O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-52 (2019)

When tender of payment by tenant serves as complete defense

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, in an action for nonpayment of rent, the tenant shall be allowed to tender to the landlord, within seven days of the day the tenant was served with the summons pursuant to Code Section 44-7-51, all rents allegedly owed plus the cost of the dispossessory warrant. Such a tender shall be a complete defense to the action; provided, however, that a landlord is required to accept such a tender from any individual tenant after the issuance of a dispossessory summons only once in any 12 month period. (b) If the court finds that the tenant is entitled to prevail on the defense provided in subsection (a) of this Code section and the landlord refused the tender as provided under subsection (a) of this Code section, the court shall issue an order requiring the tenant to pay to the landlord all rents which are owed by the tenant and the costs of the dispossessory warrant within three days of said order. Upon failure of the tenant to pay such sum, a writ of possession shall issue. Such payment shall not count as a tender pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section. (c) For a tenant who is not a tenant under a residential rental agreement as defined in Code Section 44-7-30, tender and acceptance of less than all rents allegedly owed plus the cost of the dispossessory warrant shall not be a bar nor a defense to an action brought under Code Section 44-7-50 but shall, upon proof of same, be considered by the trial court when awarding damages.

History

(Code 1933, § 61-309, enacted by Ga. L. 1970, p. 968, § 6; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1380, § 1.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Rent means money. - General Assembly in giving tenants the right to remain in possession during the pendency of a dispossessory proceeding by tendering the payment of rent into court intended ‘‘rent’’ to mean ‘‘money.’’ Lipshutz v. Shantha, 144 Ga. App. 196, 240 S.E.2d 738 (1977). Failure to tender costs. - Although the defendant tenant tendered all rent due within seven days after service, but failed to tender the amount of the cost of the dispossessory warrant, the defendant did not have a complete defense so as to bar the

action. Terrell v. Griffith, 129 Ga. App. 675, 200 S.E.2d 485 (1973). Second tender in 12-month period no defense. - Housing authority was not required to accept a tenant’s tender of rent and the cost of dispossessory warrant made in response to the authority’s second dispossessory warrant issued within a 12-month period. Housing Auth. v. Jackson, 216 Ga. App. 51, 453 S.E.2d 60 (1994). Acceptance of late rent not estoppel. - Fact that the tenant had been delinquent in rental payments during two prior months,

which failures to pay had generated termination notices not followed through by the landlord, who accepted late rental payments on those occasions, did not constitute an estoppel which would require the landlord to accept late rent after termination notices on subsequent occasions. Baker v. Housing Auth., 152 Ga. App. 64, 262 S.E.2d 183 (1979). Reliance on terms of agreement. - Termination notice obviously indicates an intention to rely on the exact terms of the agreement. Baker v. Housing Auth., 152 Ga. App. 644, 262 S.E.2d 183 (1979). Waiver of defenses when lease concerns commercial property. - Landlord was entitled to rely on default provisions of lease of residence for commercial purposes in refusing tender of past due rent and in taking action to dispossess appellant, and appellant was not entitled to defenses of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 et seq., having waived those provisions in the lease. Eason Publications, Inc. v. Monson, 163 Ga. App. 370, 294 S.E.2d 585 (1982).

New trial on grounds of payment of rent not available remedy. - Fact that the appellant had made out an affirmative defense as to payment of rent, and that the evidence showed the rent was paid, avails the appellant nothing when the issue was not raised at trial as a defense and no disposition, verdict, or judgment was sought on its account. A motion for a new trial on the grounds of payment of rent is not an available remedy to a dispossessory action since the plea of ‘‘complete defense’’ as a matter of law goes to the judgment only and not the verdict. Able-Craft, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 167 Ga. App. 725, 307 S.E.2d 671 (1983). Cited in West Court Square v. Assayag, 131 Ga. App. 690, 206 S.E.2d 579 (1974); Minit Chek Food Stores, Inc. v. Plaza Capital, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 110, 217 S.E.2d 415 (1975); C & A Land Co. v. Rudolf Inv. Corp., 163 Ga. App. 832, 296 S.E.2d 149 (1982); Greenhill v. Allen, 181 Ga. App. 532, 352 S.E.2d 845 (1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 950. C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 1376 et seq. ALR. - Power of equity to relieve against forfeiture of lease for nonpayment of rent, 16 ALR 437.

Demand of rent due as prerequisite of enforcement of forfeiture or termination of lease providing for termination for nonpayment, 28 ALR2d 803; 31 ALR4th 1254. Relief against forfeiture of lease for nonpayment of rent, 31 ALR2d 321.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases, 1983–2020 · leading case: Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree, Ltd., 363 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree, Ltd., 363 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 6× “Hardwick, Cook maintains that its tender of the past due rent affords it a complete defense to the dispossessory under OCGA § 44-7-52. However, we agree with the trial court that the provisions of OCGA § 44-7-52 do not apply to the circumstances of this case.”
Able-Craft, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 307 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 44-7-52 (Code Ann. § 61-309) provides: “In an action for nonpayment of rent, the tenant shall be allowed to tender to the landlord, within seven days of the day the tenant was served with the summons pursuant to Code Section 44-7-51, all rents allegedly owed *726 plus the…”
Price v. Age, Ltd., 390 S.E.2d 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “Although appellant argues that he did not refuse to deliver possession of the premises to appellee and that the premises were available, it is uncontroverted that appellant did not tender to appellee within seven days after he was served with the summons all rents allegedly owed…”
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Matassino, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 4× “O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-52, -54. The court will address Freddie Mac’s challenge to each factor in turn.”
Wanda H. Broner v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 258 F. App'x 254 (11th Cir. 2007). “§ 1831n(2)(A); and O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-52 and 44-7-58. Broner stated separate claims against DeKalb County and William Linkous for violations of the Bankruptcy Code; 31 U.”
Florence v. Green Acres Mobile Home Estates, Inc., 495 S.E.2d 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “Jamie Hames and Christy Hames contend, in Case No. A97A2044, that the trial court erred in granting the landlord a writ *92 of possession because they tendered their rent pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-52, because they did not breach their lease agreement and because the landlord did…”
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Matassino, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-52, 54. Accordingly, a Georgia dispossessory action lies within the grant of jurisdiction in Freddie Mac’s charter, and this court has jurisdiction over it.”
Anita Holdings, LLC v. Outlet Mall of Savannah, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 4× “Specifically, Anita contends that the trial court failed to: (1) credit its tender of the amount due as a complete defense to the dispossessory pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-52 (a); and (2) require Outlet Mall to follow the correct dispossessory procedures outlined in OCGA § 44-7-55…”
Greenhill v. Allen, 352 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 10× “Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting possession of the premises to appellees as a matter of law because pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-52 a complete defense to the dispossessory action had been presented in appellant’s answer.”
Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 453 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 8× “The trial court denied the Housing Authority’s writ of possession, concluding that the tender was a complete defense to the action pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-52. This appeal followed. In its sole enumeration of error, the Housing Authority asserts that the trial court erred in its…”
Eckerd Corp. v. Alterman Real Est., Ltd., 598 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “Relying on OCGA § 44-7-52, Eckerd also argues that tendering the disputed rent into court is a complete defense to an issuance of a dispossessory writ while the case proceeds.”
— 44-7-52(a) — 1 case
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Matassino, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2012). “O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-52, -54. The court will address Freddie Mac’s challenge to each factor in turn.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.