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Call Now: 904-383-7448In any county where the chief judge of the superior court, state court, municipal court, probate court, or magistrate court has provided for probation services for such court through agreement with a private corporation, enterprise, or agency or has established a county or municipal probation system for such court pursuant to Article 6 of this chapter, the provisions of this article relating to supervision services shall not apply to defendants sentenced in any such court.
(Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, § 16; Ga. L. 1972, p. 604, § 12; Code 1981, §42-8-30, as redesignated by Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 4-1/HB 310.)
The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, redesignated former Code Section 42-8-30.1 as present Code Section 42-8-30, and substituted "Article 6 of this chapter" for "Code Section 42-8-100" and deleted "probation" preceding "supervision" near the end. See Editor's notes for applicability.
- Applicability of this state's correction laws to probationers' found in other states, T. 42, C. 11.
- Former Code Section 42-8-30 (Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, § 16; Ga. L. 1972, p. 604, § 12), relating to supervision of juvenile offenders by probation supervisors, was repealed by Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 4-1/HB 310, effective July 1, 2015.
Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective July 1, 2015, and shall apply to sentences entered on or after such date."
- Juvenile's interference with a juvenile probation officer's attempt to take the juvenile into custody, after the juvenile tested positive for illegal drug use, was sufficient to support an adjudication under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b); moreover, the appeals court was not persuaded by the juvenile's contention that O.C.G.A. § 42-8-30 specifically limited the role of the "probation supervisor" over juveniles to those counties in which no juvenile probation system existed. In the Interest of M.M., 287 Ga. App. 233, 651 S.E.2d 155 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 95 (Ga. 2008).
- Georgia Supreme Court answered two questions certified to it from a federal district court and concluded, as a matter of common law, that the mere passage of time does not extinguish an unserved sentence and that the common law principle has not been abrogated by the State-wide Probation Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-30. Anderson v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 298 Ga. 854, 784 S.E.2d 791 (2016).
Cited in P.R. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 346, 210 S.E.2d 839 (1974).
- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 526-536. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 1-77.
- 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 2144-2161. 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 6-8.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-03-25
Citation: 298 Ga. 854, 784 S.E.2d 791, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 251
Snippet: misdemeanors. See Sentinel I, 296 Ga. at 327-328; OCGA § 42-8-30. The question, then, is whether common law tolling
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-11-24
Citation: 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456
Snippet: private probation statute; (2) alleged that OCGA § 42-8-30.1 precludes tolling of misdemeanor probation sentences