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(Code 1981, §42-1-19, enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 168, § 15/HB 571; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-67/HB 310.)
The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, inserted "to the Department of Community Supervision," in the last sentence of subsection (f). See Editor's notes for applicability.
- Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective July 1, 2015, and shall apply to sentences entered on or after such date."
- For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 231 (2015).
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in releasing the defendant from the sex offender registration requirements because under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), there was evidence that the underlying child molestation offense consisted of the defendant touching the genitals of the child victim with the defendant's hands; thus, the sexual offense did not rise to the level of intentional physical harm so as to preclude release from the registration requirements. State v. Randle, 331 Ga. App. 1, 769 S.E.2d 724 (2015).
Phrase "intentional physical harm," as it was used in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), providing conditions for release from the sex offender registry, meant intentional physical contact that caused actual physical damage, injury, or hurt to the victim; a sex offender registrant was entitled to release from registration because his unwanted touching of a ten-year-old boy's penis did not constitute such physical damage, injury, or hurt. State v. Randle, 298 Ga. 375, 781 S.E.2d 781 (2016).
- Trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a general demurrer was reversed as to failing to register as a sex offender as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 because the separation of powers doctrine required the court to adhere to the decision of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to issue the defendant a pardon as the plain meaning of the sweeping language used by the Board in the pardon removed the duty of the defendant to register as a sex offender. Davis v. State, 340 Ga. App. 652, 798 S.E.2d 474 (2017).
- Trial court erred when the court denied the defendant's petition for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender and failed to determine whether the defendant ever touched a woman who testified at the criminal trial without the woman's consent, thereby committing a sexual offense; thus, since neither the verdict nor the evidentiary ruling in the defendant's case conclusively established that the encounter was a "relevant similar transaction," further proceedings were necessary. Yelverton v. State of Georgia, 300 Ga. 312, 794 S.E.2d 613 (2016).
Trial court was indeed authorized, after denying the petition to be released from the sex offender registration requirement on one specific ground and being reversed on appeal, to deny the petition a second time for a wholly different reason. Royster v. State of Ga., 346 Ga. App. 333, 814 S.E.2d 455 (2018).
- Because O.C.G.A. § 42-1-19 barred a person on the sex offender registry from filing a second petition for release from registration requirements within two years from a final order on a previous petition, if the first petition for relief was denied, but the defendant's first petition was not denied as the petition was treated as either a voluntary dismissal or, alternatively, a dismissal for failure to prosecute, neither of which operated as an adjudication on the merits of the first petition, the trial court erred by dismissing the defendant's second petition for release from sex offender registration requirements as that petition was not filed within two years of the previous petition. Hawkins v. State, 330 Ga. App. 547, 768 S.E.2d 523 (2015).
- Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender registration statutes concerning level of classification - Claims for downward departure, 66 A.L.R.6th 1.
Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender registration statutes concerning level of classification - claims for downward departure, 66 A.L.R.6th 1.
Total Results: 5
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-02-01
Snippet: (the “Registry”), see OCGA §§ 42-1-12 through 42-1-19 (the “Registry Act”), violated his constitutional
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-06-19
Citation: 301 Ga. 391, 801 S.E.2d 821, 2017 WL 2623882, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 532
Snippet: response to a petition for release under OCGA § 42-1-19, and, moreover, it is unlikely to occur in the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-11-30
Citation: 300 Ga. 312, 794 S.E.2d 613, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 780
Snippet: offender. See OCGA § 42-1-12. Pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4), Yelverton filed a petition for release
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-03-21
Citation: 298 Ga. 675, 784 S.E.2d 392, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 242
Snippet: residency and employment restrictions, see OCGA § 42-1-19, the standard for release is, quite understandably
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-01-19
Citation: 298 Ga. 375, 781 S.E.2d 781, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 85, 2016 WL 225016
Snippet: “intentional physical harm” to the victim. See OCGA §§ 42-1-19 (a) (4), 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (D). The issue before