Jurisdiction.

- When no grounds existed which required the correction of an inmate's sentence, neither the trial court nor the appellate court had jurisdiction to grant the request under O.C.G.A. § 42-9-1. Harper v. State, 262 Ga. App. 136, 586 S.E.2d 336 (2003).

Parole conditions.

- Trial court erred by requiring the defendant to waive the defendant's Fourth Amendment right as a condition of parole since "any attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department by attempting to impose as a part of a criminal sentence conditions operating as a prerequisite of or becoming automatically effective in the event of a subsequent parole of defendant by the State Board of Pardons and Parole would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the Executive." Stephens v. State, 207 Ga. App. 645, 428 S.E.2d 661 (1993).

Pardon removed duty of defendant to register.

- Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a general demurrer was reversed as to failing to register as a sex offender as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 because the separation of powers doctrine required the court to adhere to the decision of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to issue defendant a pardon as the plain meaning of the sweeping language used by the Board in the pardon removed the duty of the defendant to register as a sex offender. Davis v. State, 340 Ga. App. 652, 798 S.E.2d 474 (2017).

Cited in State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684, 814 S.E.2d 701 (2018).

Suspension of sentence upon prisoner's parole by another state.

- When a prisoner is incarcerated in another state and is serving that state and this state's sentences concurrently, a provision for suspension of this state's sentence in the event of parole by the other state authorities does not usurp functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-147.

C.J.S.

- 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, §§ 15-18.