Due process concerns.

- State inmate's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against a county sheriff and state prison warden failed because the inmate's erroneous transfer to prison from the county jail after the inmate was granted an appeal bond in one criminal case did not preclude the inmate from being detained on a bench warrant prior to the trial of a second criminal case; such transfers did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause because the inmate did not present any evidence the inmate's detention at the prison was qualitatively different from the inmate's detention in the jail, and pretrial detention in a prison setting was authorized by O.C.G.A. §§ 42-6-1 to42-6-5. White v. Thompson, 299 Fed. Appx. 930 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).

Matters constituting "detainer."

- Defendant's admission in the defendant's brief that the district attorney filed a letter with the department of corrections stating there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant, and that the state intended to prosecute, substantially complied with the codal definition of a "detainer." Riley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 409, 349 S.E.2d 274 (1986).

Order of court not "detainer."

- Order issued by the trial court directing the Department of Offender Rehabilitation to produce the defendant for arraignment and trial on certain dates was not a detainer, and the defendant was not required to follow the procedure outlined in O.C.G.A. § 42-6-3 for ensuring the trial date after the defendant had filed a demand for speedy trial. Street v. State, 211 Ga. App. 230, 438 S.E.2d 693 (1993).

Applicable to prisoners with appeals pending upon prior convictions.

- While Ga. L. 1968, p. 1110, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 42-6-1 through42-6-6) does not specifically mention prisoners with appeals pending upon prior convictions, there is nothing in the statutes which would prohibit either a district attorney or a sheriff from writing the Board of Offender Rehabilitation (Corrections) that such a situation exists with reference to a prisoner, and from sending an arresting officer with a warrant to pick up the prisoner upon release. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-101 (rendered prior to 1982 amendment).

Detention after expiration of sentence.

- It was not contemplated that the board should have power to hold a prisoner after expiration of the prisoner's sentence. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-410.

Request for detention from county probation department.

- As officers and employees of county probation departments are not prosecuting officers of court, requests of county probation department for detention of an inmate on the inmate's release date cannot be treated as detainers. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-268.

Request for the retention of an inmate supported by warrant only does not constitute filing of a detainer. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-23.

Request for detention and return of inmate in Georgia prison system to county for service of sentence already imposed and to be served in county work camp (now county correctional institution) is not a detainer within the meaning of Ga. L. 1968, p. 1110, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 42-6-1 through42-6-6); the same relates solely to requests for the detention of an inmate pending delivery for trial upon pending charges. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-502.

Recourse in lieu of detainer.

- Although the detainer procedure may be invoked by an accusation without a waiver of indictment by grand jury, this procedure will not authorize the Board of Offender Rehabilitation (Corrections) to hold a prisoner after the prisoner's sentence has expired; the district attorney can arrest the prisoner upon the prisoner's release and proceed against the prisoner as the district attorney would proceed against any other criminal defendant. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-410.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 129-131.

C.J.S.

- 72 C.J.S., Prisons and Rights of Prisoners, §§ 133, 134.