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Call Now: 904-383-7448Possession of personal property in conformance with the requirements of Code Section 44-5-161 for a period of four years confers title to the property by prescription. No prescription arises if the property is concealed, is removed from the state, or is otherwise not subject to reclamation.
(Laws 1847, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 569; Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, §§ 2, 4; Code 1863, § 2644; Code 1868, § 2643; Code 1873, § 2685; Code 1882, § 2685; Civil Code 1895, § 3592; Civil Code 1910, § 4172; Code 1933, § 85-1706.)
- Statute is designed to protect a possession held under a title acquired in good faith, and not one taken in disregard of the rights of another person, of whose title the claimant had been informed, and about which, with proper inquiry, one might have had full knowledge. Hunt v. Dunn, 74 Ga. 120 (1884); Hicks v. Moyer, 10 Ga. App. 488, 73 S.E. 754 (1912); Taylor v. Wilkins, 22 Ga. App. 723, 97 S.E. 101 (1918) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-177).
Statute embodies the statute of limitations as to trover. Blocker v. Boswell, 109 Ga. 230, 34 S.E. 289 (1889) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-177).
- As in case of adverse possession of realty, adverse possession of chattels for the statutory period operates not merely to bar the remedy but vests absolute title in the possessor, which is equally available for attack or defense. Woodcliff Gin Co. v. Kittles, 173 Ga. 661, 161 S.E. 119 (1931).
- Nature of the possession of personal property and that of realty, required to give title by prescription is the same. Ewing v. Tanner, 184 Ga. 773, 193 S.E. 243 (1937).
Rules for determining whether title to personalty has ripened by prescription are the same as those applying to real estate. Frye v. Commonwealth Inv. Co., 107 Ga. App. 739, 131 S.E.2d 569, aff'd, 219 Ga. 498, 134 S.E.2d 39 (1963).
Successive periods of possession may be united or tacked to each other to make up the time of adverse holding prescribed by the statute. Woodcliff Gin Co. v. Kittles, 173 Ga. 661, 161 S.E. 119 (1931).
- Title by prescription does not arise unless the property is held adversely under a claim of title as when the property is held by a bailee for the true owner. Rawson v. Tift, 53 Ga. App. 248, 185 S.E. 397 (1936).
In order for the possession of a chattel to ripen into a prescriptive title, under the provisions of this statute, the possession must be adverse to the true owner. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-177).
Since there is a fiduciary relation between a corporation and the corporation's stockholders giving rise to the duty on its part to protect the stockholder against fraudulent transfers based upon forged or unauthorized endorsements or stock powers, there can be no adverse possession of the stock by the corporation which can become the foundation of a prescriptive title unless the facts clearly and unmistakably demonstrate that the character of its possession is in truth and in fact adverse. Frye v. Commonwealth Inv. Co., 107 Ga. App. 739, 131 S.E.2d 569, aff'd, 219 Ga. 498, 134 S.E.2d 39 (1963).
- If one claiming prescriptive title entered into permissive possession of a chattel, acknowledging that title thereto was in the original owner, before the owner could convert such permissive possession into an adverse possession, the owner would have to show knowledge on the part of the original owner that the owner claimed the property as the owner's own before the statute would commence to run in the owner's favor. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946).
Statute of limitations does not run in favor of a bailee until the bailee sets up an adverse claim in respect of the bailment. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946).
Statute does not begin to run until the possession of the trustee becomes adverse, tortious and wrongful, by the disloyal acts of the trustee, which must be open, continued and notorious, so as to preclude all doubt as to the character of the holding of the property, or the want of knowledge on the part of the cestui que trust. Frye v. Commonwealth Inv. Co., 107 Ga. App. 739, 131 S.E.2d 569, aff'd, 219 Ga. 498, 134 S.E.2d 39 (1963).
- Possession of a chattel for more than four years without a claim of title thereto adverse to that of the owner will not ripen into a prescriptive title. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946).
- Adverse possession of personal property for less than four years does not give title thereto by prescription. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946).
Payment of taxes on personal property by one in possession is not evidence in itself of a claim of title thereto adverse that of the owner, but is a circumstance to be considered by the court along with the other evidence in the case. Culbreath v. Patton, 73 Ga. App. 667, 37 S.E.2d 719 (1946).
Abandonment of wife, without more, is insufficient to put the wife on notice that the husband was holding her property adversely. Allen v. Allen, 196 Ga. 736, 27 S.E.2d 679 (1943).
- See Ulmer v. Ulmer, 53 Ga. App. 417, 186 S.E. 433 (1936).
Cited in Southwestern R.R. v. Atlantic & G.R.R., 53 Ga. 401 (1874); Slay v. George, 145 Ga. 771, 89 S.E. 830 (1916); Rogers v. Citizens Bank, 92 Ga. App. 399, 88 S.E.2d 548 (1955).
- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession, § 8.
- 73 C.J.S., Property, § 37.
- Larceny by finder of property, 36 A.L.R. 372.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-06-27
Citation: 711 S.E.2d 709, 289 Ga. 437, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1935, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 507
Snippet: prescription, which is governed by OCGA §§ 44-5-160 to 44-5-177. 5. The Daniels' remaining enumerations of error