O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
In recognition of the doctrine contained in the Constitution of this state requiring the three branches of government to be separate, it is declared to be the policy of the General Assembly that the duties, powers, and functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles are executive in character and that, in the performance of its duties under this chapter, no other body is authorized to usurp or substitute its functions for the functions imposed by this chapter upon the board.
History
Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 210, § 2; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 42.
Annotations
Cross references. Composition and powers of State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Paras. I, II. Administrative rules and regulations. Parole Consideration, Official Compila-
tion of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Rules of State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Rules, Rule 475-3.05. Other Clemency, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Rules of State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Rules, Rule 475-3-.10.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Jurisdiction. - When no grounds existed which required the correction of an inmate’s sentence, neither the trial court nor the appellate court had jurisdiction to grant the request under O.C.G.A. § 429-1. Harper v. State, 262 Ga. App. 136, 586 S.E.2d 336, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 862 (2003). Parole conditions. - Trial court erred by requiring the defendant to waive the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right as a condition of parole since “any attempt
by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant by the State Board of Pardons and Parole would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the Executive.” Stephens v. State, 207 Ga. App. 645, 428 S.E.2d 661, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 314 (1993).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Suspension of sentence upon prisoner’s parole by another state. - When a prisoner is incarcerated in another state and is serving that state and this state’s sentences concurrently, a pro-
vision for suspension of this state’s sentence in the event of parole by the other state authorities does not usurp functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. 1974 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 74-147.
RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 15 et seq.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
13
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1985–2021 · leading case:
Manley v. State, 698 S.E.2d 301 (Ga. 2010).
Manley v. State, 698 S.E.2d 301 (Ga. 2010).
· cites it 4× “II(a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983; OCGA § 42-9-1 et seq. See also Vargas v. Morris, 266 Ga.”
State v. Davis, 814 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. 2018).
· cites it 2× “" OCGA § 42-9-1. The State's efforts to inject the circumstances of the pardon itself into this appeal therefore are without merit.”
State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684 (Ga. 2018).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 42-9-1. The State’s efforts to inject the circumstances of the pardon itself into this appeal therefore are without merit.”
Smith v. State, 329 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 4× “[1] OCGA § 42-9-1. It is not a relevant factor in a trial court's ascertainment of whether a plea is voluntarily, understandingly, and knowingly made.”
Kelly Renee Gissendaner v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 794 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015).
“Anticipating that an execution date would be set in early 2015, Gissendaner’s legal team (which included both her attorneys and an investigator working on her behalf) had begun in late 2014 to prepare an application for state clemency.”
Stephens v. State, 428 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “In OCGA § 42-9-1, the General Assembly promulgated and declared its legislative policy regarding the executive character of the functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, as follows: “In recognition of the doctrine contained in the Constitution of this state requiring…”
Williams v. Lawrence, 540 S.E.2d 599 (Ga. 2001).
· cites it 2× “OCGA §§ 42-9-1, 42-9-50, 42-9-51; Davis v.”
Davis v. the State, 798 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “” 17 *657 Recognizing the importance of separation of powers and the Board’s independence in order to effectively wield its clemency power, OCGA § 42-9-1 provides: [I] t is declared to be the policy of the General Assembly that the duties, powers, and functions of the State…”
McConnell v. State, 635 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “State 5 (vacating sentence precluding parole where trial court improperly sentenced defendant based on recidivist status); OCGA § 42-9-1 (“functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles are executive in character and .”
Harper v. State, 586 S.E.2d 336 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “To the extent that Harper’s opaque motion to correct his sentence below and his equally vague brief on appeal requested the trial court, and now this court, to compel the Board to release him on parole, neither the trial court nor this court has jurisdiction to grant this…”
Randall Dale Bingham v. State (Ga. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 42-9-1 (“the duties, powers, and functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles are executive in character and .”
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