TITLE 42 PENAL INSTITUTIONS

Section 6. Detainers, 42-6-1 through 42-6-25.

ARTICLE 2 INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS

42-6-20. Enactment and text of agreement.

The Agreement on Detainers is enacted into law and entered into by this State with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows:

The contracting states solemnly agree that:

A RTICLE I.

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, information or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.

A RTICLE II.

As used in this agreement:

"State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
"Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
"Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof.
Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request.
1. Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given;
2. A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.
From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.

This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.

This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

A RTICLE III.

Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint, provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by the certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.

The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested.

The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which the detainer is based.

A RTICLE IV.

The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated: provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.

Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.

In respect of any proceeding made possible by this Article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.

Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.

If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

A RTICLE V.

In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.

The officer or other representative of a State accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:

If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.

The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.

At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.

During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.

A RTICLE VI.

In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.

No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.

A RTICLE VII.

A RTICLE VIII.

A RTICLE IX.

(Ga. L. 1972, p. 938, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Applicability.

- Ga. L. 1972, p. 938 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42) by its terms relates only to an untried indictment, information, or complaint and does not apply to warrants for arrest for probation violation. Suggs v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 242, 215 S.E.2d 246 (1975).

Ga. L. 1972, p. 938 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42) does not address itself to transfers from the receiving jurisdiction back to the sending jurisdiction either after trial or after sentencing. State v. Sassoon, 240 Ga. 745, 242 S.E.2d 121 (1978).

Detainer based on an arrest warrant for pending criminal charges does not trigger the protections of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20. State v. Carlton, 276 Ga. 693, 583 S.E.2d 1 (2003).

Speedy trial provisions.

- It is clear from the language of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20, that its speedy trial provisions apply exclusively to untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720, aff'd, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Effect of failure to comply with article.

- Since the appellant failed to comply with the requirements of Ga. L. 1972, p. 938 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42) the noncompliance renders the defendant's request for trial invalid. Greathouse v. State, 156 Ga. App. 491, 274 S.E.2d 835 (1980).

When an escapee from a Florida prison committed crimes in Georgia, before being caught and returned to Florida, and was indicted in Georgia but did not comply with the procedures under O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20 to trigger the 180-day rule, the defendant was not denied a speedy trial. Cothern v. State, 195 Ga. App. 513, 393 S.E.2d 763 (1990).

State violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20, by continuing to hold a defendant in Georgia following the dismissal of the terroristic threats charge specified in the detainer, but the defendant was not prejudiced by the error as the defendant could have been tried in Georgia after serving the federal sentence. Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34, 611 S.E.2d 720, aff'd, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a Columbia County indictment against the defendant, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20, as the state failed to bring the defendant to trial upon a return from imprisonment in South Carolina to face charges in Lincoln County; moreover, the defendant's request for disposition of all untried indictments applied equally to Columbia County as it did to Lincoln County. State v. Thompson, 284 Ga. App. 744, 644 S.E.2d 889 (2007).

Failure to comply excusable.

- When the state showed that the reason for the delay in trying the defendant was due to, inter alia, conflicts of previously appointed defense counsel and requests for continuance from defense counsel, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's plea in bar for failure to try the defendant within 180 days pursuant to the Interstate Detainer Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20, et seq. King v. State, 268 Ga. App. 811, 603 S.E.2d 88 (2004).

Failure to comply with procedural requirements.

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because the defendant never waived extradition for trial on the indictment or requested a final disposition of the detainer based thereon. Therefore, the defendant did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Georgia Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20 et seq., the 180-day deadline was never triggered, and there was no violation of the IAD. Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (2011).

Jurisdiction.

- Despite the fact that drug and firearm charges filed against a detainee were not listed in the detainer, the convictions were upheld on appeal as the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20 et seq., neither granted nor divested a trial court's jurisdiction; while the better practice would have been for the state to include all charges for which the detainee was prosecuted within the detainer, it did not sacrifice jurisdiction by failing to do so. Morrison v. State, 280 Ga. 222, 626 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Impact of incarceration outside of state on speedy trial issues.

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's plea in bar based on speedy-trial grounds because the defendant's incarceration in Michigan extended the time for the defendant's speedy trial demand as the defendant was not available for trial because the defendant was in the custody of a different sovereign and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20 et seq., did not apply; there was no inherent authority in a Georgia court to compel the defendant's presence or in-court attendance since the defendant was incarcerated by or in the control of a different sovereign, specifically Michigan; and nothing in the record reflected the defendant's desire to waive the defendant's right to be present at trial. Gosline v. State, 341 Ga. App. 708, 802 S.E.2d 275 (2017).

Cited in Duchac v. State, 151 Ga. App. 374, 259 S.E.2d 740 (1979); Johnson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 512, 268 S.E.2d 782 (1980); Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1981); Reed v. State, 249 Ga. 344, 290 S.E.2d 469 (1982); Inman v. State, 191 Ga. App. 497, 382 S.E.2d 122 (1989); Ricks v. State, 204 Ga. App. 441, 419 S.E.2d 517 (1992); Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006).

Constitutionality

Constitutionality of lodging detainer.

- Lodging of a detainer by the proper officials of this state against a person serving a term of imprisonment in the correctional institution of a sister state does not violate the provisions of U.S. Const., amends. 6, 8 and 14 or Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI). Pollard v. State, 128 Ga. App. 470, 197 S.E.2d 158 (1973).

Initiating Detaining Proceedings

1. Article III

One hundred eighty-day provision not inflexible.

- This agreement does not contemplate that the 180-day provision is inflexible. Duchac v. State, 151 Ga. App. 374, 259 S.E.2d 740 (1979).

Holding that the state may ignore a prisoner's request until shortly before the expiration of the 180-day period provided in Article III, and then extend that period by initiating proceedings under Article IV, would effectively nullify the purpose of the 180-day provision of Article III and deny to a prisoner the right to a speedy trial. Duchac v. State, 151 Ga. App. 374, 259 S.E.2d 740 (1979).

Delay in bringing defendant to trial.

- When any delay in bringing the defendant to trial within the time prescribed by Art. III(a) was precipitated by the defendant's agreement to a joint recommendation, the defendant cannot complain that the defendant was not brought to trial in a timely manner. Smith v. State, 202 Ga. App. 362, 414 S.E.2d 504 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 907, 414 S.E.2d 504 (1992).

Failure to begin trial within time limit.

- Article III does not say that the untried indictment shall be dismissed if the prisoner is not brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner has served the prisoner's request for final disposition upon the proper Georgia authorities. Price v. State, 237 Ga. 352, 227 S.E.2d 368 (1976).

Strict compliance with notice provisions required.

- Facsimile transmission of the defendant's request for final disposition was insufficient as a matter of law since it was required to be sent by registered or certified mail. Clater v. State, 266 Ga. 511, 467 S.E.2d 537 (1996).

Defendant's direct notice of disposition.

- Since the defendant sent the defendant's request for a disposition of the charges directly to the state without a warden's certificate of an inmate's status, rather than through prison authorities, and the required certificate was eventually supplied at a later date, the 180-day period provided in Article III began to run once the state received the certificate rather than when the state received the defendant's direct request. Thompson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 379, 367 S.E.2d 247, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 919, 367 S.E.2d 247 (1988).

When guilt not questioned, no relief for violation.

- Violation of the speedy trial provision (Article III(a)) will support no post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 when the petitioner alleges no facts casting substantial doubt on the state trial's reliability on the question of guilt. Seymore v. Alabama, 846 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S. Ct. 816, 102 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1989).

Foreign jurisdiction's delay not dispositive.

- When the defendant was tried within 180 days after the requisite documents were filed with all entities required by O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20 and when the initial failure to forward the detainer demand to the proper court was the result of a mistake by out-of-state authorities, there was no violation of § 42-6-20. Parrott v. State, 206 Ga. App. 829, 427 S.E.2d 276 (1993).

Dismissal of charges improper.

- Because the 180-day period in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, O.C.G.A. § 42-6-20, Art. III(a), during which the defendant was required to be brought to trial, had not expired when the trial court entered the court's dismissal order, and because there was no basis for finding waiver, the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against the defendant with prejudice. State v. McCarter, 314 Ga. App. 542, 724 S.E.2d 843 (2012).

2. Article IV

Grace period inapplicable when U.S. government a sending state.

- The 30-day rule in paragraph (a) of Article IV which provides for a period of 30 days after a request for temporary custody or availability before such request be honored, would appear to be inapplicable when the United States government is the sending state. Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 250 S.E.2d 376 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984).

Tacking time limits of Articles III and IV not permitted.

- The 120-day provisions of Article IV may not be added to the 180-day provisions of Article III, once a proper request under Article III has been made by the prisoner. Duchac v. State, 151 Ga. App. 374, 259 S.E.2d 740 (1979).

Tolling time limit.

- Court was authorized to find that the 120-day time limit was tolled by delay occasioned by the appellant's numerous pretrial motions in the face of the state's good-faith efforts to expedite the trial. Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979).

Missing 120-day limit by one week.

- Defendant could not complain that the state missed by one week beginning the defendant's trial within 120 days of the defendant's return to Georgia, when a trial date had been set with the agreement of the defendant's attorney, the defendant was returned to Georgia earlier than anticipated and then filed over 60 motions which necessarily had to be determined before trial, and the defendant did not raise any objections to the date set for trial until one day after the 120-day period had elapsed. Moon v. State, 258 Ga. 748, 375 S.E.2d 442 (1988), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 1638, 113 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Zant v. Moon, 264 Ga. 93, 440 S.E.2d 657 (1994).

Right to pretransfer hearing.

- Prisoner incarcerated in a jurisdiction that has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is entitled to the procedural protections of that Act, particularly the right to a pretransfer hearing before being transferred to another jurisdiction, pursuant to Art. IV of the Detainer Agreement. Lambert v. Jones, 250 Ga. 603, 299 S.E.2d 716 (1983).

Extent of proper inquiries.

- Proper inquiries at pretransfer hearings are limited to whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and whether the petitioner is a fugitive. Lambert v. Jones, 250 Ga. 603, 299 S.E.2d 716 (1983).

3. Article V

Effect of issuance of habeas corpus writ.

- Once a detainer has been lodged against a prisoner and the prisoner has been removed from the prisoner's original place of imprisonment to the receiving state, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to compel the prisoner's presence at trial is a request for temporary custody within the meaning of this section. Reaves v. State, 242 Ga. 542, 250 S.E.2d 376 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984).

Denial of speedy trial.

- In a habeas corpus hearing to avoid extradition, the question whether a petitioner was denied a speedy trial by the demanding state is not an appropriate one for adjudication by the asylum state. Gilstrap v. Wilder, 233 Ga. 968, 213 S.E.2d 895 (1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Construction and application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): issues related to "speedy trial" requirement, and construction of essential terms, 51 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): issues related to "anti-shuttling" provision, dismissal of action against detainee, and adequacy of certificate, 52 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and application of Article IV of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): issues related to custody, temporary custody, contest as to legality of custody, necessity of hearing, and transmittal orders, 53 A.L.R.6th 1.

Construction and application of article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - Issues related to "speedy trial" requirement, and construction of essential terms, 70 A.L.R.6th 361.

Construction and application of article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - Issues related to certificate, request by defendant for disposition, and "anti-shuttling" provision, 71 A.L.R.6th 335.

Construction and application of article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - Issues related to custody, duties of prison officials, waiver of extradition, escape, assistance of counsel, and necessity of hearing, 72 A.L.R.6th 141.

Construction and application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) - issues related to "speedy trial" requirement, and construction of essential terms, 70 A.L.R.6th 361.

Construction and application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): issues related to certificate, request by defendant for disposition, and "anti-shuttling" provision, 71 A.L.R.6th 335.

Construction and application of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD): issues related to custody, duties of prison officials, waiver of extradition, escape, assistance of counsel, and necessity of hearing, 72 A.L.R.6th 141.

2018 Georgia Code 42-6-20 | Car Wreck Lawyer