Failure to pay creates liability.

- Fact that the consideration is not actually paid does not render void the conveyance but creates a liability upon the purchaser which may be enforced in an action at law. Morris v. Johnson, 219 Ga. 81, 132 S.E.2d 45 (1963).

Recital that amount paid subject to inquiry to show amount charged to purchaser's account.

- Recital in a written contract of sale of personalty that a specified amount of the purchase money was paid in cash on or before delivery of the property, leaving a stated balance to be covered by notes for installments of so much per month, is subject to inquiry and explanation to the extent of showing that what is described as the initial payment was not in fact received, but was charged to the account of the purchaser as a subsisting and unconditional liability. Newsom v. Reynolds Chevrolet Co., 43 Ga. App. 376, 158 S.E. 763 (1931).

When statement on consideration is by way of recital, actual consideration is subject to explanation; but if the consideration is referred to in the deed in such way as to make the consideration one of the terms or conditions of the contract, the consideration cannot be varied by parol. Shapiro v. Steinberg, 179 Ga. 18, 175 S.E. 1 (1934).

Parole evidence not permissible to modify terms and conditions of contract.

- If an instrument states the consideration, not merely by way of recital, but in such a way as to constitute the consideration a part of the terms and conditions of the agreement itself, then and in such event it is not permissible, even under the guise of inquiring into the consideration, to set up a new and different consideration, and in this way to incidentally modify the terms and conditions of the written contract. This rule does not apply where a total lack or a total failure of consideration is shown, in which event the instrument can be attacked irrespective of how or in what manner the consideration may be expressed. Pittman v. Pittman, 196 Ga. 397, 26 S.E.2d 764 (1943).

When consideration not ambiguous, error to admit parol evidence to show parties' intention.

- Timber lease, as properly construed, granted the right to cut and remove all the timber of stated kinds and dimensions on the described tract of land, at and for a stipulated price per 1,000 feet, subject only to the expiration of the lease on a date therein fixed, and did not limit the amount of timber that might be so cut by recital of a certain consideration, and the judge erred in holding that the contract was ambiguous on the point at issue, and in admitting over appropriate objection parol evidence offered to show an intention of the parties that only a certain quantity of timber could be so cut and removed under the right granted. McCann v. Glynn Lumber Co., 199 Ga. 669, 34 S.E.2d 839 (1945).

Cited in Bonner v. Metcalf, 58 Ga. 236 (1877); Parrott v. Baker, 82 Ga. 364, 9 S.E. 1068 (1889); Coldwell Co. v. Cowart, 138 Ga. 233, 75 S.E. 425 (1912); Gammage v. Perry, 29 Ga. App. 427, 116 S.E. 126 (1923); Carder v. Arundel Mtg. Co., 47 Ga. App. 309, 170 S.E. 312 (1933).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 86. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 11 et seq.

ALR.

- Estoppel of grantee or mortgagee as to amount of prior mortgage recited, 141 A.L.R. 1184.

Estoppel of oil and gas lessee to deny lessor's title, 87 A.L.R.2d 602.