O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-5-177 (2019)

Adverse possession of personal property

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Possession of personal property in conformance with the requirements of Code Section 44-5-161 for a period of four years confers title to the property by prescription. No prescription arises if the property is concealed, is removed from the state, or is otherwise not subject to reclamation. (Laws 1847, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 569; Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, §§ 2, 4; Code 1863, § 2644; Code 1868, § 2643; Code 1873, § 2685; Code 1882, § 2685; Civil Code 1895, § 3592; Civil Code 1910, § 4172; Code 1933, § 85-1706.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Purpose. - Statute is designed to protect a possession held under a title acquired in good faith, and not one taken in disregard of the rights of another person, of whose title the claimant had been informed, and about which, with proper inquiry, one might have had full knowledge. Hunt v. Dunn, 74 Ga. 120 (1884); Hicks v. Moyer, 10 Ga. App. 488, 73 S.E. 754 (1912); Taylor v. Wilkins, 22 Ga. App. 723, 97 S.E. 101 (1918) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-177). Statute embodies the statute of limitations as to trover. Blocker v. Boswell, 109 Ga. 230, 34 S.E. 289 (1889) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-177). Prescription vests absolute title. - As in case of adverse possession of realty, adverse possession of chattels for the statutory period operates not merely to bar the remedy but vests absolute title in the possessor, which is equally available for attack or defense. Woodcliff Gin Co. v. Kittles, 173 Ga. 661, 161 S.E. 119 (1931). Nature of required possession same as for realty. - Nature of the possession of personal property and that of realty, required to give title by prescription is the same. Ewing v. Tanner, 184 Ga. 773, 193 S.E. 243 (1937). Rules for determining whether title to personalty has ripened by prescription are

the same as those applying to real estate. Frye v. Commonwealth Inv. Co., 107 Ga. App. 739, 131 S.E.2d 569, aff ’d, 219 Ga. 498, 134 S.E.2d 39 (1963). Successive periods of possession may be united or tacked to each other to make up the time of adverse holding prescribed by the statute. Woodcliff Gin Co. v. Kittles, 173 Ga. 661, 161 S.E. 119 (1931). Property must be adversely held under claim of title. - Title by prescription does not arise unless the property is held adversely under a claim of title as when the property is held by a bailee for the true owner. Rawson v. Tift, 53 Ga. App. 248, 185 S.E. 397 (1936). In order for the possession of a chattel to ripen into a prescriptive title, under the provisions of this statute, the possession must be adverse to the true owner. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d (1946) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-177). Since there is a fiduciary relation between a corporation and the corporation’s stockholders giving rise to the duty on its part to protect the stockholder against fraudulent transfers based upon forged or unauthorized endorsements or stock powers, there can be no adverse possession of the stock by

the corporation which can become the foundation of a prescriptive title unless the facts clearly and unmistakably demonstrate that the character of its possession is in truth and in fact adverse. Frye v. Commonwealth Inv. Co., 107 Ga. App. 739, 131 S.E.2d 569, aff ’d, 219 Ga. 498, 134 S.E.2d 39 (1963). Statute will not run until possession adverse. - If one claiming prescriptive title entered into permissive possession of a chattel, acknowledging that title thereto was in the original owner, before the owner could convert such permissive possession into an adverse possession, the owner would have to show knowledge on the part of the original owner that the owner claimed the property as the owner’s own before the statute would commence to run in the owner’s favor. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946). Statute of limitations does not run in favor of a bailee until the bailee sets up an adverse claim in respect of the bailment. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946). Statute does not begin to run until the possession of the trustee becomes adverse, tortious and wrongful, by the disloyal acts of the trustee, which must be open, continued and notorious, so as to preclude all doubt as to the character of the holding of the property, or the want of knowledge on the part of the cestui que trust. Frye v. Commonwealth

Inv. Co., 107 Ga. App. 739, 131 S.E.2d 569, aff ’d, 219 Ga. 498, 134 S.E.2d 39 (1963). Possession without claim of title will not ripen into title. - Possession of a chattel for more than four years without a claim of title thereto adverse to that of the owner will not ripen into a prescriptive title. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946). Possession must be for four years. - Adverse possession of personal property for less than four years does not give title thereto by prescription. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946). Payment of taxes on personal property by one in possession is not evidence in itself of a claim of title thereto adverse that of the owner, but is a circumstance to be considered by the court along with the other evidence in the case. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946). Abandonment of wife, without more, is insufficient to put the wife on notice that the husband was holding her property adversely. Allen v. Allen, 196 Ga. 736, 27 S.E.2d 679 (1943). Title acquired by prescription. - See Ulmer v. Ulmer, 53 Ga. App. 417, 186 S.E. 433 (1936). Cited in Southwestern R.R. v. Atlantic & G.R.R., 53 Ga. 401 (1874); Slay v. George, 145 Ga. 771, 89 S.E. 830 (1916); Rogers v. Citizens Bank, 92 Ga. App. 399, 88 S.E.2d 548 (1955).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession, § 8. C.J.S. - 73 C.J.S., Property, § 37.

ALR. - Larceny by finder of property, 36 ALR 372.

ARTICLE 8 ESCHEAT 44-5-190 through 44-5-199. Reserved. Repealed by Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 9, effective January 1, 1998. Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 9, effective January 1, 1998, repealed the Code sections formerly codified at this article, which consisted of §§ 44-5-190 through 44-5-199 and was based on Ga. L. 1984, p. 1124, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 44. For new

provisions concerning escheat, see Title 53, Chapter 2, Article 5. Ga. L. 1984, p. 1124, § 1, effective March 29, 1984, repealed the Code sections formerly codified at this article, which consisted of §§ 44-5-190 through 44-5-195 and was

based on Laws 1801, Cobbs 1851 Digest, pp 251, 254; Laws 1805, Cobbs 1851 Digest, p 252; Laws 1817, Cobbs 1851 Digest, p 254; Laws 1836, Cobbs 1851 Digest, p 255; Orig. Code 1863, §§ 2627, 2630-2633; Code 1868, §§ 2627, 2630-2633; Code 1873, §§ 2669,

2671-2674; Code 1882, §§ 2669, 2671-2674; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3575, 3577-3580; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4155, 4157-4160; Ga. L. 1917, p 101, § 2; Code 1933, §§ 85-1101, 85-1103 - 85-1108.

ARTICLE 9 FORFEITURE Cross references. - Forfeiture based on convictions, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XX. Construction against forfeiture in equity, § 23-1-23. Forfeiture of estates granted on condition, § 44-6-41. Forfeiture

of life estates generally, § 44-6-83. Forfeiture of life estates in personalty, § 44-6-89. Forfeiture of estates for years, § 44-6-103. Forfeiture of easements, § 44-9-6.