"Other registrable instruments" construed.

- Words "other registrable instruments" in this statute mean deeds and other instruments required by law to be executed with the formality of deeds. New London Square, Ltd. v. Diamond Elec. & Supply Corp., 132 Ga. App. 433, 208 S.E.2d 348 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-14).

Words "or other registrable instrument" do not include a materialman's claim of lien. New London Square, Ltd. v. Diamond Elec. & Supply Corp., 132 Ga. App. 433, 208 S.E.2d 348 (1974).

Statute provides two modes under which a deed may be recorded, by attestation or by acknowledgment. Ballard v. Orr, 105 Ga. 191, 31 S.E. 554 (1898); Stallings v. Newton, 110 Ga. 875, 36 S.E. 227 (1900); Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648, 64 S.E. 800 (1909) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-2-14).

Deeds of realty and personalty may be acknowledged before, as well as attested by, an officer, or proven by the affidavit of a subscribing witness to prepare the deeds for record. Webb v. United-American Soda Fountain Co., 59 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1932).

For historical discussion of common law and statutory provisions on attestation and acknowledgment, see Webb v. United-American Soda Fountain Co., 59 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1932).

Effect of acknowledgment on title.

- Acknowledgment, while required for recordation, is not necessary in order to convey title by a deed properly signed and delivered. Stallings v. Newton, 110 Ga. 875, 36 S.E. 227 (1900); Northrop v. Columbian Lumber Co., 186 F. 770 (5th Cir. 1911).

Attestation of security deed.

- First sentence of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 and the statutory recording scheme indicate that the word "duly" in the second sentence of § 44-14-33 should be understood to mean that a security deed is "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" only if the clerk responsible for recording determines, from the face of the document, that it is in the proper form for recording, meaning that it is attested or acknowledged by a proper officer and (in the case of real property) an additional witness; the General Assembly chose to enact the 1995 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-33 not as a freestanding Code provision but as an addition to a Code provision clearly referenced by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-61, and the General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of the existing state of the law when the legislature enacted the 1995 amendment so the placement of the amendment makes complete sense. United States Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gordon, 289 Ga. 12, 709 S.E.2d 258 (2011).

Instrument valid between parties even though unattested, or improperly attested.

- Retention of title contract or a mortgage may be valid between the parties even though it is unattested, or improperly attested and not recorded and not entitled to be recorded because of such improper attestation. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Creede, 103 Ga. App. 203, 118 S.E.2d 844 (1961).

Alleged defect in notarization not apparent on face of document.

- Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the corporations on the issue of whether the corporations had actual or constructive notice of fraud regarding the relatives' quitclaim deeds despite the relatives' assertions that the deeds were notarized after the deeds were signed and were notarized outside the presence of each of the relatives; even assuming the assertion was true, that defect in proper notarization was not apparent from the face of any of the deeds involved, all of which were signed, witnessed, and notarized. Bowman v. Century Funding, Ltd., 277 Ga. App. 540, 627 S.E.2d 73 (2006).

Deed ineligible for recordation.

- Deed was materially altered when an attachment containing the description of one of two parcels of property was removed, the deed was ineligible for recordation, and the buyer's failure to object to the recording of the altered deed did not support a finding that the buyer accepted the altered deed without objection as: (1) the seller did not resign the deed and it was not re-attested; (2) the buyer was not sent the altered deed or land description; (3) there was no evidence that the buyer consented to the alteration or that the buyer otherwise agreed to accept only one parcel of land; (4) the delivery of the altered deed to the bank's attorney was not constructive delivery to the buyer as the attorney represented the bank and the buyer had not authorized the attorney to accept and retain the recorded deed on the buyer's behalf; and (5) the buyer never received a copy of the altered deed or land description before or after it was recorded. Z & Y Corp. v. Indore C. Stores, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 163, 638 S.E.2d 760 (2006).

Cited in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 110 Ga. App. 68, 137 S.E.2d 718 (1964); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 286 Ga. 53, 684 S.E.2d 861 (2009); Gordon v. Ameritrust Mortg. Co. LLC (In re Nesbitt), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2013).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 101.

C.J.S.

- 26A C.J.S., Deeds, §§ 382 et seq., 394.

ALR.

- Acknowledgment or oath over telephone, 12 A.L.R. 538; 58 A.L.R. 604.

Sufficiency of certificate of acknowledgment, 29 A.L.R. 919.