O.C.G.A. § 42-6-6 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. Examination, treatment, hospitaliza-

tion of mentally ill persons generally, § 37-3-1 et seq.

ARTICLE 2 INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS JUDICIAL DECISIONS Congressional intent. - Congress has provided in Ga. L. 1972, p. 932 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42) an efficient and effective method for resolving a prisoner’s claim that the prisoner has been denied a speedy trial and is, therefore, subject to an illegal detainer. Requiring resort to remedies under Ga. L. 1972, p. 932 will remove the necessity of intervention by the federal courts, furthering the established principle of comity between state and federal courts. Hurst v. Hogan, 435 F. Supp. 125, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14976 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Right to a speedy trial. - Ga. L. 1972, p. 932 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch.

6, T. 42) is designed to provide the right to a speedy trial for defendants who are not subject to the judicial power of the state having an untried indictment. The agreement has provisions for sanctions if a speedy disposition of the pending indictment is not effected. If trial is not held within 120 days of the arrival of the movant within the jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment is pending and before the movant is returned to the jurisdiction of the sending state, the untried indictment shall be dismissed with prejudice. Hunt v. State, 147 Ga. App. 787, 250 S.E.2d 517, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2948 (1978).

When the defendant applied for a speedy trial under the provisions of former Code 1933, § 27-1901 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170) and could not procedurally seek a speedy trial under that section because the defendant was not physically present or within the subpoena power of the Georgia courts, the defendant’s right to a speedy trial must be determined under Ga. L. 1972, p. 932 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42) if it was utilized to secure the defendant’s trial. Johnson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 512, 268 S.E.2d 782, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2257 (1980). Purpose of Ga. L. 1972, p. 932 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42) is to ensure speedy trial on pending charges before staleness and difficulty of proof set it. These are pretrial, and not sentencing, considerations. Suggs v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 242, 215 S.E.2d 246, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1095 (1975); Bernyk v. State, 182 Ga. App. 329, 355 S.E.2d 753, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1696 (1987). Invocation of article by nonpresent defendant. - In order for a demand for trial pursuant to the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 to serve as the predicate for an absolute acquittal because of the failure of compliance therewith, it is

necessary that the filing comply with the provisions of that statute, but a defendant who is not able to satisfy § 17-7-170 and thus not available to pursue the defendant’s remedy in the appropriate state court is still not without remedy, since the defendant can invoke the provisions of O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42. Luke v. State, 180 Ga. App. 378, 349 S.E.2d 391, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2158 (1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500, 411 S.E.2d 546, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1428 (1991). Prerequisite to seeking habeas corpus. - When a prisoner in federal custody seeks to challenge a detainer lodged against the prisoner by officials of a state other than that in which the prisoner is incarcerated, the prisoner must exhaust the prisoner’s remedies under Ga. L. 1972, p. 932 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42) before seeking federal habeas corpus. Hurst v. Hogan, 435 F. Supp. 125, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14976 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Comity between states. - State need not reduce a capital sentence authorized under its own laws because of the effects of another state’s judicial processes, brought about by operation of Ga. L. 1972, p. 932 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 42). Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1230 (1979).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Validity, construction, and application

of interstate agreement on detainers, 98 A.L.R.3d 160.