Creation. Board members, officers, records, and compensation. Board meetings. [Reserved] Department created. Administrative functions of department. Special school district for school age youth. Educational programs for adult offenders; awarding of Program and Treatment Completion Certificate. Office of commissioner created; general duties; appointment; compensation. Duties of commissioner relating to department retirements. Additional duties of commissioner.

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 1985, p. 283, § 1 changed the name of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation, the Board of Offender Rehabilitation, and the commissioner of offender rehabilitation to the Department of Corrections, the Board of Corrections, and the commissioner of corrections, respectively, and amended sections throughout the Code to conform to the change. Section 2 of that Act, not codified by the General Assembly, provided as follows: “For administrative convenience, equipment and supplies bearing the name Board of Offender Rehabilitation, Department of Offender Rehabilitation, or commissioner of

Sec.

Selection of department personnel; employee records. Office of board, commissioner, and staff. Powers and duties of board; adoption of rules and regulations. Reasonableness of rules and regulations. Grants to municipal corporations and counties for local jails and correctional institutions. Power of Governor to declare state of emergency with regard to jail and prison overcrowding. Employee benefit fund. Retaining department issued weapons.

offender rehabilitation may be used by the Board of Corrections, Department of Corrections, or commissioner of corrections as if such equipment or supplies bore the name Board of Corrections, Department of Corrections, or commissioner of corrections.” Administrative rules and regulations. Board of Corrections, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Title 125. Law reviews. For comment, “Inherently Governmental: A Legal Argument for Ending Private Federal Prisons and Detention Centers,” see 67 Emory L.J. 293 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 17 et seq.

C.J.S. 72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners, §§ 12-16.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 51 cases (20 in the last 5 years), 2010–2026 · leading case: Yelverton v. State, 794 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2016).
Yelverton v. State, 794 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 72× “Pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4), Yelverton filed a petition for release from the registration requirements.”
The State v. Randle, 769 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 56× “In 2002, Randle applied for and obtained restoration of his civil and political rights (excluding certain firearm-related rights) from the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.”
Sexual Offender Reg. Review Bd. v. Berzett, 801 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 4× “Another controversy between Berzett and the Board could possibly arise in the future if the Board performs another risk assessment, but that will not occur unless so requested by a superior court judge in response to a petition for release under OCGA § 42-1-19, and, moreover, it…”
Gregory v. Sexual Offender Reg. Review Bd., 784 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 4× “17 Finally, although there are procedures by which a sexual offender may seek to be released from the registration requirements and residency and employment restrictions, see OCGA § 42-1-19, the standard for release is, quite understandably, more onerous for Level II risk…”
State v. Randle, 781 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 6× “See OCGA §§ 42-1-19 (a) (4), 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (D).”
Gardei v. Conway, 868 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 2022). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 42-1-19. However, Gardei asserts in his petition that he is not eligible for removal from the Registry under this or any other statutory provision.”
Collins v. the State, 792 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “Furthermore, we note that recent revisions to the Act by the 2016 General Assembly, effective July 1, 2016, provide for: (1) filing a petition in the sentencing court to seal certain records following exoneration and discharge (see OCGA § 42-8-62.1 (c) (2016)); and (2) filing a…”
Jefferson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 6× “And OCGA § 42-1-19 provides that “[a] petition for release pursuant to this Code section shall be filed in the superior court of the jurisdiction in which the individual was convicted.”
Royster v. State of Georgia., 814 S.E.2d 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 14× “2 As *457 we explained in great detail in the earlier appeal in this case, a person who petitions to be released from the requirement that he be registered as a sex offender must show that he has "completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense…”
Davis v. the State, 798 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4× “35 The State suggests that because the requirement to register as a sex offender is not a legal disability, the Board, which can only remove legal disabilities and restore civil and political rights, lacked the power to absolve Davis of the duty to register and that such can…”
In Re White, 702 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 42-1-19 is a new statute which defines the petition process in much greater detail.”
Hawkins v. the State, 768 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 8× “Without addressing the merits of the case, the trial court dismissed the petition pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-19 (b) (3), *548 which provides that “[i]f a petition for release is denied, another petition for release shall not be filed within a period of two years from the date of…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.