Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448Should any creditor of the applicant desire to object to the schedule for want of sufficiency and fullness or for fraud of any kind or to dispute the valuation of the personalty, the propriety of the survey, or the value of the premises so platted as the exempted real property, he shall specify his objections in writing at the time and place appointed for the hearing.
(Ga. L. 1868, p. 27, § 6; Code 1873, § 2010; Code 1882, § 2010; Civil Code 1895, § 2836; Civil Code 1910, § 3386; Code 1933, § 51-403; Code 1981, §44-13-13; Code 1981, §44-13-12, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1983, p. 1170, § 2.)
- Ga. L. 1983, p. 1170, § 2, effective July 1, 1983, redesignated former Code Section 44-13-13 as this Code section. The 1983 Act also redesignated former Code Section 44-13-12, relating to approval of application and recordation of exempted real property, as present Code Section 44-13-11.
Purpose of objection to schedule for want of sufficiency and fullness is to prevent the allowance of the homestead, and it does not fail as an objection under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-12 merely because it may be described as an "objection to the homestead." Alday v. Spooner, 35 Ga. App. 614, 134 S.E. 343 (1926).
- An amendment to objections, which in general terms alleged that the head of the family owned property not scheduled, some of which consisted of debts owing to that individual by persons unknown to the objector, without further specifying or describing the property charged to have been omitted, was properly disallowed for want of fullness and certainty in these respects. Wood & Bro. v. Collins, 111 Ga. 32, 36 S.E. 423 (1900).
- A creditor who files objections to the allowance of an exemption on the ground that specified articles of personalty were omitted from the schedule, should on the trial be confined to the articles mentioned in the objections, and should not be allowed to show by evidence that other articles of personalty were omitted from the schedule. Wood & Bro. v. Collins, 111 Ga. 32, 36 S.E. 423 (1900).
- Where an application for an exemption of personalty was made, and creditors of the applicant objected thereto on the ground of fraud, and the case was carried to the superior court by appeal, on the trial, the objectors were entitled to the opening and conclusion. McNally v. Mulherin & Co., 79 Ga. 614, 4 S.E. 332 (1887).
- A creditor is not obliged to contest the right of a debtor to a homestead on any other grounds then those stated in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-12, but if the creditor appears voluntarily and raises questions which the ordinary (now probate judge) would not otherwise have power to pass upon, and they are passed upon, the creditor will be bound by the judgment. Patterson v. Wallace, 47 Ga. 452 (1872). See also Harris v. Colquitt & Baggs, 44 Ga. 663 (1872).
If the creditor failed to appear and object that the schedule was insufficient, and it gives a general description of the property, and no fraud or unfairness is alleged or shown, the creditor will not be permitted to attack the judgment of the ordinary (now probate judge) setting it apart, collaterally, in a claim case, on the ground that the schedule was not sufficiently descriptive. Bartlett v. Russell, 41 Ga. 196 (1870).
- The fact that the bankrupts, as residents of Georgia, did not set apart exemptions in the manner provided did not preclude the allowance of exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings. Clark v. Nirenbaum, 8 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 649, 46 S. Ct. 349, 70 L. Ed. 780 (1926).
- Where a creditor filed objections, one of which was to the schedule for want of sufficiency and fullness in that the applicant had omitted certain personalty, appeal to the superior court lies. Alday v. Spooner, 35 Ga. App. 614, 134 S.E. 343 (1926).
- An appeal to the superior court from the judgment of the ordinary (now probate judge), in setting apart or refusing to set apart a homestead, lies only where the objections interposed by creditors of the applicant are those provided for in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-12. When objections other than those specified in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-12 are filed, the judgment of the ordinary (now probate judge) is reviewable by certiorari, an appeal is not the remedy. Fontano v. Mozley & Co., 121 Ga. 46, 48 S.E. 707 (1904).
- 40 C.J.S., Homesteads, § 149 et seq.
No results found for Georgia Code 44-13-12.