O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-83 (2019)

Actions to foreclose and exercise of powers of sale after reversion

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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No action to foreclose and no action to recover property under a conveyance of real property to secure debt shall be commenced and no power contained in or conferred by a conveyance of real property to secure debt shall be exercised after the title thereby conveyed has reverted as provided in this part.

History

Ga. L. 1941, p. 487, § 6.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Title reverted to grantor after seven years causing grantee to lose security interest. - Because a security deed did not specify a fixed period for repayment or state that the security interest was perpetual under O.C.G.A. § 44-

14-80(a), title to the property reverted to the grantor after seven years and the grantee’s security interest in the property was lost. Vineville Capital Group, LLC v. McCook, 329 Ga. App. 790, 766 S.E.2d 156, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 781 (2014).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1994–2023 · leading case: Mike’s Furniture Barn, Inc. Et Al. v. Smith, 803 S.E.2d 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
Mike’s Furniture Barn, Inc. Et Al. v. Smith, 803 S.E.2d 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “Under the plain language of this statute, any intent to create a perpetual and indefinite security interest must appear by an “affirmative statement” in the deed.”
Vineville Capital Grp., LLC v. Mccook, 766 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 44-14-83. 4 The second page of the McCook security deed has nine paragraphs of terms related to renewals and extensions, subrogation, indemnity, insurance, acceleration, time being of the essence, default, foreclosure, and assignment.”
Brinson v. McMillan, 440 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. 1994). · cites it 2× “Provided the right to foreclose or otherwise recover the land conveyed by the security deed is not barred by the provisions of OCGA § 44-14-83, even if the evidence at trial reveals that an action to collect the debt is barred by the statute of limitation, such would not prevent…”
Joyce M. Griggs v. Gregory D. Miller, of Est. of John Henry Miller (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 2× “]” OCGA § 44-14-83. Consequently, the trial court erred in holding that Miller could proceed with foreclosure proceedings.”
Charles E. Head v. Planet Home Lending, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “The Court explained, “Provided the right to foreclose or otherwise recover the land conveyed by the security deed is not barred by the provisions of OCGA § 44-14-83” — which bars foreclosure after title has reverted by statute — “even if the evidence at trial reveals that an…”
Freeport Title & Guar. v. SummitBridge Nat'l Investments V, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2021). · cites it 2× “2d 800, 803 (2017)(citing O.C.G.A. § 44-14-83). The underlying loan obligation, however, may be extended as well as the security interest for an additional seven (7) year period on certain conditions.”
White Props. Investments, LLC v. Dip Lending I, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 44-14-83. See also Bell v. Freeport Title & Guar.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.