CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 24, 2014 | 766 S.E.2d 456
...Also before the trial court was a motion for partial summary
judgment filed by Glover on behalf of himself and the proposed plaintiff class asking the trial court
to find: (1) that Sentinel lacked a valid contract to provide probation supervision services to the
Superior Court of Columbia County; (2) that OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1) is unconstitutional under the
Georgia Constitution; (3) that the procedures followed by Sentinel for the collection of its probation
supervision fees conflict with rights guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution; and (4) that plaint...
...The trial court’s consolidation of these
issues has not been specifically challenged by the parties on appeal. See Ford
v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co.,
267 Ga. 226, 229 n.12 (476 SE2d 565) (1996).
Among other things, the trial court held that OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1)
was not unconstitutional on its face and did not offend due process or equal
protection nor condone imprisonment for debt; ruled that the statutory
framework prohibited private probation services from having the sentences of
m...
...rd, Tennille,
Osborn and Martin, alleged Sentinel’s contract to provide probation services to
the Columbia County Superior Court was invalid due to Sentinel’s failure to
secure approval from the Columbia County Commission as required by OCGA
§
42-8-100 (g) (1) and Glover filed his complaint as a class action additionally
challenging the constitutionality of OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1).8 Two plaintiffs
also alleged that Sentinel illegally modified the terms and conditions of their
7
There is no State Court in Columbia County.
8
Glover, who filed his class action complaint in...
...olumbia County Superior Court seeking
the recovery of probation supervision fees he paid to Sentinel asserting both that Sentinel lacked a
valid contract with the Columbia County Superior Court to provide probation supervision services
and that OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1) was unconstitutional, moved for class certification pursuant to
OCGA §
9-11-23 (b) (3).
7
sentences by adding conditions such as drug screens and treatment programs not
included...
...probation supervision fees, had never been the subject of an arrest warrant by Sentinel and claimed
only that Sentinel lacked the authority to collect probation fees from him and others similarly
situated due to its failure to comply with the statutory requirements of OCGA §
42-8-100.
8
Along with challenging the constitutionality of OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1),
several plaintiffs claimed Sentinel illegally collected excessive supervision fees
from them through the unlawful tolling of their misdemeanor sentences and for
electronic monitoring and drug and alcohol testing not authorized by the private
probation statutory framework....
...the trial court entered its judgments in September 2013, and whether the claims will remain live for
15
2. Turning to the substantive challenges raised, we first address plaintiffs’
constitutional challenge to OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1), Georgia’s private
probation statute, which provides, in pertinent part:
The chief judge of any court within the county ....
...unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that the statute lacks a
plainly legitimate sweep.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Blevins v. Dade
County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
288 Ga. 113, 118 (3) (702 SE2d 145) (2010).
On its face, OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1) simply gives courts the authority
to contract with private providers for the administration of probation services.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that because the statute does not limit or restrict the
manner in which courts cont...
...does not forbid imprisonment for criminal conduct, even though the criminal
conduct also results in a civil debt). Accordingly, we hold the statute does not
on its face condone imprisonment for debt as alleged by the plaintiffs.
3. In ruling on plaintiffs’ challenge to OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1), the trial
court determined as a matter of law that the private probation statutory
framework prohibits the tolling of sentences imposed on defendants supervised
22
by private probation...
...te court has
provided for probation services for such court through agreement
with a private corporation, enterprise, or agency or has established
a county or municipal probation system for such court pursuant to
Code Section
42-8-100, the provisions of this article relating to
probation supervision services shall not apply to defendants
sentenced in any such court.
(Emphasis supplied.) Based on this statutory language, the trial cour...
...similar formulations elsewhere in the Code. See, e.g., OCGA §§
10-2-22, 40-1-
55. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that none of the provisions of the
State-wide Probation Act are applicable to defendants sentenced in courts
utilizing probation systems authorized by OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1).
Our inquiry does not end here, however, as we must determine whether
any authority exists outside the provisions of Article 2 for the application of
tolling or electronic monitoring to misdemeanor probationers.
(b) Tolling....
...probation
statutory framework does not allow for the tolling of misdemeanor probationers’
24
Statutes specific to misdemeanor probation systems are codified in Article 6 of Title 42,
Chapter 8, which encompasses code sections
42-8-100 through
42-8-108. While subsection (c) of
OCGA §
42-8-100 specifically allows a court to suspend or probate a defendant’s sentence and
subsection (e) of that statute empowers a judge to revoke, modify or change a probated sentence “at
any time during the period of time originally prescribed...
...provisions found in Article 2.
27
sentences.25 To the extent Georgia courts have recognized OCGA §
42-8-36 as
a basis for allowing courts utilizing probation systems established pursuant to
OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1) to toll a probationer’s sentence, such analysis was in
error and hereby is disapproved....
...OCGA §
17-10-1 (1) (a) permits a sentencing judge to suspend or
probate all or any part of a defendant’s sentence “under such rules and
regulations as the judge deems proper.” Judges operating within Georgia’s
private probation statutory framework retain this power. See OCGA §
42-8-100
(c) and (e)....
...in and of
itself, prohibit the application of these conditions to misdemeanor probationers
supervised by private probation servicing companies.
4. Having affirmed the trial court’s rulings with respect to the
constitutionality of OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1) and having addressed the proper
statutory interpretation of OCGA §
42-8-30.1, we now consider whether the trial
court erred in finding that the plaintiffs have a right of recovery against Sentinel
under the doctrine of money h...
...sentencing court had the ability to lawfully impose. Under Georgia law, a
private probation company can act as a probation provider and its employees
may serve as probation officers only if the company complies with the terms and
provisions of OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1)....
...plaintiffs seeking the recovery of probation supervision fees paid to Sentinel
asserting both that Sentinel lacked a valid contract with the Columbia County
Superior Court to provide probation supervision services and that Georgia’s
private probation statute, OCGA §
42-8-100 (g) (1), was unconstitutional....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2003 | 276 Ga. 391, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 1102
...Supreme Court of Georgia. March 27, 2003. *822 Gilbert J. Murrah, Bainbridge, for appellant. Lehman & Cauley, LLP, Thomas L. Lehman, Cairo, for appellees. THOMPSON, Justice. In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether OCGA §§
36-32-2(a) and
42-8-100(f)(1) and (g)(1) violate the separation of powers doctrine of the Georgia Constitution....
...ty to determine the validity of the contracts for probation services; and the constitutionality of OCGA §
36-32-2(a), which provides that a judge of the municipal court serves at the pleasure of the governing authority which appointed him; and OCGA §
42-8-100(f)(1) and (g)(1), which authorize the chief judge of a state court, or judge of a municipal court, respectively, to enter into contracts for probation services with the approval of the governing authority....
...the municipal court is a municipal office discharging strictly municipal functions, OCGA §
36-32-2(a) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine of the Georgia Constitution. Building Auth. of Fulton County, supra. 2. Ward asserts that OCGA §
42-8-100(f)(1) and (g)(1) also violate the separation of powers doctrine because these provisions unconstitutionally allow the executive to invade the province of the judiciary by requiring the governing authority's approval of the selection of a private probation service provider by the judiciary. (a) OCGA §
42-8-100(f)(1) is applicable to state courts; it provides, in part: The chief judge of any court within the county, with the approval of the governing authority of that county, is authorized to enter into written contracts with corporations......
...Furthermore, this statute is no more intrusive than statutory authority permitting the county to set a judge's salary, OCGA §
15-22-1 et seq., [2] which this Court held to be constitutional in McCray v. Cobb County,
251 Ga. 24,
302 S.E.2d 563 *824 (1983). Accordingly, we conclude that OCGA §
42-8-100(f)(1) "permit[s] practical arrangements in a complex government," and therefore does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Greer v. State of Ga., supra at 669,
212 S.E.2d 836. (b) OCGA §
42-8-100(g)(1) pertains to municipalities; it provides, in pertinent part: The judge of the municipal court of any municipality ......
...and other probation services for persons convicted in such court.... The final contract negotiated by the judge with the private probation entity shall be attached to the approval by the governing authority of the municipality ... as an exhibit thereto. As the trial court correctly concluded, OCGA §
42-8-100(g)(1) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because it addresses strictly municipal functions. See Building Auth. of Fulton County v. State of Ga., supra. (c) Ward contends that OCGA §
42-8-100(f)(1) and (g)(1) must be interpreted to require approval by the appropriate governing authority of a judge's decision to privatize probation services....
...ivate probation service provider, the judge must present the resulting contract to the governing authority for approval. This is because the governing authority bears the ultimate fiscal responsibility for the court's operation. It follows that OCGA §
42-8-100(f)(1) and (g)(1) are not unconstitutional for any of the reasons asserted....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2010 | 286 Ga. 665, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 744
...*833 On February 18, 2008, Harrelson filed a petition in the Superior Court of Richmond County seeking habeas corpus relief and challenging the constitutionality of OCGA §
15-21A-6(c), which sets forth a waivable fifty dollar application fee for indigent defense services, and OCGA §
42-8-100(g)(1), which authorizes the use of private organizations to administer probation services for misdemeanor offenders....
...urned to her, given that the conviction pursuant to which such fines and fees had been imposed was invalid. The court denied Sentinel's motion to open default and declined to address Harrelson's constitutional challenges to OCGA §§
15-21A-6(c) and
42-8-100....
...Sentinel and Jones appeal separately in Case Nos. S09A1624 and S09A1625, challenging the grant of habeas relief and denial of Sentinel's motion to open default. Harrelson cross-appeals in Case No. S09X1626, seeking to have OCGA §
15-21A-6(c) and the private probation provisions of OCGA §
42-8-100 held unconstitutional....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 25, 2016 | 784 S.E.2d 791
...Decided: March 25, 2016
S15Q1816. ANDERSON v. SENTINEL OFFENDER SERVICES, LLC.
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
In Sentinel Offender Services, LLC. v. Glover, we concluded that
Georgia’s private probation statutory framework, see OCGA §
42-8-100 et seq.,
does not allow for the tolling of misdemeanor probationers’ sentences....
...me when that violation occurred. See
Roberts and Shamblin, supra.
4
Though this language is taken from a statute that became effective July 1,
2015, the language appears to be wholly unchanged from when it was originally
placed in OCGA §
42-8-100 in 2001....
...probation was administered by the Department of Corrections (“DOC”).
Simultaneously with the enactment of this statute, however, the legislature
amended Georgia’s Probation Code by adding Article 6 which contained two
new statutory provisions, OCGA §§
42-8-100 and
42-8-101....
...and regulations regarding
contracts or agreements for probation services [as authorized under this statute]
and regarding standards and qualifications in the provision of probation services
in the probate court or magistrate court.” See OCGA §§
42-8-100 and
42-8-101,
Ga. L. 1991, p. 1136, § 2. Since that time, “[s]tatutes specific to misdemeanor
probation systems are codified in Article 6 of Title 42, Chapter 8, which
encompasses code sections
42-8-100 through 24-8-108.” Sentinel Offender
SVCS., LLC v....
