O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-3-226 (2019)

Amendment of instrument; presumption of validity in court action

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Except to the extent expressly permitted or required by other provisions of this article, the instrument shall be amended only by the agreement of lot owners of lots to which two-thirds of the votes in the association pertain or such larger majority as the instrument may specify; provided, however, that, during any such time as there shall exist an unexpired option to add any additional property to the property owners’ association or during any such time as the declarant has the right to control the association under the instrument, the agreement shall be that of the declarant and the lot owners of lots to which two-thirds of the votes in the association pertain, exclusive of any vote or votes appurtenant to any lot or lots then owned by the declarant, or a larger majority as the instrument may specify. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subsection, during such time as the declarant shall own at least one lot primarily for the purpose of sale of such lot, no amendment shall be made to the instrument without the written agreement of the declarant if such amendment would impose a greater restriction on the use or development by the declarant of the lot or lots owned by the declarant. (b) No amendment of an instrument shall require approval of lot owners to which more than 80 percent of the association vote pertains and the mortgagees holding 80 percent of the voting interest of mortgaged lots; any property owners’ association which exists prior to July 1, 1994, and amends its documents to avail itself of the provisions of this article shall be deemed to have amended the association instrument to conform to this limitation. This subsection shall not be deemed to eliminate or modify any right of the declarant provided for in the instrument to approve amendments to the

instrument so long as the declarant owns any lot primarily for the purpose of sale and, furthermore, this Code section shall not be construed as modifying or altering the rights of a mortgagee set forth elsewhere in this article. (c) Except to the extent expressly permitted or required by other provisions of this article, or agreed upon or permitted by the instrument concerning submission of additional property to this article by the declarant or the association, or agreed upon by all lot owners and the mortgagees of all lots, no amendment to the instrument shall change the boundaries of any lot, the number of votes in the association pertaining thereto, or the liability for common expenses pertaining thereto. (d) Agreement of the required majority of lot owners to any amendment of the instrument shall be evidenced by their execution of the amendment. In the alternative, provided that the declarant does not then have the right to control the association pursuant to the instrument, the sworn statement of the president, of any vice president, or of the secretary of the association attached to or incorporated in an amendment executed by the association, which sworn statement states unequivocally that agreement of the required majority was otherwise lawfully obtained and that all notices required by this article were properly given, shall be sufficient to evidence the required agreement. Any such amendment of the instrument shall become effective only when recorded or at such later date as may be specified in the amendment itself. (e) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this article or in the instrument, the approval of any proposed amendment by a mortgagee shall be deemed implied and consented to if the mortgagee fails to submit a response to any written proposal for an amendment within 30 days after the mortgagee receives notice of the proposed amendment sent by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, return receipt requested. (f ) In any court suit or action where the validity of the adoption of an amendment to an instrument is at issue, the adoption of the amendment shall be presumed valid if the suit is commenced more than one year after the recording of the amendment on the public record. In such cases, the burden of proof shall be upon the party challenging the validity of the adoption of the amendment.

History

(Code 1981, § 44-3-226, enacted by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1879, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 10, § 44; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3.)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code

section is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1999–2025 · leading case: Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, 747 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, 747 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 19× “For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that for the restrictive covenant at issue to be enforceable against the Marinos, they had to agree to the covenant in writing pursuant to OCGA § 44-5-60 (d) (4), or the covenant had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the votes…”
Pasha v. Battle Creek Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 829 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 6× “Indeed, under OCGA § 44-3-226 (a) of the Act, the Declaration could be amended if two-thirds of the homeowners approved of such an amendment.”
Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, 770 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “And in Marino I, we concluded that for the restrictive covenant at issue to be enforceable against the Marinos, they had to agree to the covenant in writing pursuant to OCGA § 44-5-60 (d) (4), or the covenant had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the votes in the…”
Patricia Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 14× “For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that for the restrictive covenant at issue to be enforceable against the Marinos, they had to agree to the covenant in writing pursuant to OCGA § 44-5-60 (d) (4), or the covenant had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the votes…”
Ga. Appreciation Prop., Inc. v. Enclave at Riverwalk Townhome Ass'n, Inc., 812 S.E.2d 157 (5th Cir. 2018). · cites it 2× “] See OCGA § 44-3-226 (a) (emphasis supplied). On May 17, 2016, Enclave proposed 17 amendments to the Declaration and the bylaws of the Association and sought to obtain written consent to the amendments from the unit owners.”
Gregory Vaughn v. Windfield Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 44-3-226 (a) (1) (requiring two-thirds vote to amend an instrument); § 44-3-221 (17) (defining “instrument” to include declarations); OCGA § 44-3-221 (18) (“‘Property owners’ development’ or ‘development’ means real property which contains lots and which may contain…”
Georgia Appreciation Prop., Inc. v. Enclave at Riverwalk Townhome Ass'n, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 4× “] See OCGA § 44-3-226 (a) (emphasis supplied). On May 17, 2016, Enclave proposed 17 amendments to the Declaration and the bylaws of the Association and sought to obtain written consent to the amendments from the unit owners.”
Rafael a. Ochoa v. Coldwater Creek Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 2× “]” OCGA § 44-3-226 (a) (1); see also OCGA § 44-3-234 (“The limitations provided in .”
Patricia Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “And in Marino I, we concluded that for the restrictive covenant at issue to be enforceable against the Marinos, they had to agree to the covenant in writing pursuant to OCGA § 44-5-60 (d) (4), or the covenant had to be approved by at least two- thirds of the votes in the…”
Mobley v. Bent Tree Cmty., Inc., 523 S.E.2d 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “Crew, Jr., for appellant. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, Derek W.”
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