Constitutionality.

- Defendant who entered an Alford plea in 2000 to sex offenses as a first offender was properly required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the 2005 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12; the statute applies to first offenders convicted before July 1, 2004, and it is not an ex post facto law because if a defendant fails to register, the defendant will be guilty of a felony distinct from those crimes of which the defendant has been previously convicted. Watson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 635, 642 S.E.2d 328 (2007).

Defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(3) as a result of failing to renew the defendant's registration as a sex offender was upheld on appeal as the requirement to register as a sexual offender under § 42-1-12(e)(3) resulted in a new crime under § 42-1-12(n) and was not an ex post facto law. Frazier v. State, 284 Ga. 638, 668 S.E.2d 646 (2008).

Trial court did not err in revoking a convicted sexual offender's probation for failing to register an address change when the offender moved into a motel because O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 was not unconstitutionally vague in failing to define the term "temporary residence"; nor does the statute's use of the term "temporary residence" in any way authorize or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, but rather, § 42-1-12(a)(16) sets forth in considerable detail the information that must be reported by a sexual offender. Dunn v. State, 286 Ga. 238, 686 S.E.2d 772 (2009).

Trial court did not err in revoking a convicted sexual offender's probation for failing to register an address change after the offender moved into a motel because the offender failed to establish that the offender was treated differently from a similarly situated nonresident sexual offender entering the state; if O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(7) applies to a hypothetical nonresident sexual offender, that person must update his or her information within 72 hours of a change of address as required in § 42-1-12(f)(5), and any nonresident sexual offender who is required to register by virtue of the specification of § 42-1-12(e)(7) is equally subject to the requirement that he or she register a new address within 72 hours of changing that address and equally subject to being charged with a violation. Dunn v. State, 286 Ga. 238, 686 S.E.2d 772 (2009).

Because sexual offender registry requirements are regulatory, and not punitive the registry requirement is not a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; moreover, it is of no consequence whether a defendant has committed an offense that is "sexual" in nature before being required to register since the nature of the offense requiring the registration would not somehow change the registration requirements into a form of "punishment." Rainer v. State, 286 Ga. 675, 690 S.E.2d 827 (2010).

O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 does not violate substantive due process because § 42-1-12 advances the state's legitimate goal of informing the public for purposes of protecting children from those who would harm the children, and it is not arbitrary to believe that a child may be more at risk of harm from someone who would falsely imprison the child and who is not the child's parent; the fact that a defendant's offense did not involve sexual activity is of no consequence because under the statute, one only needs to have committed a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor in order to meet the statutory definition of "sexual offender" for purposes of registration. Rainer v. State, 286 Ga. 675, 690 S.E.2d 827 (2010).

It is commonly understood by persons of common intelligence that criminal conduct which is a sexual offense is, at a minimum, criminal conduct which involves genitalia. Inasmuch as the offense of cruelty to children is found in Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated and a defendant's conduct that led to the defendant's conviction is a sexual offense, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 is not unconstitutionally vague. Wiggins v. State, 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2906, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1251, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4005 (U.S. 2011).

Registration requirements for homeless sex offenders unconstitutionally vague.

- Defendant was entitled to quash an indictment charging the defendant with failure to register a new residence address under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 as the defendant, who was homeless and not living in a shelter, was not given an objective standard or guidelines as to how to register if the defendant did not have a street or route address; thus, § 42-1-12 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to homeless sex offenders without a street or route address. Santos v. State, 284 Ga. 514, 668 S.E.2d 676 (2008).

Failure of homeless to register.

- Defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed because the record showed that the state has never contested the evidence showing the defendant's homeless status nor had the state ever alleged, either in the indictment or at trial, that, despite the defendant's homelessness, the defendant had a street or route address which the defendant failed to register with the sheriff's office. Chestnut v. State, 331 Ga. App. 69, 769 S.E.2d 779 (2015).

Classification implicated liberty interest.

- Defendant's classification as a sexually dangerous predator implicated a liberty interest as it required electronic monitoring and tracking, additional registration requirements, additional employment restrictions, and reputational harm associated with such a classification. Gregory v. Sexual Offender Registration Review Bd., 298 Ga. 675, 784 S.E.2d 392 (2016).

Reliance on registration database.

- Defendant sergeant reasonably relied on the Georgia Bureau of Investigation's information that charges for failing to register as a sex offender were outstanding and that the plaintiff was last known to be in the sergeant's county; thus, verifying that the offender had not given the offender's address to the sheriff provided sufficient probable cause to seek an arrest warrant and a Fourth Amendment challenge properly failed; O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(c) statutorily charged the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) with providing conviction data (including names and fingerprints) of persons required to register as sex offenders to local sheriffs, who in turn were charged with maintaining a list of their names and addresses, and the sergeant was in no position to challenge the information on the GBI database. Smith v. Greenlee, 289 Fed. Appx. 373 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).

As for defendant's argument that registering as a sex offender would have exposed the defendant to prosecution for reentry of a previously removed alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the court found no Fifth Amendment violation because the defendant could not show that anything the defendant would have been required to provide under Georgia's sex offender statute would have confronted the defendant with a substantial hazard of self-incrimination (there were no nationality, visa, or other immigration details required to be submitted); the cases defendant cited in support of the defendant's Fifth Amendment argument were distinguishable because those cases imposed a disclosure requirement largely designed to discover involvement in criminal activities, and the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), was not designed to uncover criminal behavior, but was instead intended to protect the public from sex offenders by tracking the offenders' interstate movement. United States v. Simon-Marcos, F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2010)(Unpublished).

Construction.

- Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 makes the registration requirements conditional upon a sexual offender having been told of the need to register upon release. Instead, § 42-1-12 directs the official to give the registration information to a person who is required to register, which indicates that the sexual offender has an obligation to register which is independent of the notice given by the official. Petway v. State, 291 Ga. App. 301, 661 S.E.2d 667 (2008).

O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(7) clearly provides that convictions for rape and crimes relating to rape require registration as a sex offender, and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642, 670 S.E.2d 425 (2008).

O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(7) does not give a nonresident sexual offender who falls under its definition license to remain in the state for fourteen consecutive days without providing notification to the appropriate sheriff because the statute brings such a person within the ambit of § 42-1-12; the obligations of those who are required to register are unaffected by the specifications in § 42-1-12(e)(7) because § 42-1-12(e) declares who shall register, and § 42-1-12(f) prescribes the obligations of those persons. Dunn v. State, 286 Ga. 238, 686 S.E.2d 772 (2009).

Trial court properly convicted the defendant of failing to register as a sexual offender under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(4) because the statute was not unconstitutionally vague absent the definition of the term sexually violent offense as the statute included offenses in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2 and the defendant admitted the defendant knew the defendant was required to register. Youmans v. State, 291 Ga. 754, 732 S.E.2d 441 (2012).

Motion to enforce terms inadequate to address regulatory mechanism.

- Defendant's motion to enforce the terms and conditions of the defendant's sentence was ineffectual to address the regulatory mechanism requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender. Smith v. State, 328 Ga. App. 885, 763 S.E.2d 269 (2014).

Counseling requirement as precondition to parole.

- Prisoner who has not been convicted of a sex offense is entitled to due process before the state declares the prisoner to be a sex offender. While classification or designation as a sex offender under Georgia law is controlled by Georgia's Sex Offender Registration law, O.C.G.A § 42-1-12, the Parole Board's counseling precondition was insufficiently stigmatizing to constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest and to support a due process entitlement. Kramer v. Donald, 286 Fed. Appx. 674 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).

When pardoned.

- Inclusion on the sex offender registry pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 was a legal consequence of the underlying criminal offense and a disability imposed by law and the defendant's pardon by its express terms removed all disabilities under Georgia law resulting from the defendant's conviction and relieved all the legal consequences thereof, and restored all of the defendant's civil and political rights, excepting only the defendant's firearm rights. State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684, 814 S.E.2d 701 (2018).

Cruel and unusual punishment.

- Habeas court properly ruled that an inmate's sentence of 10 years in prison for having consensual oral sex with a 15-year-old when the inmate was only 17 years old constituted cruel and unusual punishment in light of the 2006 amendments to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-4 and42-1-12. As a result, the inmate's conviction was reversed and the inmate was not required to register as a sex offender. Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 652 S.E.2d 501 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to strike an illegal sentence because the requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender did not violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Wiggins v. State, 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2906, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1251, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4005 (U.S. 2011).

Evidence insufficient to prove failure to register.

- Defendant's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender had to be reversed because a rational trier of fact could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence presented that the defendant violated the sex offender registration requirements of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 as the state's sole witness did not testify that the witness was working when the defendant was required to register or that the defendant could not have registered with someone else. Davis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 118, 766 S.E.2d 566 (2014).

Because the defendant was required to renew sex offender registration information in the county in which the defendant resided, and the evidence showed that the defendant did not renew registration in the county where the defendant had lived but had registered in the county where the defendant had moved to, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for violating the State Sexual Offender Registry statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12. Jones v. State, 340 Ga. App. 398, 797 S.E.2d 653 (2017).

Failure to register results in new crime.

- Defendant's failure to abide by the requirement to register as a sexual offender, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, would result in a new crime, thus, § 42-1-12 is not an ex post facto law. Miller v. State, 291 Ga. App. 478, 662 S.E.2d 261 (2008).

Registration requirement not sentence or punishment.

- Requiring a defendant who had been convicted of aggravated child molestation to submit to lifetime registration as a sex offender under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 did not exceed the maximum sentence allowed under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 as such registration was not a sentence or a punishment. Hollie v. State, 298 Ga. App. 1, 679 S.E.2d 47 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 389, 696 S.E.2d 642 (2010).

Registration is not a sentence or punishment.

- That the sentencing judge did not impose sexual offender registration as a condition of probation did not excuse the defendant from registering as registration was not a sentence or a punishment. Rogers v. State, 297 Ga. App. 655, 678 S.E.2d 125 (2009).

Requiring registration as special condition of probation proper.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to strike an illegal sentence because the special condition of probation the trial court imposed, requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender, was required by the sex-offender registration statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12. Moreover, the facts supporting the requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender, that the defendant committed conduct that was a sexual offense against a minor, were found by the jury. The sex-offender registry requirement is regulatory and not punitive in nature. Wiggins v. State, 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2906, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1251, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4005 (U.S. 2011).

Sentence of 30 years, 15 to serve, proper.

- Defendant, who was indicted for violating O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 "on or about April 4, 2007, the exact date being unknown", was properly sentenced to 30 years, to serve 15 imprisoned, because an amendment to § 42-1-12 that was effective July 1, 2006, increased the sentencing range from one-to-three years to ten-to-thirty years. Relaford v. State, 306 Ga. App. 549, 702 S.E.2d 776 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0429, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 576.

Life sentence for failing to register unconstitutional.

- Imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment imposed against a defendant, who was a second time offender, for failing to register as a sexual offender was held unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate to the crime of failing to register. Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008).

Denial of request for removal from registration requirement.

- While the petitioner did present substantial evidence, the trial court's determination of risk depended, inter alia, on the court's assessment of the credibility of the petitioner and of the expert who testified very favorably on the petitioner's behalf regarding a risk assessment examination and analysis by the expert, and the petitioner failed to show a manifest abuse of discretion in the denial of the petition. Royster v. State of Ga., 346 Ga. App. 333, 814 S.E.2d 455 (2018).

Cited in Turner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 747, 500 S.E.2d 628 (1998); Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 505 S.E.2d 491 (1998); State v. Stulb, 296 Ga. App. 510, 675 S.E.2d 253 (2009); Bell v. State, 323 Ga. App. 751, 748 S.E.2d 114 (2013).

No written findings of fact or conclusions of law required.

- By the statute's plain terms, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 specifies the criterion the trial court must consider in determining whether to grant a petition for relief from the statute's registration requirements for sexual offenders, namely, the risk that the petitioner will reoffend, but the statute does not state that the trial court's order granting or denying a petition must include written findings of fact or conclusions of law. In re Baucom, 297 Ga. App. 661, 678 S.E.2d 118 (2009).

Motion to quash indictment untimely.

- Defendant's motion to quash an indictment and a subsequent motion to quash a failure to register as a sex offender count under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 were properly denied; the defendant waived the right to challenge the form of the failure to register count of the indictment because the defendant's motion was not made before entry of a not guilty plea and even if § 17-7-110 applied to the filing of the defendant's motion, it was untimely under that statute as well. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

Void indictment for failure to specify violation.

- An indictment that failed to inform the defendant of what alleged action or inaction constituted a violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(f)(5) was deficient and void. Only if additional factual allegations had been asserted in the indictment would it be clear what acts or omissions the grand jury had found probable cause to believe the defendant had committed, and what acts or omissions the trial jury would be required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had committed in order to find the defendant guilty as charged. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 800 S.E.2d 356 (2017).

Motion to sever properly denied.

- Defendant's motion to sever the failure to register as a sex offender counts under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 from the remaining aggravated sodomy and child molestation counts was properly denied as: (1) the charges involved a series of acts which were connected together; (2) the case was not so complex as to impair the jury's ability to distinguish the evidence and to apply the law intelligently to the counts as joined; and (3) the failure to report charges were legally material to the crimes against two children because the failure constituted evasive conduct that was circumstantial evidence of guilt; moreover, evidence of the conduct underlying the defendant's conviction of a sex offense in North Carolina was admissible as a similar transaction. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

Retroactive registration of sex offenders is nonpunitive.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to remove the defendant from the sex offender registry, or in the alternative to be resentenced as a first offender, as the United States Supreme Court had already determined that retroactive registration of sex offenders was nonpunitive and did not constitute an ex post facto law, and to resentence the defendant as a first offender would be in direct contravention of the plain language of O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-6.1 and42-1-12 since the defendant pled guilty but mentally ill to kidnaping a child under the age of 14, which was a serious violent felony. Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 86, 673 S.E.2d 604 (2009).

Registration for first offender.

- Georgia superior court properly required a first offender to register as a sex offender pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 as both the 2005 and 2006 amendments to the statute dictated registration, and despite the fact that registration was not part of the first offender's plea agreement, as neither the court nor the prosecutor had the power to exempt the first offender from the adoption of new rules regarding registration entered after the plea. Peters v. Donald, 282 Ga. App. 714, 639 S.E.2d 345 (2006).

Residence, not domicile.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on a count alleging that the defendant failed to register as a sex offender under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 as that section did not speak to the concept of "domicile," but to residence address and moving and residence included an intent to live in a place for the time being; although the state did not show exactly where the defendant resided after leaving the county, it showed that the defendant left the county and lived outside the state for more than a year without informing the county sheriff of a change in residence address, as required by law. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

In a declaratory action suit brought by a registered sex offender, former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15(a) was held unconstitutional as to the sex offender's residence, which was acquired prior to a child care facility locating itself within 1,000 feet of the property, as forcing the sex offender from the home was a regulatory taking of the property without just and adequate compensation. However, no regulatory taking occurred with regard to prohibiting the sex offender from physically working at a business, pursuant to former § 42-1-15(b)(1), in which the sex offender held an ownership interest in as there existed no prohibition on owning a business within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, school, or other area where minors congregated and the sex offender failed to show that physically working at the premises was necessary. Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 282 Ga. 754, 653 S.E.2d 740 (2007).

Change of residence.

- Trial court's conclusion that the state failed to present any competent evidence showing that the defendant had changed residences was erroneous because in the court's assessment of the evidence, the trial court erroneously determined that an investigator's testimony amounted to inadmissible hearsay; the investigator's testimony as to the declaration of the defendant's father that the defendant no longer lived at that residence was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement and was admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Moreover, the circumstances presented by the evidence would authorize a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant had intended to change residences without notifying the local authorities as required; the evidence showed that the defendant had been living at the defendant's mother's residence for over two weeks, had not returned to the defendant's father's residence by the time the defendant was arrested, had failed to report for a scheduled meeting with a probation officer, and had not contacted the probation officer to explain the defendant's failure to report for the meeting or to provide any information as to the defendant's current residential status. State v. Canup, 300 Ga. App. 678, 686 S.E.2d 275 (2009).

Indictment was insufficient to withstand a general demurrer because the indictment did not allege that the defendant was a convicted sexual offender, that the defendant was required as a sexual offender to register the defendant's address with the sheriff of the county in which the defendant resided, the defendant previously resided in a county and had registered the defendant's address, or that the defendant changed the defendant's address to one in another county, and the indictment did not inform the defendant of what alleged action or inaction constituted a registration statute. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 800 S.E.2d 356 (2017).

Sufficient evidence to support conviction of failure to notify of change of residence.

- Since the defendant's release to probation occurred after the effective date of the registration statute and the evidence proved that the defendant was required to register under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(4), the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for failure of a registered sex offender to report a change in residence prior to moving. Pardon v. State, 322 Ga. App. 393, 745 S.E.2d 658 (2013).

Evidence of convictions admissible in trial for failure to notify of address change.

- In a defendant's trial for failure to notify the sheriff of changes in the defendant's address as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 based on the defendant's past rape conviction, the defendant's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to admission of the defendant's past convictions for burglarizing and robbing the defendant's parents. Such evidence was admissible to impeach the defendant's testimony that the defendant had lived with the defendant's parents at their home without interruption. Relaford v. State, 306 Ga. App. 549, 702 S.E.2d 776 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0429, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 576.

Registration requirement for first offender under former law.

- Trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal was proper with respect to the defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony by a probation officer as the officer's statement that under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-2(a)(3), the defendant did not have to register as a sex offender if the defendant was afforded treatment as a first offender was a correct statement of law at the time; accordingly, counsel's failure to object thereto was not ineffectiveness as any such objection would have lacked merit. Ethridge v. State, 283 Ga. App. 289, 641 S.E.2d 282 (2007).

Denial of petition for release from requirement to register.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's petition for release from the requirement to register as a sexual offender for life as the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the defendant was no longer a substantial risk of reoffending since an agency abuse case was pending against the defendant, which required a child of the defendant to not bring any children around the defendant, and defendant characterized the conduct involving the child molestation of the defendant's three children as a mistake which everyone makes. Miller v. State, 291 Ga. App. 478, 662 S.E.2d 261 (2008).

Trial court erred by denying a defendant's petition for release from the requirement that the defendant register as a sexual offender, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, since the defendant's Texas conviction involving the use of the defendant's position as a clergyman to sexually assault two victims was not similar enough to any Georgia criminal statute that would have found the defendant to have been convicted of committing a dangerous sexual offense as that term was defined in § 42-1-12(1)(10)(A). Sharma v. State, 294 Ga. App. 783, 670 S.E.2d 494 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying a defendant's petition seeking relief from the sexual offender registration requirements, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, because the defendant failed to provide a report from a licensed psychiatrist that allegedly set forth an opinion that the defendant posed no threat whatsoever of reoffending. Further, the defendant failed to provide any additional information regarding the underlying conduct for the out-of-state conviction that required the registration. In re Baucom, 297 Ga. App. 661, 678 S.E.2d 118 (2009).

Confinement in probation detention center impacting registration period.

- Defendant's confinement in a probation detention center was not equivalent to confinement in prison for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(g) because under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34.1(c), such centers were alternatives to confinement in prison, and therefore the 10-year waiting period for release from sex offender registration requirements did not begin running upon the defendant's release from the center, but from the date the defendant was released from probation. In re White, 306 Ga. App. 365, 702 S.E.2d 694 (2010).

Probation condition overbroad and vague.

- Upon convicting the defendant of sexual battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1, special probation conditions 4, 5, and 6 were erroneously imposed as those conditions lacked reasonable specificity and encompassed groups and locations not rationally related to the sentencing objectives and failed to give the defendant notice of either the conduct or the groups to avoid. Grovenstein v. State, 282 Ga. App. 109, 637 S.E.2d 821 (2006).

No contest plea properly admitted.

- Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence a no contest plea and in "making reference" to the plea with regard to the similar transaction evidence as the defendant's failure to object to the introduction of the evidence precluded review of the issue on appeal; further, the plea was admissible to show a conviction for purposes of the defendant's alleged failure to register as a sex offender under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 and the jury was permitted to consider the plea as similar transaction evidence. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

Lack of knowledge of registration requirements not a defense.

- Defendant's conviction for filing false information with the Georgia Sex Offender Registry, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(n), was upheld. The defendant's claimed lack of knowledge of the registration requirements was no excuse and was refuted by the fact that the defendant had filed registration notification forms. Scott v. State, 303 Ga. App. 672, 695 S.E.2d 71 (2010).

Failure to advise defendant of requirement to register as sex offender.

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea to two counts of child molestation because defendant's trial counsel failed to advise the defendant that entering a plea of guilty to child molestation would necessitate that the defendant comply with the requirements of the state's sex offender registry statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12; the defendant was subject to the sex offender registration requirements at the time that the defendant entered into defendant's plea, the terms of the sex offender registry statute were succinct, clear, and explicit in setting forth the consequences of defendant's guilty plea, and the defendant's trial counsel could have readily determined that the defendant was required to register and conveyed that information to the defendant. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010).

Trial counsel's failure to advise a client that pleading guilty will require the defendant to register as a sex offender is constitutionally deficient performance. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010).

Ineffective assistance of counsel found.

- In a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 case in which a defendant was challenging the conviction under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, the determination of the Georgia Court of Appeals that trial counsel's failure to challenge the use of the defendant's conviction under an unconstitutional anti-sodomy statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a)(1), to convict the defendant for failure to register as a sex offender was not ineffective assistance resulted in a decision that was an unreasonable application of federal law. Green v. Georgia, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2013).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction.

- Evidence that the defendant moved without registering the new address within 72 hours was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. Jackson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 597, 782 S.E.2d 499 (2016).

Release from registration after 10 years if victim not physically harmed.

- Phrase "intentional physical harm," as it was used in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), providing conditions for release from the sex offender registry, meant intentional physical contact that caused actual physical damage, injury, or hurt to the victim; a sex offender registrant was entitled to release from registration because the registrant's unwanted touching of a ten-year-old boy's penis did not constitute such physical damage, injury, or hurt. State v. Randle, 298 Ga. 375, 781 S.E.2d 781 (2016).

Attempt crimes required registration.

- Defendant was properly ordered to register as a sex offender because the convictions constituted criminal offenses against a victim who was a minor, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, because the attempt convictions pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 were covered within the registration requirement; the defendant was convicted of criminal attempt to commit child molestation and criminal attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-4(a) and16-6-5(a), respectively, as the defendant communicated over the Internet with a police officer who was disguised as a 14-year-old girl, and arranged to meet the alleged girl, and the fact that an actual child was not involved did not negate the offense or the need for the registration as there was no impossibility defense. Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834, 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005).

Because the crime of attempt to commit rape was related to a sexually violent offense, the defendant was properly required to comply with the registration requirements of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, and the trial court did not err in convicting the defendant for violating the registry statute. Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642, 670 S.E.2d 425 (2008).

Registration for public indecency proper.

- Offense of public indecency, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-8, was not a victimless crime and, therefore, a perpetrator thereof may have been required to register under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12; the trial court did not err in requiring the defendant to register as a condition of the defendant's sentence for public indecency. Brown v. State, 270 Ga. App. 176, 605 S.E.2d 885 (2004).

Because the defendant's sex offender registration as part of probation was limited to the maximum sentence allowed by law as punishment for that crime, the trial court did not improperly give the defendant an indeterminate sentence by requiring the defendant to register as a sexual offender following the defendant's conviction for felony public indecency. Loya v. State, 321 Ga. App. 430, 740 S.E.2d 382 (2013).

Registration required when convicted as child sex offender.

- Defendant was properly ordered to register as a sex offender after a conviction for cruelty to a child since the cruelty as stated in the indictment was rape of a minor, a threat to arrest and jail the victim, and force used to make the victim touch the defendant's penis. Wiggins v. State, 272 Ga. App. 414, 612 S.E.2d 598 (2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 280 Ga. 268, 626 S.E.2d 118 (2006).

As the indictments made it clear that the underlying conduct for the two aggravated assaults to which the defendant entered Alford pleas was the oral sodomy of one minor and the rape of another, and the defendant was held to have notice of all lesser crimes shown by the facts alleged in the indictment, the defendant was required to register as a sex offender under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12. Rogers v. State, 297 Ga. App. 655, 678 S.E.2d 125 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, because when the defendant was charged with failure to register the defendant was required to register as a sex offender since the defendant had been convicted of criminal sexual conduct toward a minor in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2, and the supreme court's ruling that § 16-6-2 infringed upon the right of privacy had to be applied retroactively on collateral review, but the court of appeals could not apply it in the defendant's case since it was not on collateral review; the appeal was from a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, which was a proceeding separate from defendant's original offense, and at the time of the defendant's sodomy conviction, the conduct in which the defendant engaged was against the law in Georgia. Green v. State, 303 Ga. App. 210, 692 S.E.2d 784 (2010).

Because the addendum to the defendant's sentence purported to impose restrictions upon the defendant's future parole, if granted, the sentence was a nullity; however, in light of the testimony and the nature of the offense of which the defendant was convicted, incest, the conditions of probation imposed were reasonable and were not vague or overly broad because several of the conditions imposed were specifically mandated by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, and even if the trial court had not specifically imposed sex offender registration as a condition of probation, the defendant was nonetheless required by statute to register. Stephens v. State, 305 Ga. App. 339, 699 S.E.2d 558 (2010).

Perpetrator 18 and victim 13 required registration.

- Trial court properly held that the defendant, who was convicted of a statutory rape that occurred when the defendant was 18 and the victim was 13, had to register as a sex offender. Because the victim was under 14, the case did not fall within the exception of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(C) for misdemeanor statutory rape under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(c); moreover, the defendant was prosecuted in superior court, not juvenile court. Planas v. State, 296 Ga. App. 51, 673 S.E.2d 566 (2009).

Registration required when crime against minor.

- Based on the allegations in the defendant's second indictment that the defendant sucked on the breasts of a minor under the age of 16, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the defendant committed a criminal offense against a victim who was a minor and was thus subject to the registration requirements and conditions in O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12. Phillips v. State, 298 Ga. App. 520, 680 S.E.2d 424 (2009).

Defendant's convictions for child molestation supported the trial court's requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender because the defendant's conviction constituted a conviction for criminal sexual conduct toward a minor and a dangerous sexual offense. Kruel v. State, 344 Ga. App. 256, 809 S.E.2d 491 (2018).

Electronically furnishing obscene materials required registration.

- Detective erroneously promised during an interview that a defendant would not be charged with an offense that required sex offender registration because a conviction for electronically furnishing obscene material to a minor under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 would require registration as a sex offender under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(2); prior to the erroneous promise, the defendant's confession was voluntarily made under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824) as the confession was made without the slightest hope of benefit. State v. Lee, 295 Ga. App. 49, 670 S.E.2d 879 (2008).

Internet sex crimes required registration.

- Defendant's convictions under the computer pornography and child exploitation act, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.2, required registration as a sex offender pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, as the conviction for pornography and child exploitation under § 16-12-100.2(d) for the use of an on-line Internet service in the attempt to commit child molestation, was within the definition of a "criminal offense against a victim who was a minor," pursuant to § 42-1-12; the defendant had communicated with a police officer who posed as a 14-year-old girl, sent her sexually explicit messages, and arranged a meeting with her. Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834, 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005).

Registration for "criminal offense against a minor" based on communication over the Internet.

- Trial court properly ordered the defendant to register as a sex offender, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12, although the defendant's convictions did not fit within the category of "sexually violent offenses," pursuant to § 42-1-12, as the offenses were all within the "criminal offense against a victim who was a minor" category, pursuant to § 42-1-12, based on a strict construction of the registration statute, pursuant to the statutory interpretation rules under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(a); the defendant's convictions arose for communications over the Internet with a police officer who posed as a young girl, and the defendant sent her sexually explicit messages and arranged a meeting with her, at which time the defendant was arrested. Spivey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 834, 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005).

Conduct alleged in indictment satisfied definition of sexual offense and required registration.

- As a defendant entered an Alford plea to two counts of cruelty to children by committing the acts alleged in the indictment, the defendant acknowledged touching the breast and buttocks of the 14-year-old victim and although the defendant did not plead guilty to a sexual offense, the defendant pled guilty to conduct which, by the conduct's nature, was a sexual offense against a minor. Therefore, the defendant was required to register as a sexual offender under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(1). Morrell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 592, 677 S.E.2d 771 (2009).

Registration not required for sentence imposed before effective date of act.

- O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(3) applied to sentences imposed on or after July 1, 2004, and thus, when the defendant was sentenced in December 2001, the new statutory language did not apply and the defendant did not need to register as a sex offender. State v. Plunkett, 277 Ga. App. 605, 627 S.E.2d 182 (2006).

Misdemeanor conviction for interference with child custody did not require registration.

- Trial court properly permanently enjoined the Georgia Department of Corrections from requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender because the defendant's State of Alabama conviction for interference with custody of a child was a misdemeanor conviction that did not trigger the sex offender registration requirement under Georgia law. Owens v. Urbina, 296 Ga. 256, 765 S.E.2d 909 (2014).

Sex offender registration not required after successful completion of first offender sentence.

- Defendant was not required to register as a sexual offender because the defendant successfully completed a first-offender sentence for statutory rape and burglary charges, and a "conviction" under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(a)(8) did not include a discharge without an adjudication of guilt following the successful completion of a first offender sentence; the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 42-8-62(a) provided that, with certain exceptions, once a first offender was discharged without an adjudication of guilt, he or she stood completely exonerated and was not considered as having been convicted of a crime. Jackson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 356, 683 S.E.2d 60 (2009).

Release from registration proper when offense did not rise to intentional physical harm.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in releasing the defendant from the sex offender registration requirements because under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), there was evidence that the underlying child molestation offense consisted of the defendant touching the genitals of the child victim with the defendant's hands; thus, the sexual offense did not rise to the level of intentional physical harm so as to preclude release from the registration requirements. State v. Randle, 331 Ga. App. 1, 769 S.E.2d 724 (2015).

Pardon removed duty of defendant to register.

- Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a general demurrer was reversed as to failing to register as a sex offender as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 because the separation of powers doctrine required the court to adhere to the decision of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to issue the defendant a pardon as the plain meaning of the sweeping language used by the Board in the pardon removed the duty of the defendant to register as a sex offender. Davis v. State, 340 Ga. App. 652, 798 S.E.2d 474 (2017).

Release of information by sheriff.

- Sheriff must release relevant information relating to sexually violent predators; however, the sheriff is given the authority to determine what information and in what manner such information will be released. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U97-23.

ALR.

- Validity, construction, and application of state statute including "sexually motivated offenses" within definition of sex offense for purposes of sentencing or classification of defendant as sex offender, 30 A.L.R.6th 373.

Validity, construction, and application of state statutes imposing criminal penalties for failure to register as required under sex offender or other criminal registration statutes, 33 A.L.R.6th 91.

State statutes or ordinances requiring persons previously convicted of crime to register with authorities as applied to juvenile offenders - Constitutional issues, 37 A.L.R.6th 55.

State statutes or ordinances requiring persons previously convicted of crime to register with authorities as applied to juvenile offenders - duty to register, requirements for registration, and procedural matters, 38 A.L.R.6th 1.

State statutes or ordinances requiring persons previously convicted of crime to register with authorities as applied to juvenile offenders - expungement, stay or deferral, exceptions, exemptions, and waiver, 39 A.L.R.6th 577.

Court's duty to advise sex offender as to sex offender registration consequences or other restrictions arising from plea of guilty, or to determine that offender is advised thereof, 41 A.L.R.6th 141.

Application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 6 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 619 (2004), to Sex Offender Registration Statutes, 51 A.L.R.6th 139.

Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender registration statutes concerning level of classification - Initial classification determination, 65 A.L.R.6th 1.

Validity, construction, and application of federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 et seq., its enforcement provision, 18 U.S.C.A § 2250, and associated regulations, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 213.

Validity and applicability of state requirement that person convicted or indicted of sex offenses be subject to electronic location monitoring, including use of satellite or global positioning system, 57 A.L.R. 6th 1.

Validity of state sex offender registration laws under ex post facto prohibitions, 63 A.L.R. 6th 351.

Validity, construction and application of state sex offender registration statutes concerning level of classification - general principles, evidentiary matters, and assistance of counsel, 64 A.L.R. 6th 1.

Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender registration statutes concerning level of classification - initial classification determination, 65 A.L.R.6th 1.

Removal of adults from state sex offender registries, 77 A.L.R.6th 197.

Discharge from commitment and supervised release of civilly committed sex offender under state law, 78 A.L.R.6th 417.

Validity, construction, and application of state sex offender statutes prohibiting use of computers and internet as conditions of probation or sentence, 89 A.L.R.6th 261.

Validity of state sex offender registration laws under equal protection guarantees, 93 A.L.R.6th 1.