O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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As used in this article, the term: (1) “Board” means the Board of Community Supervision. (2) “DCS” means the Department of Community Supervision. (3) “Private probation officer” means an individual employed by a

private corporation, private enterprise, private agency, or other private entity to supervise defendants placed on probation by a court for committing an ordinance violation or misdemeanor. (4) “Probation officer” means an individual employed by a governing authority of a county, municipality, or consolidated government to supervise defendants placed on probation by a court for committing an ordinance violation or misdemeanor.

History

Code 1981, § 42-8-100, enacted by Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 3-2/HB 310; Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 7-1/SB 367.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall become effective July 1, 2015, and shall apply to sentences entered on or after such date.”

Law reviews. For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 139 (2016).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Passage of time does not extinguish unserved sentence. - Georgia Supreme Court answered two questions certified to it from a federal district court and concluded, as a matter of common law, that the mere passage of time does not extin-

guish an unserved sentence and that the common law principle has not been abrogated by the State-wide Probation Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-30. Anderson v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, 298 Ga. 854, 784 S.E.2d 791, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 251 (2016).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 13 cases, 1996–2019 · leading case: Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Glover, 766 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 2014).

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Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Glover, 766 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 2014). · cites it 43× “1 Among other things, the plaintiffs: (1) challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 42-8-100 (g) (1), Georgia’s private probation statute; (2) alleged that OCGA § 42-8-30.”

Hills McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2013). · cites it 7× “Finally, in two paragraphs of seemingly out-of-place allegations, Count II also requested that the court declare O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(f) 4 invalid under the Georgia constitution.”

Ward v. City of Cairo, 583 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 16× “Ward brought an action for declaratory judgment against the City of Cairo and Grady County to determine the validity of the contracts for probation services; and the constitutionality of OCGA § 36-32-2 (a), which provides that a judge of the municipal court serves at the…”

Akeem Washington v. Shannon Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “The Supreme Court has dictated that we apply a functional or conduct-based analysis, and not a status-based analysis, in determining whether to extend quasi-judicial immunity.”

Anderson v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 784 S.E.2d 791 (Ga. 2016). · cites it 20× “Glover, we concluded that Georgia’s private probation statutory framework, see OCGA § 42-8-100 et seq., does not allow for the tolling of misdemeanor probationers’ sentences.”

Hills McGee v. Solicitor Gen. of Richmond Cnty., Georgia, 727 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2013). · cites it 3× “The second • claim alleged that O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g), 3 the statute permitting a Georgia county to contract with private entities for the provision of probation services, deprives an indigent accused of due process of law.”

Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Harrelson, 690 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. 2010). · cites it 4× “Named as respondents were Harold Vernon Jones II, in his official capacity as Solicitor-General of the Richmond County State Court (“Jones”), and Sentinel Offender Services, LLC (“Sentinel”), the private company administering Harrelson’s probation pursuant to its contract with…”

Huzzie v. State, 558 S.E.2d 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “Under OCGA § 42-8-100 (f) (1), the chief judge of any court within the county is authorized “to enter into written contracts with corporations, enterprises, or agencies to provide probation supervision, counseling, or collection services in misdemeanor cases.”

Christina Brinson v. Providence Cmty. Corr., 703 F. App'x 874 (11th Cir. 2017). · cites it 2× “In Count II, 1 Until July 1, 2015, this provision was codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g) and was substantially the same.”

Edwards v. State, 545 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 42-8-100 authorizes the chief judge of any court within a county to enter into written contracts with corporations, enterprises, or agencies to provide probation supervision, counseling, or collection services in misdemeanor cases.”

Rollins v. Campbell (In Re Rollins), 200 B.R. 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996). · cites it 2× “In accordance with recent enabling legislation under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100 (enacted by Ga. L.1991, p.”

Keen v. Jud. Alternatives of Georgia, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Ga. 2015). · cites it 13× “The legislation effectively caused the proliferation of private probation service companies throughout the State, Contracts with private probation service companies are governed by state law, “Agreements for Probation Services,” codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-100 through 108…”

Show all 13 citing cases →

— 42-8-100(f) — 1 case

Hills McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2013). “Finally, in two paragraphs of seemingly out-of-place allegations, Count II also requested that the court declare O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(f) 4 invalid under the Georgia constitution.”

— 42-8-100(g) — 4 cases

Hills McGee v. Solicitor Gen. of Richmond Cnty., Georgia, 727 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2013). “The second • claim alleged that O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g), 3 the statute permitting a Georgia county to contract with private entities for the provision of probation services, deprives an indigent accused of due process of law.”

Christina Brinson v. Providence Cmty. Corr., 703 F. App'x 874 (11th Cir. 2017). “In Count II, 1 Until July 1, 2015, this provision was codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g) and was substantially the same.”

Keen v. Jud. Alternatives of Georgia, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Ga. 2015). “The legislation effectively caused the proliferation of private probation service companies throughout the State, Contracts with private probation service companies are governed by state law, “Agreements for Probation Services,” codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-100 through 108…”

— 42-8-100(g)(1) — 1 case

— 42-8-100(g)(2) — 1 case

Akeem Washington v. Shannon Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2019). “The Supreme Court has dictated that we apply a functional or conduct-based analysis, and not a status-based analysis, in determining whether to extend quasi-judicial immunity.”

— 42-8-100(g)(l) — 1 case

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