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2018 Georgia Code 42-1-19 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 42-1-19 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 42-1-19

TITLE 42 PENAL INSTITUTIONS

Section 1. General Provisions, 42-1-1 through 42-1-19.

ARTICLE 2 SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION REVIEW BOARD

42-1-19. Petition for release from registration requirements.

  1. An individual required to register pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 may petition a superior court for release from registration requirements and from any residency or employment restrictions of this article if the individual:
    1. Has completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12; and
      1. Is confined to a hospice facility, skilled nursing home, residential care facility for the elderly, or nursing home;
      2. Is totally and permanently disabled as such term is defined in Code Section 49-4-80; or
      3. Is otherwise seriously physically incapacitated due to illness or injury;
    2. Was sentenced for a crime that became punishable as a misdemeanor on or after July 1, 2006, and meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(F) of Code Section 17-10-6.2;
    3. Is required to register solely because he or she was convicted of kidnapping or false imprisonment involving a minor and such offense did not involve a sexual offense against such minor or an attempt to commit a sexual offense against such minor. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "sexual offense" means any offense listed in division (a)(10)(B)(i) or (a)(10)(B)(iv) through (a)(10)(B)(xix) of Code Section 42-1-12; or
    4. Has completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 and meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(F) of Code Section 17-10-6.2.
    1. A petition for release pursuant to this Code section shall be filed in the superior court of the jurisdiction in which the individual was convicted; provided, however, that if the individual was not convicted in this state, such petition shall be filed in the superior court of the county where the individual resides.
    2. Such petition shall be served on the district attorney of the jurisdiction where the petition is filed, the sheriff of the county where the petition is filed, and the sheriff of the county where the individual resides. Service on the district attorney and sheriff may be had by mailing a copy of the petition with a proper certificate of service.
    3. If a petition for release is denied, another petition for release shall not be filed within a period of two years from the date of the final order on a previous petition.
    1. An individual who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be considered for release from registration requirements and from residency or employment restrictions.
    2. An individual who meets the requirements of paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section may be considered for release from registration requirements and from residency or employment restrictions only if:
      1. Ten years have elapsed since the individual completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12; or
      2. The individual has been classified by the board as a Level I risk assessment classification, provided that if the board has not done a risk assessment classification for such individual, the court shall order such classification to be completed prior to considering the petition for release.
  4. In considering a petition pursuant to this Code section, the court may consider:
    1. Any evidence introduced by the petitioner;
    2. Any evidence introduced by the district attorney or sheriff; and
    3. Any other relevant evidence.
  5. The court shall hold a hearing on the petition if requested by the petitioner.
  6. The court may issue an order releasing the individual from registration requirements or residency or employment restrictions, in whole or part, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual offense. The court may release an individual from such requirements or restrictions for a specific period of time. The court shall send a copy of any order releasing an individual from any requirements or restrictions to the sheriff and the district attorney of the jurisdiction where the petition is filed, to the sheriff of the county where the individual resides, to the Department of Corrections, to the Department of Community Supervision, and to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.

(Code 1981, §42-1-19, enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 168, § 15/HB 571; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-67/HB 310.)

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, inserted "to the Department of Community Supervision," in the last sentence of subsection (f). See Editor's notes for applicability.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective July 1, 2015, and shall apply to sentences entered on or after such date."

Law reviews.

- For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 231 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Release from registration requirements proper.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in releasing the defendant from the sex offender registration requirements because under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), there was evidence that the underlying child molestation offense consisted of the defendant touching the genitals of the child victim with the defendant's hands; thus, the sexual offense did not rise to the level of intentional physical harm so as to preclude release from the registration requirements. State v. Randle, 331 Ga. App. 1, 769 S.E.2d 724 (2015).

Phrase "intentional physical harm," as it was used in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), providing conditions for release from the sex offender registry, meant intentional physical contact that caused actual physical damage, injury, or hurt to the victim; a sex offender registrant was entitled to release from registration because his unwanted touching of a ten-year-old boy's penis did not constitute such physical damage, injury, or hurt. State v. Randle, 298 Ga. 375, 781 S.E.2d 781 (2016).

Pardon removed duty of defendant to register.

- Trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a general demurrer was reversed as to failing to register as a sex offender as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 because the separation of powers doctrine required the court to adhere to the decision of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to issue the defendant a pardon as the plain meaning of the sweeping language used by the Board in the pardon removed the duty of the defendant to register as a sex offender. Davis v. State, 340 Ga. App. 652, 798 S.E.2d 474 (2017).

Denial of petition for release from requirement to register.

- Trial court erred when the court denied the defendant's petition for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender and failed to determine whether the defendant ever touched a woman who testified at the criminal trial without the woman's consent, thereby committing a sexual offense; thus, since neither the verdict nor the evidentiary ruling in the defendant's case conclusively established that the encounter was a "relevant similar transaction," further proceedings were necessary. Yelverton v. State of Georgia, 300 Ga. 312, 794 S.E.2d 613 (2016).

Trial court was indeed authorized, after denying the petition to be released from the sex offender registration requirement on one specific ground and being reversed on appeal, to deny the petition a second time for a wholly different reason. Royster v. State of Ga., 346 Ga. App. 333, 814 S.E.2d 455 (2018).

Second petition for release from registration improperly dismissed.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 42-1-19 barred a person on the sex offender registry from filing a second petition for release from registration requirements within two years from a final order on a previous petition, if the first petition for relief was denied, but the defendant's first petition was not denied as the petition was treated as either a voluntary dismissal or, alternatively, a dismissal for failure to prosecute, neither of which operated as an adjudication on the merits of the first petition, the trial court erred by dismissing the defendant's second petition for release from sex offender registration requirements as that petition was not filed within two years of the previous petition. Hawkins v. State, 330 Ga. App. 547, 768 S.E.2d 523 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender registration statutes concerning level of classification - Claims for downward departure, 66 A.L.R.6th 1.

Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender registration statutes concerning level of classification - claims for downward departure, 66 A.L.R.6th 1.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 42-1-19

Total Results: 5  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Sexual Offender Reg. Review Bd. v. Berzett, 301 Ga. 391 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 2017 | 801 S.E.2d 821

...Another controversy between Berzett and the Board could possibly arise in the future if the Board performs another risk assessment, but that will not occur unless so requested by a superior court judge in response to a petition for release under OCGA § 42-1-19, and, moreover, it is unlikely to occur in the case of Berzett (or most other sexual offenders) unless at least ten years have passed since his completion of “all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 . . . OCGA § 42-1-19 (c) (2) (A)....
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Gregory v. Sexual Offender Reg. Review Bd., 298 Ga. 675 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 21, 2016 | 784 S.E.2d 392

...within 1,000 feet of an area where minors congregate. See OCGA § 42-1-15 (c) (2).17 Finally, although there are procedures by which a sexual offender may seek to be released from the registration requirements and residency and employment restrictions, see OCGA § 42-1-19, the standard for release is, quite understandably, more onerous for Level II risk assessments and sexually dangerous predators. See OCGA § 42-1-19 (c) (2) (A-B). 16 OCGA § 42-1-14 (f) provides: In addition to the requirements of registration for all sexual offenders, a sexually dangerous predator shall report to the sheriff of the county where such p...
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Gardei v. Conway, 868 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 1, 2022 | 313 Ga. 132

...(“GBI”), in their individual capacities (collectively “Respondents”),1 alleging that Respondents’ continued enforcement against him of the statutory requirements governing Georgia’s Sex Offender Registry (the “Registry”), see OCGA §§ 42-1-12 through 42-1-19 (the “Registry Act”), violated his constitutional rights....
...he renewal requirement was a consequence of Gardei’s initial sex 9 The Registry Act also provides a method for sex offenders who meet certain requirements to petition a superior court for release from the Registry requirements. See OCGA § 42-1-19....
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State v. Randle, 298 Ga. 375 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 19, 2016 | 781 S.E.2d 781

...of the criteria for eligibility for removal from the sex offender registry, namely, the requirement that the offense that resulted in the offender’s inclusion on the registry involved no “intentional physical harm” to the victim. See OCGA §§ 42-1-19 (a) (4), 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (D)....
...Randall completed his prison sentence, registered as a sex offender in accordance with OCGA § 42-1-12, and served out the remainder of his term on probation, from which he was released in June 2001. In 2013, Randle filed a petition for release from the sex offender registry pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4), which authorizes release where at least ten years have elapsed since the offender has completed his sentence, see id....
...The 2010 legislation, inter alia, established the current process for petitioning for release from the registry and, in so doing, expressly adopted the criteria set forth at OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1). See Ga. L. 2010, p. 168, Act 389, § 15 (enacting OCGA § 42-1-19)....
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Yelverton v. State, 300 Ga. 312 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 2016 | 794 S.E.2d 613

...More than 25 years ago, Raymond Yelverton was convicted of child molestation and aggravated child molestation, see Yelverton v. State, 199 Ga. App. 41 (403 SE2d 816) (1991), and as a result, he is required to register as a sexual offender. See OCGA § 42-1-12. Pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4), Yelverton filed a petition for release from the registration requirements....
...Sexual Offender Registration Review Board, 298 Ga. 675, 680-682 (1) (784 SE2d 392) (2016). Yelverton completed his sentence in February 2010. In March 2015, Yelverton filed his petition for release in the Superior Court of Tift County,4 alleging that he is eligible for release *314under OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4)....
...[h]as completed all prison, parole, supervised release, and probation for the offense which required registration pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12 and meets the criteria set forth in subparagraphs (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(F) of Code Section 17-10-6.2. OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4)....
...If the court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual offense,”6 *315the court has discretion to release the petitioner from the registration requirements. OCGA § 42-1-19 (f). When presented with a petition for release, a court may consider “[a]ny evidence introduced by the petitioner,” OCGA § 42-1-19 (d) (1), “[a]ny evidence introduced by the district attorney or sheriff,” OCGA § 42-1-19 (d) (2), and “[a]ny other relevant evidence.” OCGA § 42-1-19 (d) (3). In this case, the court below determined that Yelverton was not eligible for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4) because he did not meet all of the criteria set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1)....
...(E) The offense did not involve the transportation of the victim; and (F) The victim was not physically restrained during the commission of the offense. OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (A)-(F). In 2010, the General Assembly incorporated these same criteria by reference into OCGA § 42-1-19, specifying that satisfaction of the criteria is a necessary condition of eligibility for release from the sexual offender registration requirements under OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4).9 The court below determined that Yelverton failed to meet the criterion set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C), and for that reason, he is not eligible for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4)....
...ted relief from registration. Based on that determination, the court below denied the petition for release.10 Yelverton contends that the court below misconstrued OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C), as that provision is incorporated by reference in OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4)....
...In particular, Yelverton argues that a decision to admit evidence of an independent act against the accused in a criminal trial does not always and necessarily require a finding that there is “evidence of a relevant similar transaction” for the purposes of OCGA §§ 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C) and 42-1-19 (a) (4). For that reason, Yelverton says, a court considering a petition for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4) must decide for itself whether the evidence presented against the petitioner in his criminal trial — or other evidence presented at the hearing on the petition for release — amounts to “evidence of a relevant similar transact...
...Our reasoning in Evans is instructive here. Just as the statutory context of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C) suggests that the provision is most naturally and reasonably understood to prohibit deviations from the mandatory minimum sentence for repeat sexual offenders, the context of its incorporation by reference into OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4) suggests that it is likewise most naturally and reasonably understood to render a sexual offender ineligible for release from the registration requirements if he has committed independent but similar sexual offenses that show him to be a repeat offender.11 Indeed, even when a sexual offender is not categorically ineligible for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4), a superior court properly may release the offender from the registration requirements only upon a finding “by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual offense.” OCGA § 42-1-19 (f)....
...As it is used in OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C), “evidence of a relevant similar transaction” has the same meaning in both the sentencing and sexual offender registration contexts. Accordingly, as it is used in OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C) and incorporated by reference in OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4), “evidence of a relevant similar transaction” does not simply mean evidence of an independent act that is admitted pursuant to the Williams standard (under the old Evidence Code) — or OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (under the new Evidence Code) — in a case in which the defendant is charged with a sexual offense....
...hereby committed a sexual offense. Accordingly, neither the verdict nor the evidentiary ruling conclusively establishes that the encounter with the woman is a “relevant similar transaction” for the purposes of OCGA §§ 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (C) and 42-1-19 (a) (4). In these circumstances, it was for the court below — the court hearing the petition for release — to determine for itself whether there is “evidence of a relevant similar transaction” that would *320render Yelverton ineligible for release....
...lestation are “criminal offense[s] against a victim who is a minor.” See Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834, 837 (2) (a) (619 SE2d 346) (2005). Yelverton is, therefore, subject to the registration requirements. A petition for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 must be filed “in the superior court of the jurisdiction in which the [petitioner] was convicted [of the crime that renders him subject to the registration requirements],” unless the petitioner was convicted in a jurisdiction outside Georgia. OCGA § 42-1-19 (b) (1). To be eligible for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4), a petitioner also must show either that ten years have elapsed since his completion of his sentence, see OCGA § 42-1-19 (c) (2) (A), or that he has been classified by the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board as a Level I sexual offender. See OCGA § 42-1-19 (c) (2) (B)....
...That petition was denied upon the same ground as the second petition. Yelverton attempted to appeal from the denial of his first petition, but his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals because he failed to file an application for discretionary review. We note that OCGA § 42-1-19 (b) (3) contemplates the filing of successive petitions for release, and in any event, the State does not contend in this appeal that the denial of the first petition is res judicata or otherwise works an estoppel to bar the second petition. If a sexual offender has a prior conviction for a sexual offense, he is rendered ineligible for release from the registration requirements by the incorporation of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (A) into OCGA § 42-1-19 (a) (4)....