...However, under the statutes governing statutory partitioning, OCGA § 44-6-160 et seq., the notice of intention to seek partitioning is the only process necessary in order to bring a defendant into court to meet the application for partitioning ( Clay v. Clay, 269 Ga. 902(1), 506 S.E.2d 866 (1998)), and OCGA § 44-6-166.1(b) specifically provides for a sale of the property in a statutory partitioning action when "a fair and equitable division of the property cannot be made by means of metes and bounds....

...thin our equity jurisdiction. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(2). 2. Ononye contends that he filed a statutory partition action, that the trial court erred in failing to follow the statutory partitioning procedures set out in OCGA § 44-6-166.1, and that the court erred in applying equitable partitioning principles....

...Instead, it prayed that "an equitable partition be made ordering" Ezeofor to transfer her interest in the property to him. Moreover, before the trial court entered its partition order, Ononye did not request that the trial court follow the procedures set forth in OCGA § 44-6-166.1, nor did he object to the procedures the trial court was following....

...§ 44-6-160, or if a party in interest convinces the court that the land cannot be divided fairly, the land may be appraised and a party in interest given the opportunity to purchase the petitioner’s share before a public sale is ordered. OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...In concluding that the property should be sold, the court below committed no error. Pack has conceded that she does not have the financial resources to secure ownership of the entire property for herself, so she could not avail herself of the statutory remedy in OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...below, and because Pack could not purchase Mahan’s interest, the court did not err when it ordered a public sale of the property. See OCGA § 44-6-167 (“In the event lands and tenements sought to be partitioned are not sold pursuant to Code Section 44-6-166.1, the court shall order a public sale of such lands and tenements.”); Wilkerson, 126 Ga....

...operty. Under these peculiar circumstances, we agree that a remedy at law was inadequate and that the proceeding in equity was more just and equitable. See Larimer v. Larimer, 249 Ga. 500 (292 SE2d 71) (1982); Anderson, supra at 515 (3). 2. As OCGA § 44-6-166.1 is “a statutory remedy which is part of a partitioning at law,” Cheeves v....

...Benton filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Stone had an adequate remedy at law in Cobb County under OCGA § 44-6-160 et seq., Stone could not pursue the equitable remedy. The trial court granted Benton's motion, and Stone appealed. Stone contends that OCGA § 44-6-166.1 provides that a co-owner of land can buy out another co-owner's interest if a party to that action, other than a petitioner, convinces the court that "the value of the entire property will be depreciated by the partition applied for." OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (b)....

...Because Stone, as a petitioner, is barred by the statute from seeking a buy-out and because Benton has not sought to purchase Stone's interest, Stone argues that she has no adequate remedy at law and can pursue an equitable remedy under OCGA § 44-6-140. Before the legislature passed OCGA § 44-6-166.1, a statutory partition action had two possible outcomes at law. A court could either divide the land under § 44-6-160 or if the land could not be divided fairly, the court could order a public sale under § 44-6-167. In 1983, the legislature added § 44-6-166.1 and amended § 44-6-167....

...In effect, the legislature added a third possible outcome in a statutory partition action; the legislature did not reduce a petitioner's remedies at law or expand remedies at equity. [1] OCGA § 44-6-160 remains unchanged. The action begins when a common owner of land applies for a writ of partition. Then, under OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (b) a party in interest has the opportunity to convince the court that the land cannot be divided fairly. A party in interest is defined as "any person, other than a petitioner, having an interest in property." OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (a) (1). If the party in interest successfully persuades the court that the land cannot be divided fairly, then the land is appraised and the party in interest may have the chance to purchase the petitioner's share. But OCGA § 44-6-166.1 does not end the remedies provided by the statute. "In the event lands and tenements sought to be partitioned are not sold pursuant to Code Section 44-6-166.1, the court shall order a public sale of such lands and tenements." OCGA § 44-6-167. *540 The legislature added § 44-6-166.1 in order to give a party in interest the opportunity to purchase the land before a public sale is ordered, but the legislature did not intend to make the availability of a public sale under § 44-6-167 wholly dependant on whether a party in interest seeks a buy-out under § 44-6-166.1. To hold otherwise would mean that every partition action would have an inadequate remedy at law merely because a party in interest did not seek a buyout. We hold that even if a party in interest does not pursue the remedy under § 44-6-166.1, the petitioner may still seek a public sale under § 44-6-167 by convincing the court that a fair and equitable division of the property cannot be made by means of metes and bounds because of improvements on the property, because the premises are valuable for mining purposes or for the erection of mills or other machinery, or because the value of the entire property will be depreciated by the partition applied for. Because the addition of § 44-6-166.1 does not render Stone's remedy at law inadequate, she may not pursue an equitable remedy. Although Stone is barred by § 44-6-166.1 from seeking to buy out Benton's interest in the land, she nevertheless has an adequate remedy at law under the public sale provision, OCGA § 44-6-167. Judgment affirmed. All Justices concur, except Clarke, P. J., not participating. NOTES [1] The addition of § 44-6-166.1 does not change the holding of Gifford v....

...Reconsideration Denied February 11, 2000. *95 Chamberlain Hrdlicka White Williams, Richard N. Hubert, Atlanta, for appellant. Warren R. Hinds, Atlanta, for appellee. BENHAM, Chief Justice. This appeal follows the entry of final judgment in a case in which, pursuant to OCGA §§ 44-6-166.1 and 44-6-167 and the petitions of the parties, the trial court ordered the sale of certain real property owned by the parties as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and the division of the proceeds according to the parties' Cohabitation Agreement ("the Agreement"), as construed by the trial court....

...In a verified answer and counterclaim, appellant Maree agreed that the property should be sold and the proceeds divided pursuant to the parties' Agreement. In November 1998, after appellant Maree filed a motion for sale of the property pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-166.1 and for distribution of the proceeds, the trial court issued an order for sale of the property....

...ent. Therefore, appellant may not on appeal complain that the trial court erred in dividing the proceeds pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. Similarly, since appellant asked the trial court to order a public sale and partition pursuant to OCGA §§ 44-6-166.1 and 44-6-167, we will not consider whether the trial court erred in doing as appellant asked....

Gregory, Justice. This case involves an application to partition property. The appellant owns a 77% undivided interest in the subject property. Appellees own the remaining undivided interest. In April 1985 appellant filed for partitioning under OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...In November 1985 the trial court entered an order finding that the property cannot be fairly divided, and appointing three appraisers to appraise the property. The trial court’s order stated that the average of the three appraisals would constitute the appraised price of the property in accordance with OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (c)....

...proceeding into an equitable partitioning under OCGA § 44-6-140. The trial court denied this motion on March 11, 1987. Subsequently, appellees notified the appellant and the court of their intention to purchase the property in accordance with OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (d)....

...This section provides that any party to the partitioning action may pay the remaining parties for their respective shares of the appraised price of the property. This payment will constitute complete satisfaction of the claims of those seeking partition, and title will be transferred to the party making payment. Section 44-6-166.1 *501(e) (1) provides that “no later than 90 days after the appraised price is established, the parties in interest shall tender to the court sufficient sums to pay to petitioners their shares of the appraised price....

...In 1983 the legislature enacted OCGA § 44-6-167.1 to allow an owner of an interest in the land to purchase the property from the other owners without resorting to a public sale. OCGA § 44-6-167 remains a remedy where the lands are not sold pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-166.1. In construing OCGA § 44-6-167, this court has held that an order of the trial court appointing the commissioners and ordering them to conduct the sale is a final judgment which may be appealed to this court....

...The court held in Lochrane that a rule requiring the parties to wait until the property had been sold and the deed delivered to file an appeal would work too great a hardship. We think this reasoning applies to the case before us. A rule which would require a party in a partitioning action under OCGA § 44-6-166.1 to wait until after the opposing party had purchased the land and had title transferred to him to file an appeal would work the same hardship....

...ty will be subject to public sale is a final judgment which may be appealed directly to this court. 2. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the appellees could tender the purchase price beyond the ninety day limit of OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (e) (1)....

...o provision as to how the property should be divided, and that a fair and equitable division of the property could not be made by metes and bounds; a hearing was sought to determine whether physical division is equitable under the provisions of OCGA § 44-6-166.1. The trial court granted a writ of partition, and after a hearing, determined that a division by metes *634and bounds will depreciate the value of the property as a whole. In accordance with OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (c), three appraisers were appointed, and an average appraised price of $12,202,666.67 was established. The court then issued a final order pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (e) (1), requiring Mansour to tender into the court its share of the appraised price, or the property would be subject to public sale under the provisions of OCGA § 44-6-167....

...Under the circumstances, 1-85 could not seek partition because such an action is in direct contravention of the agreement. 2. Mansour submits that 1-85 as the petitioning party in the partition action may not seek to invoke the buy-out procedures of OCGA § 44-6-166.1. See OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (a), (b); Stone v....

...hat appellees had no lawful ownership interest in the property because their interest had been obtained by fraud. The trial court ruled that partitioning should occur and appointed three persons to make appraisals and report their findings. See OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...nd bounds was impossible; that a proceeding in equity for partition was more suitable and just than a proceeding to partition at law; that the defendants were not entitled to a jury trial; and that partitioning should proceed in accordance with OCGA § 44-6-166.1. On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in granting appellees a remedy at law under OCGA § 44-6-166.1; in allowing appellees to proceed in equity; and in denying appellant the jury trial to which he claimed entitlement pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-165. 1. OCGA § 44-6-166.1 provides that its procedures must be followed [w]henever an application is made for the partition of property and any of the parties in interest convinces the court that a fair and equitable division of the property cannot be made by means of metes and bounds because ....

.... The trial court found that “because of the fact that this property consists of 53 acres of timberland with no road frontage and because of the varying percentage interests of the parties hereto an equitable division by metes and bounds is impossible.” See OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...for a timber company to buy the smaller tracts for timber, some being as small as 0.086805 percent of the 53-acre tract, with the result that the smaller tracts would be virtually worthless. This finding supports the trial court’s ruling that OCGA § 44-6-166.1 applies because it demonstrates that the value of the land as a whole would be diminished. See Royston v. Royston, 13 Ga. 425 (1853). 2. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing appellees to proceed in equity while at the same time granting them a remedy at law under OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...to partition at law,” which is the standard established by OCGA § 44-6-140 for determining whether a partitioning should proceed in equity. On the other hand, the trial court concluded that the property should *551be partitioned pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-166.1, a statutory remedy which is part of a partitioning at law. Decided March 19, 2001. Ginger J....

Thompson, Presiding Justice. We are called upon in these appeals to determine whether the trial court was authorized to order the public sale of land jointly-owned by the parties in the underlying partition action. See OCGA §§ 44-6-166.1; 44-6-167....

...All parties, including Young, agreed a fair and equitable division of the property could not be made by metes and bounds without depreciating the value of the entire property. Accordingly, in July 2006 the parties entered into a consent writ of partition which provided for the sale of the property pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-166.1, the Georgia statute setting out the procedure for the sale of jointly owned property when physical division is inequitable. Appraisals were obtained and a sale price determined in accordance with OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (c). However, neither Young nor any other party in interest tendered the sums necessary to purchase petitioners’ shares of the property. See OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (c)-(e). On February 6, 2007, Mary Young deeded her interest in the property to the Mary E. Young Revocable Trust. She died one day later. The case appeared on a pretrial calendar in July 2010. The property not having been sold pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-166.1 and there being no appearance by Young or anyone on her behalf, the trial court struck Young’s pleadings, entered judgment in favor of the petitioners, and appointed three commissioners to conduct the sale of the property consistent with the requirements of OCGA §§ 44-6-167-44-6-169, which set forth the procedure to be used when land sought to be partitioned is not sold pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...GA § 44-6-160, or if a party in interest convinces the court that the land cannot be divided fairly, the land may be appraised and a party in interest given the opportunity to purchase the petitioner’s share before a public sale is ordered.2 OCGA § 44-6-166.1. Alternatively, land may become subject to public sale under OCGA § 44-6-167 if it is not sold pursuant to the procedure set out in OCGA § 44-6-166.1 or if a petitioner con*780vinces the court that a fair and equitable division of the property cannot be made by means of metes and bounds because of improvements on the property, because the premises are valuable for mining purposes or...

...No challenge having been made to the judgment of partition and the property not having been sold pursuant to its mandate, as a matter of law the property became subject to public sale according to the procedures of OCGA § 44-6-167 ninety days after the appraised price was established. See OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (e) (1) (property subject to public sale pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-167 no later than ninety days after appraised price established if no party in interest tenders sufficient sums to pay petitioners’ shares in the property). While the...

...on to add parties would have satisfied any obligation petitioners may have had to move for substitution of parties. Id. (c) Appellant’s contention that the public sale was improper because the court failed to follow the procedures set out in OCGA § 44-6-166.1 is misplaced. The property in question was sold at a public sale authorized by OCGA § 44-6-167, not OCGA § 44-6-166.1....

...s 44-6-160-44-6-169 to frame its proceeding and order so as to meet the exigency of the case without forcing the parties into equity. A party in interest is defined as “any person, other than a petitioner, having an interest in property.” OCGA § 44-6-166.1 (a) (1). In June 2008, petitioners filed a motion noting Young’s death and the purported transfer of her interest in the property to the Young Trust prior to her death and seeking to add as party defendants the Young Trust and its c...

...Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. See OCGA § 44-6-165. A planimeter is “an instrument for measuring the area of any plane figure by passing a tracer around the boundary line.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1731 (1961). OCGA § 44-6-166. See Pindar, Georgia Real Estate Law & Procedure § 13-61 (5th ed....

...1998). An employee of the local tax assessors’ office testified that his office taxed the Pinecrest tract based on 268 acres. Patel v. Patel, 276 Ga. 266, 269 (2) (577 SE2d 587) (2003); Huntley v. State, 271 Ga. 227, 230 (518 SE2d 890) (1999). See OCGA § 44-6-166.1. See Jennings v....

...Elliott, for appellees. The partitioning was sought under OCGA § 44-6-140, the equitable partitioning statute. Whether the facts authorized an equitable partitioning as opposed to statutory partitioning under OCGA § 44-6-160 et seq. is not an issue on appeal. Although not sought in this action, OCGA § 44-6-166.1 provides an additional statutory partitioning remedy when the property cannot be equitably divided....