O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
No waiver or release of the notice requirement of Code Section 44-14-162.2 shall be valid when made in or contemporaneously with the security instrument containing the power of nonjudicial foreclosure sale; but, notwithstanding the requirements of Code Sections 44-14162.1, 44-14-162.2, this Code section, and Code Section 44-14-162.4, a subsequent quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure shall be valid and effective as such.
History
Ga. L. 1981, p. 834, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 415, § 44; Ga. L. 2009, p. 614, § 2/SB 141; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1079, § 1/SB 333.
Annotations
Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2012, p. 1079, § 3/SB 333, not
codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to sales made on foreclosure under power of sale executed on or after July 1, 2012.”
Law reviews. For annual survey on real property law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2009). For article, “Georgia Foreclosure Confirmation Proceedings in Today’s Reces-
sionary Real Estate World: Back to the Future,” see 16 (No. 4) Ga. St. B.J. 11 (2010). For annual survey on real property, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 255 (2012).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Foreclosure of unimproved lots. - The notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 4414-162.2 were not applicable to the foreclosure of unimproved lots. Stepp v. Farm
& Home Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. App. 257, 474 S.E.2d 108, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 801 (1996).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
15
cases, 1990–2016 · leading case:
Ray v. Atkins, 421 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
Ray v. Atkins, 421 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 6× “In the event the property encumbered by the mortgage, security deed, or lien contract has been transferred or conveyed by the original debtor, the term “debtor” shall mean the current owner of the property encumbered by the debt, if the identity of such owner has been made known…”
TKW Partners, LLC v. Archer Capital Fund, L.P., 691 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 4× “) OCGA § 44-14-162.3 (a). 10 The deed to secure debt also provided that the secured property was not being used as a dwelling place and “the notice requirements of OCGA § 44-14-162.”
PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Smith, 785 S.E.2d 505 (Ga. 2016).
· cites it 2× “4 — and in so doing, limited the “notice requirements of this Act” language of Section 5 (b) to say in OCGA § 44-14-162.3 “the notice requirement [singular] of Code Section 44-14-162.”
Com. Exch. Bank v. Johnson, 398 S.E.2d 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 4× “" NOTES [1] It should be noted, however, that this waiver was invalid, as OCGA § 44-14-162.3 expressly states; "No waiver or release of the notice requirement of Code Section 44-14-162.”
Ciuperca v. RES-GA Seven, LLC, 735 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 4× “Prior to July 1, 2012, OCGA § 44-14-162.3 (a) (2011) provided that the notice requirement of OCGA § 44-14-162.”
Ikomoni v. Bank of Am., N.A., 769 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 3× “Under the version of OCGA § 44-14-162.3 applicable to this case, a secured creditor was required to give OCGA § 44-14-162.”
Peters Et Al. v. Certusbank Nat'l Ass'n, 763 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 2× “2 (a): *31 Under a prior Code section, such notice was required only for foreclosed properties “used as a dwelling place by the debtor,” see former OCGA § 44-14-162.3 (a), but the General Assembly removed this limitation in an amendment effective July 1, 2012.”
Stepp v. Farm & Home Life Ins. Co., 474 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 44-14-162.3 (a). Consequently, the notice requirements of OCGA § 44-14-162.”
Dickens v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 398 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 4× “" OCGA § 44-14-162.3. While there have been allegations and denials by the parties, we have found no competent evidence of record to show whether either Robert Lee Dickens or Rebecca T.”
Stubbs v. Bank of Am., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
· cites it 2× “See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.3(c) (“[n]o waiver or release of the notice requirement of Code Section 44-14-162.”
Dickens v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 431 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× ““Those Code sections require that no sale of real estate on foreclosure shall be valid unless notice of the sale has been given the debtor.” Dickens, 197 Ga.”
— 44-14-162.3(c) — 1 case
Stubbs v. Bank of Am., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
“See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.3(c) (“[n]o waiver or release of the notice requirement of Code Section 44-14-162.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.