Consent order, unless set aside, cannot be reopened to relitigate cotenants' rights.

- Consent order entered in a partitioning case, decreeing certain persons to be cotenants and appointing partitioners to partition the property in question, cannot be subsequently reopened to relitigate the rights of the parties as cotenants, unless the order is reversed or set aside. Johnson v. James, 246 Ga. 680, 272 S.E.2d 692 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partition, § 115.

C.J.S.

- 68 C.J.S., Partition, § 131.

Subpart 2 Statutory Partition

44-6-160. Grounds for partition; jurisdiction; contents of petition.

When two or more persons are common owners of lands and tenements, whether by descent, purchase, or otherwise, and no provision is made, by will or otherwise, as to how such lands and tenements shall be divided, any one of such common owners may apply by petition to the superior court of the county in which such lands and tenements are located for a writ of partition which shall set forth plainly and distinctly the facts and circumstances of the case, shall describe the premises to be partitioned, and shall define the share and interest of each of the parties therein. When the lands in question constitute a single tract situated in more than one county, the application may be made to the superior court of any of such counties.

(Laws 1767, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 581; Code 1863, § 3896; Code 1868, § 3920; Code 1873, § 3996; Code 1882, § 3996; Civil Code 1895, § 4786; Ga. L. 1900, p. 56, § 1; Civil Code 1910, § 5358; Ga. L. 1920, p. 85, § 1; Code 1933, § 85-1504.)

Law reviews.

- For annual survey on domestic relations, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (2009). For article, "A Primer on Heirs Property and Georgia's New Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act: Protecting Owners of Heirs Property," see 19 G. St. B.J. 16 (Oct. 2013).

Constitutionality.

- See Southall v. Carter, 229 Ga. 240, 190 S.E.2d 517 (1972).

Enjoining partition.

- It is error to enjoin tenants in common from filing proceedings for partition. Ellis v. Jenkins, 250 Ga. 29, 295 S.E.2d 736 (1982).

Not applicable to joint-tenants with a right of survivorship.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160 has long been construed to apply only to tenants in common, not to joint-tenants with a right of survivorship. Wallace v. Wallace, 260 Ga. 400, 396 S.E.2d 208 (1990).

Exclusive possession by one spouse defeats partitioning by other.

- Whether the property is held by husband and wife as tenants in common or as joint-tenants, if it is subject to the exclusive possession of one of them, it is not subject to partitioning by the other. Wallace v. Wallace, 260 Ga. 400, 396 S.E.2d 208 (1990).

Right to partition.

- When a non-possessing tenant in common has not agreed to give up the right to partition, that right is not extinguished by a judgment imposed upon the tenant. To the extent Blalock v. Blalock, 250 Ga. 862 (1983), and White v. White, 253 Ga. 388 (1984), can be read as finding a relinquishment of the right to partition in a judicial decree not supported by an agreement, those cases are disapproved. Harvey v. Sessoms, 284 Ga. 75, 663 S.E.2d 210 (2008).

Cited in Wilkinson v. Tuggle, 61 Ga. 381 (1878); Lochrane v. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 122 Ga. 433, 50 S.E. 372 (1905); Mize v. Bank of Whigham, 138 Ga. 499, 75 S.E. 629 (1912); Knowles v. Knowles, 146 Ga. 507, 91 S.E. 776 (1917); English v. Poole, 31 Ga. App. 581, 121 S.E. 589 (1917); Clements v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 158 Ga. 764, 124 S.E.2d 516 (1924); Jennings v. Jennings, 173 Ga. 428, 160 S.E. 405 (1931); Walden v. Walden, 191 Ga. 182, 12 S.E.2d 345 (1940); Wren v. Wren, 199 Ga. 851, 36 S.E.2d 77 (1945); Joel v. Joel, 201 Ga. 520, 40 S.E.2d 541 (1946); Armstrong v. Merts, 76 Ga. App. 465, 46 S.E.2d 529 (1948); Mixon v. Sumner, 205 Ga. 579, 54 S.E.2d 411 (1949); Leggitt v. Allen, 85 Ga. App. 280, 69 S.E.2d 106 (1952); Bufford v. Bufford, 221 Ga. 13, 142 S.E.2d 796 (1965); Goodman v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 221 Ga. 396, 144 S.E.2d 764 (1965); White v. Howell, 224 Ga. 135, 160 S.E.2d 374 (1968); Bodrey v. Bodrey, 122 Ga. App. 23, 176 S.E.2d 234 (1970); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 126 Ga. App. 172, 190 S.E.2d 140 (1972); McCreary v. Wright, 132 Ga. App. 500, 208 S.E.2d 373 (1974); Sikes v. Sikes, 233 Ga. 97, 209 S.E.2d 641 (1974); Burnham v. Lynn, 235 Ga. 207, 219 S.E.2d 111 (1975); Seymour v. Presley, 239 Ga. 572, 238 S.E.2d 347 (1977); Crooke v. Gilden, 262 Ga. 122, 414 S.E.2d 645 (1992).

Statutory partition more appropriate.

- Trial court erred by ordering the equitable partition sale of 3.503 acres of real property because the co-owner failed to show that the remedy at law of a statutory partition, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160 et seq., was insufficient or that peculiar circumstances rendered the equitable proceeding more suitable and just; and, in a statutory partition, a court may order the sale of property that cannot be fairly divided by metes and bounds. Pack v. Mahan, 294 Ga. 496, 755 S.E.2d 126 (2014).

Equitable jurisdiction applicable only when peculiar circumstances or insufficient legal remedy.

- Application to partition lands between tenants in common may be instituted at law, or an application may be brought in equity whenever the remedy at law is insufficient or peculiar circumstances render the proceeding in equity more suitable and just. But, unless for some special reason equitable jurisdiction is applicable, a party seeking the writ of partition is required to resort to the remedy afforded by this statute. Gifford v. Courson, 224 Ga. 840, 165 S.E.2d 133 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

Accounting alone gives court of equity jurisdiction of partition proceeding.

- While equity jurisdiction ceases when the legislature gives a specific remedy at law, and while a specific legal remedy for partition is provided, and while equity will not ordinarily take cognizance of a partition proceeding unless the remedy at law is insufficient, or peculiar circumstances render the proceeding in equity more suitable and just, an accounting between tenants in common will alone and of itself give a court of equity jurisdiction of a partition proceeding, whether or not there are other peculiar circumstances which render the proceeding in equity more suitable and just. Mills v. Williams, 208 Ga. 425, 67 S.E.2d 212 (1951).

Error for court to dismiss equitable proceeding after amended petition sets cause of action.

- After an amendment of the petition set out a cause of action for equitable partition, it was error for the court to dismiss the action on the ground that by amendment it had been changed from an equitable to a statutory proceeding for partition, or that it did not set forth a cause of action. Gibson v. Gibson, 180 Ga. 457, 179 S.E. 354 (1935).

No right of partitioning unless property held in common.

- Under the plain wording of this statute, the right to have a partitioning does not exist unless the property sought to be partitioned is held under a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. Paris v. Clay, 223 Ga. 738, 158 S.E.2d 377 (1967) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

Any co-owner may apply for partition writ.

- Statute relating to partition of realty expressly provides that, in all cases where two or more persons are common owners of land by descent, any one of such owners may apply for a writ of partition. Evans v. Little, 246 Ga. 219, 271 S.E.2d 138 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

Division under will had without interference from executors.

- When a will provides for a division, the remaindermen become tenants in common and the division may be had without any interference from the executors. Watkins v. Gilmore, 121 Ga. 488, 49 S.E. 598 (1904).

Division may be had without an interference from the executors. Miller v. Harris County, 186 Ga. 648, 198 S.E. 673 (1938).

Partition proper despite coexecutors lack of assent.

- Son and coexecutor of mother's will, under which he and his brother, also his coexecutor, each received an undivided one half interest in property, had standing to bring a partition action in spite of his brother's refusal to assent, and partition was proper although the estate was still in probate. Clay v. Clay, 268 Ga. 40, 485 S.E.2d 205 (1997).

Heirs are not compelled to get the consent of the administrators before a partition. Hunnicutt v. Rogers, 135 Ga. 595, 69 S.E. 913 (1911).

Existence or nonexistence of administration of estate does not preclude bringing partition action by a tenant in common. Evans v. Little, 246 Ga. 219, 271 S.E.2d 138 (1980).

Executors can join with the surviving cotenant for the partition of land owned jointly by their testatrix and the surviving cotenant since the testatrix makes devises of the land, and since the partition of the land between the estate and the surviving cotenant is necessary for its due administration by the executors. Peck v. Watson, 165 Ga. 853, 142 S.E. 450, 57 A.L.R. 560 (1928).

Voluntary partition by tenants not binding on remaindermen.

- When the tenant in fee of a half undivided interest, by voluntary agreement to which the remaindermen were not parties, partitioned land, the partition is binding upon the tenants in fee alone so long as the limited estate of the life tenant continues, even though the remainderman assented to the partition. Teasley v. Hulme, 150 Ga. 495, 104 S.E. 151, 12 A.L.R. 641 (1920).

Defeasible fee under will providing how tenants' interest can be sold cannot be partitioned.

- Tenants in common having a defeasible fee in land devised under a will, which provides how their interest can be sold during their joint lives, cannot have the devised property partitioned, either by statutory or equitable proceedings. Trimble v. Fairbanks, 209 Ga. 741, 76 S.E.2d 16 (1953).

Petitioners abandoning statutory proceedings and instituting probate proceedings bound by probate court's judgment.

- When parties holding as heirs an undivided interest in lands have abandoned, without formally dismissing, a proceeding instituted in the superior court for partition, and agreed among themselves to institute such a proceeding in the court of ordinary (now probate court) to bring about a partition of the same lands, and this is done by an appropriate proceeding in that court, resulting in a judgment confirming the assignment of the various parcels by the appraisers, no objection being filed or appeal taken, the parties are bound by the judgment. The parties will not subsequently be permitted to disregard such judgment, and seek, by amendment to the original petition in the superior court, another partitioning of the lands. Zeagler v. Zeagler, 192 Ga. 453, 15 S.E.2d 478 (1941).

Sufficiency of application for partition.

- Application for partition need only set forth the circumstances of the case, describe the premises to be partitioned, and define the share and interest of each of the parties as provided in statute. Anderson v. Anderson, 27 Ga. App. 513, 108 S.E. 907, cert. denied, 27 Ga. App. 835 (1921) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

Under the statutes governing statutory partitioning, the notice of intention to seek partitioning was the only process necessary in order to bring a defendant into court to meet the application for partitioning, and a sale of the property was provided for when a fair and equitable division of the property was not able to have been made by means of metes and bounds; ordering the sale of the property was within the trial court's authority without the need for securing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Shields v. Gish, 280 Ga. 556, 629 S.E.2d 244 (2006).

It is immaterial whether petition prays for partition by sale or by metes and bounds, since in an application in either form the issues are the same. Anderson v. Anderson, 27 Ga. App. 513, 108 S.E. 907, cert. denied, 27 Ga. App. 835 (1921).

Sale can be ordered in a statutory partition for property that cannot be divided fairly by metes and bounds.

- In a statutory partition, a court may order the sale of property that cannot be fairly divided by metes and bounds. Pack v. Mahan, 294 Ga. 496, 755 S.E.2d 126 (2014).

Premises must be described and the interest of each party defined. Childs v. Hayman, 72 Ga. 791 (1884).

Process or prayer for process attached thereto is not required. Griffin v. Griffin, 153 Ga. 547, 113 S.E. 161 (1922).

Applicant must show title in applicant and name each person who may own interest.

- In order for a partition proceeding to be maintainable, the applicant must not only show title in the applicant to a specified interest in the property sought to be sold or divided, but must name as a defendant each of the other persons who may own an interest therein, and set forth their respective interests. Hill v. McCandless, 198 Ga. 737, 32 S.E.2d 774 (1945).

Defendant may controvert complainant's title or deny cotenancy.

- In a bill for partition, it is not necessary that the complainant's title to the property should be fully set out. However, the defendant may, by plea or answer, controvert the complainant's title to the whole or any part of the property, or deny the cotenancy, in which event, a preliminary trial should be had to settle these issues. Dollar v. Dollar, 214 Ga. 499, 105 S.E.2d 736 (1958).

Respondent in partition proceeding can only set up matters germane to the case as made by the applicant's petition, and cannot recover a personal judgment against the applicant on a separate and independent matter. Starling v. Starling, 214 Ga. 786, 107 S.E.2d 651 (1959).

Not error to allow petitioners' transferee to be made party plaintiff.

- When, pending an application for partition of realty, the original petitioners sold their interest to another person, the proceedings were not thereby vacated, and it was not error to allow the other person to be made a party plaintiff in the application, it not appearing that the original petitioners were dismissed. Hamby Mt. Gold Mines v. Calhoun Land & Mining Co., 83 Ga. 311, 9 S.E. 831 (1889).

Venue of statutory proceeding for partition of land is the county where the land lies. Douglas v. Johnson, 130 Ga. 472, 60 S.E. 1041 (1908).

Statutory partition action under this statute, which can bestow title on both parties and divest both parties of title, is a case "respecting title to land" and must be brought in the county where the land lies. Schuehler v. Pait, 239 Ga. 520, 238 S.E.2d 65 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

Judgment, until set aside, binding upon all parties with notice.

- Judgment rendered in partition proceedings under this statute, until reversed or set aside, is binding upon all who were parties to the proceedings with due notice thereof, whatever may be its effects as to another co-owner, to whom no such notice was given. Chattahoochee Lumber Co. v. Yeates, 137 Ga. 64, 72 S.E. 504 (1911) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

Service on the parties, actual or constructive, is necessary to render the judgment conclusive. Childs v. Hayman, 72 Ga. 791 (1884).

Judgment admissible in later suit to establish plaintiff's title.

- Judgment is admissible in a suit for an injunction and damages committed upon the property set apart to the plaintiff to establish the plaintiff's title to such a portion. Chattahoochee Lumber Co. v. Yeates, 137 Ga. 64, 72 S.E. 504 (1911).

Appellate jurisdiction over cases involving statutory partition is in the Supreme Court of Georgia. However, when the sole issue in an appeal is the recusal of the trial court such an issue in no way deals with an area where exclusive jurisdiction rests in the Supreme Court. It is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since it is not what is in the complaint before the trial court that determines the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, but the issues on appeal. Stevens v. Myers, 190 Ga. App. 61, 378 S.E.2d 334 (1989).

Jurisdiction of appeal from judgment in action involving statutory partitioning proceedings is in Supreme Court, as partition action is one "respecting title to land." Wiley v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 824, 213 S.E.2d 682 (1975).

Appeal not timely until judge appoints commissioners and orders sale.

- In a case when a partition is sought by bringing the lands involved to sale, the objecting party may only bring the case to the Supreme Court by a proper bill of exceptions after the judge has appointed commissioners and ordered the commissioners to sell the land. Lanier v. Gay, 195 Ga. 859, 25 S.E.2d 642 (1943).

Motion to set aside filed more than three years after entry of partition judgment.

- Trial court did not err when the court denied a mother's motion to set aside a judgment of partition because the motion to set aside was filed more than three years after the entry of the judgment of partition, and that judgment was made by a court with jurisdiction; the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the partitioning judgment since the land sought to be partitioned was partially located in the county of the trial court, and that court had personal jurisdiction of the mother since, under the partitioning statutes, the notice of intent to seek partitioning was the only process necessary to bring a defendant into court to meet the application for partitioning. Cabrel v. Lum, 289 Ga. 233, 710 S.E.2d 810 (2011).

Court empowered to determine all various matters in dispute.

- Proceedings under this statute are in the nature of proceedings in equity. The court has all the power and jurisdiction for hearing and determining the various matters in dispute between the parties, in respect to their respective titles, as fully and completely as if it were a bill in chancery for that purpose. Griffin v. Griffin, 33 Ga. 107 (1861); Hamby Mt. Gold Mines v. Calhoun Land & Mining Co., 83 Ga. 311, 9 S.E. 831 (1889) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

When a tenant in common applies to the superior court to have certain land partitioned, and to have an accounting between the tenants in common, a proceeding is in the nature of a proceeding in equity, in which the court has all the power and jurisdiction for hearing and determining the various matters in dispute between the parties, including their respective titles to the land, to have an accounting for rents and profits, awarding partition, etc. Gibson v. Gibson, 180 Ga. 457, 179 S.E. 354 (1935); Borum v. Deese, 196 Ga. 292, 26 S.E.2d 538 (1943); Liddell v. Johnson, 213 Ga. 752, 101 S.E.2d 755 (1958).

Partition in kind is the rule and should be generally followed, unless it cannot be conveniently made, or the interest of the parties will be promoted by a sale. Anderson v. Anderson, 27 Ga. App. 513, 108 S.E. 907, cert. denied, 27 Ga. App. 835 (1921).

Error to appoint receiver when no necessity proved and defendant solvent.

- When, on the trial of an equitable petition for the partition of real estate, accounting, the settlement of accounts between the tenants in common, the settlement of an estate, and the appointment of a receiver, the evidence shows that the defendant against whom the charges of waste, mismanagement, etc., were made is solvent, and no necessity for a receivership is proved, it is error to appoint receivers to take possession of and to hold and manage the property in question pending final disposition of the case. Liddell v. Johnson, 213 Ga. 752, 101 S.E.2d 755 (1958).

Proper to hold funds pending trial of accounting suit.

- In the case of a partition by sale, it is proper for the decree to direct that the funds be held in court pending the trial of the action for accounting. Liddell v. Johnson, 213 Ga. 752, 101 S.E.2d 755 (1958).

Court's power extends to an accounting between the tenants in common. Griffin v. Griffin, 153 Ga. 547, 113 S.E. 161 (1922).

In an equitable partitioning proceeding, the court has adequate authority to have the property of the tenants in common partitioned to require any of the tenants in common to account for rents and profits received by any of them from the jointly owned property, and it can adjust the accounts. Liddell v. Johnson, 213 Ga. 752, 101 S.E.2d 755 (1958).

Court may make adjustments for improvements and expenditures.

- When, in pursuance of an agreement between several tenants in common, two of them enter upon the land and make expenditures of money in improvements thereon in excess of the amount received in rents, they are entitled, upon a partition of the land, to an accounting from their cotenants, and to be reimbursed the amount properly found to be due them. Turnbull v. Foster, 116 Ga. 765, 43 S.E. 42 (1902).

When the court has jurisdiction, it may, in decreeing partition, make necessary and equitable adjustments for improvements and expenditures made and paid for by the respective parties. Borum v. Deese, 196 Ga. 292, 26 S.E.2d 538 (1943).

Court can question the mesne profits. Hall v. Collier, 146 Ga. 815, 92 S.E. 536 (1917).

Proceedings limited to partitioning.

- Proceedings under this statute cannot be had for the purpose of partitioning a large tract of land with certain alleged tenants in common with the applicant, and at the same time of recovering parts of the land held adversely not under the alleged tenants in common, and also of having an accounting for rent. Cock v. Callaway, 141 Ga. 774, 82 S.E. 286 (1914) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160).

Applicants not entitled to have fees awarded to counsel.

- In a proceeding at law to partition land, the applicants are not entitled to have fees awarded to their counsel from the common fund, thus requiring their cotenants to contribute to the payment of such fees. Cashin v. Markwalter, 208 Ga. 444, 67 S.E.2d 226 (1951).

Plaintiff who brought an action to quiet title and for partitioning of property was not entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses since the statutes providing for such actions do not provide for attorney fees and expenses and such an award was not authorized if the case was considered one at law. Walker v. Walker, 266 Ga. 414, 467 S.E.2d 583 (1996).

Equitable partition found authorized.

- When two railway companies erected a station on the land of one of the companies, at the joint and equal expense of both companies, under a contract whereby each of the companies became owners of one-half interest in the building, and when, after the station had been used by both companies jointly and individually for several years, the company that did not own the land because insolvent, and all the company's property, including the company's interest in the station, was duly sold under foreclosure proceedings brought in a court of competent jurisdiction and purchased by private individuals, and since the railroad of this company was dismantled and the company's business as a common carrier was abandoned, so that there was no longer any necessity for that company or the purchasers to use the station for railroad purposes, the purchasers are entitled to have the station partitioned in equity, the court having power to protect the interest of all parties by appropriate decree. Henry Talmadge & Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 170 Ga. 225, 152 S.E. 243 (1930).

Minority owner's claim of error in the partitioning of a parcel of property was rejected as, while a pending contract with a prospective buyer was taken into consideration, the property was partitioned in the way desired by the minority owner and the minority owner's surveyor; the minority owner received tracts that were worth more than would have been received if the property had remained intact and had been sold to the buyer and the minority owner received tracts valued at more than the interest that was owned before the partitioning. Talmadge v. Elson Props., 279 Ga. 268, 612 S.E.2d 780 (2005).

Superior court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's petition for an equitable partition of real property and an accounting because the property was not held by the parties as joint tenants with the right of survivorship at the time of the petition as the plaintiff's 2007 quitclaim deed to another individual was a transfer in the plaintiff's lifetime of all of the plaintiff's interest in the property, although the plaintiff quickly received the property back again from the other individual, because, when the other individual received a grant of the plaintiff's interest in the property by virtue of the quitclaim deed, it was the other individual's property to do with as the other individual wished. Reed v. McConathy, 299 Ga. 471, 788 S.E.2d 769 (2016).

Agreement between cotenants not a partnership.

- An agreement between the cotenants of a city lot, on which is located a residence, to occupy the residence jointly as a home, does not constitute a partnership as defined by law, and the fact that such an agreement embraced an additional provision that the coowners would share not only in the upkeep and maintenance of the property, but also in their personal living expenses in the home, would not have the effect of enlarging their relation of cotenancy into a partnership such as contemplated by law, so as to bar certain of the co-owners from proceeding by equitable partition against other co-owners of the land involved. Borum v. Deese, 196 Ga. 292, 26 S.E.2d 538 (1943).

Right to partition not barred by divorce decree.

- In an action for partition brought by a former husband as a tenant in common with the former wife, it was error to grant summary judgment to the former wife on the ground that the divorce decree placed the property in the exclusive possession of the wife. To be barred from seeking partition, the husband had to have contractually relinquished his right to partition. Harvey v. Sessoms, 284 Ga. 75, 663 S.E.2d 210 (2008).

Partition not available for property held as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

- When the appellant sought a petition for equitable partition of the unmarried parties' property in which the parties were joint tenants with the right of survivorship, the trial judge properly found that statutory partition was available only to tenants in common, and was not available to the appellant; and that equitable partition was also unavailable because the appellant could seek a partition of the subject property only after the joint tenancy was severed as the parties were not married parties who were seeking the equitable division of marital property in a divorce proceeding. Vargo v. Adams, 302 Ga. 637, 805 S.E.2d 817 (2017).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partition, §§ 1, 71 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 68 C.J.S., Partition, § 72 et seq.

ALR.

- Divorce as affecting estate by entireties, 52 A.L.R. 890; 59 A.L.R. 718.

Right to partition of different tracts of land in same proceeding, 65 A.L.R. 893.

Venue of suit for partition of land, 128 A.L.R. 1232.

Suit for partition as involving freehold or title to real estate within constitutional or statutory provisions relating to jurisdiction, 135 A.L.R. 1066.

Probate of will as condition precedent to suit for partition by devisees, 141 A.L.R. 1311.

Right to partition in kind of mineral or oil and gas land, 143 A.L.R. 1092.

Power of guardian to agree to, or of court to approve, voluntary partition between infant or incompetent and cotenant, 157 A.L.R. 755.

Necessity and sufficiency of pleading in partition action to authorize incidental relief, 11 A.L.R.2d 1449.

Timber rights as subject to partition, 21 A.L.R.2d 618.

Spouse of living co-owner of interest in property as necessary or proper party to partition action, 57 A.L.R.2d 1166.

Contractual provisions as affecting right to judicial partition, 37 A.L.R.3d 962.

Severance or termination of joint tenancy by conveyance of divided interest directly to self, 7 A.L.R.4th 1268.

May easement or right of way be appurtenant where servient tenement is not adjacent to dominant, 15 A.L.R.7th 1.

Homestead right of cotenant as affecting partition, 83 A.L.R.6th 605.