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O.C.G.A.Title 44Chapter 7

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53 (2019)

When writ of possession issued; trial of issues; possession pending trial

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2010 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1983–2024 40citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 40 opinions since 1983, 3 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) If the tenant fails to answer as provided in subsection (b) of Code Section 44-7-51, the court shall issue a writ of possession instanter notwithstanding Code Section 9-11-55 or Code Section 9-11-62. The court, without the intervention of a jury, shall not require any further evidence nor hold any hearings and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a verdict and judgment by default for all rents due as if every item and paragraph of the affidavit provided for in Code Section 44-7-50 were supported by proper evidence.

(b) If the tenant answers, a trial of the issues shall be had in accordance with the procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record except that if the action is tried in the magistrate court the trial shall be had in accordance with the procedures prescribed for that court. Every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial of the issues. The defendant shall be allowed to remain in possession of the premises pending the final outcome of the litigation; provided, however, that, at the time of his answer, the tenant must pay rent into the registry of the court pursuant to Code Section 44-7-54.

History

(Laws 1827, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 902; Code 1863, § 3985; Ga. L. 1866, p. 25, § 1; Code 1868, § 4007; Code 1873, § 4079; Code 1882, § 4079; Civil Code 1895, § 4815; Civil Code 1910, § 5387; Code 1933, § 61-303; Ga. L. 1970, p. 968, § 2; Ga. L. 1971, p. 536, § 2; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1372, § 5; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 44; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1134, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 33; Ga. L. 1983, p. 884, § 3-28.1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1150, § 1; Ga. L. 2007, p. 498, § 2/SB 94.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Trial calendar, Uniform State Court Rules, Rule 8.3.

Law reviews. - For article, "The Endangered Right of Jury Trials in Dispossessories," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 126 (1988).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS General Consideration Transfer to Court of Record Answer

General Consideration

Constitutionality. - See Rush v. Southern Property Mgt., Inc., 121 Ga. App. 360, 173 S.E.2d 744 (1970).

Purpose of section. - It is the purpose of this statute to afford the parties a speedy trial on the merits. Queen v. Harrell, 126 Ga. App. 122, 190 S.E.2d 160 (1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53).

Purpose in enacting this statute was to give defendants who are unrepresented by counsel and who are unschooled in the law an opportunity to state their defenses orally to the court as best they can and to have the substance of their defenses endorsed on the dispossessory warrant, thereby making a record upon which the case may proceed in the trial and appellate courts. Hill v. Hill, 241 Ga. 218, 244 S.E.2d 862 (1978); Brown v. Wilson Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 150 Ga. App. 525, 258 S.E.2d 139 (1979); Denson v. Housing Auth., 150 Ga. App. 493, 258 S.E.2d 183 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53).

Section not in conflict with Uniform State Court Rule 8.3. - Distinction made under Uniform State Court Rule 8.3 between dispossessory cases (one-day notice of trial) and other cases (20-day notice of trial) is not in conflict with the mandate of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53 that a trial of the issues in a dispossessory shall be had in accordance with the procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record. Favors v. Arnold, 181 Ga. App. 286, 351 S.E.2d 641 (1986).

Tenant's possession pending litigation. - Failure to pay the rent as required will result in dispossession of the tenant pending final outcome of the litigation; the requirement of rent payments into the court registry is mentioned only in connection with the tenant's right of continued possession pending the litigation. Jelks v. World of Realty, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 720, 266 S.E.2d 357 (1980).

Money judgment held improper. - Nothing in former Code 1933, § 61-303 or § 61-304 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53 or § 44-7-54) provided for, or was consistent with, the entry of a money judgment against the defendant upon the defendant's failure to pay rent into the registry of the court. Jelks v. World of Realty, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 720, 266 S.E.2d 357 (1980).

Defects in title no defense. - Claimed defects in landlord's title to premises cannot be raised as defense to proceeding for possession under former Code 1933, § 61-301 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 et seq.). McKinney v. South Boston Sav. Bank, 156 Ga. App. 114, 274 S.E.2d 34 (1980); Roberts v. Collins, 199 Ga. App. 614, 405 S.E.2d 508 (1991); Hague v. Kennedy, 205 Ga. App. 586, 423 S.E.2d 283 (1992), cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 900, 423 S.E.2d 283 (1992).

Void sale no defense. - Because two borrowers' allegation of wrongful foreclosure of their home was not a valid defense to a dispossessory action brought by the purchaser of their home at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-50 and 44-7-53, the trial court's order issuing a writ of dispossession was affirmed. Vines v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 302 Ga. App. 353, 691 S.E.2d 242 (2010).

Return of service sufficient. - When a hold-over tenant failed to answer a summons issued under former Code 1933, § 61-302 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51) and a default judgment was rendered against the tenant, the marshal's return of service reciting that "default may be opened not later than 8-17-78" which was given to the tenant was sufficient under former Code 1933, § 61-303 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53). Bannister v. Airport Assocs., 149 Ga. App. 501, 254 S.E.2d 742 (1979).

Date on back of summons. - While better practice would be to include the statement required by this statute within the main paragraph of the summons, the placing of the date on the back does not constitute a failure to comply with this statute so as to void the summons. Woodruff v. B-X Corp., 154 Ga. App. 197, 267 S.E.2d 757 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53).

Magistrate court had jurisdiction over dispossessory proceedings involving a property owner who, by remaining in possession of the premises after a lawful foreclosure of one's deed to secure debt, became a tenant at sufferance and subject to summary dispossession by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Day, 193 Ga. App. 690, 388 S.E.2d 727 (1989).

Removal to federal court. - Even though Georgia courts have held that dispossessory actions were not civil actions, a dispossessory action filed by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was properly removed to federal court under a Weems analysis since: (1) dispossessory actions were tried before a magistrate court, which was a regular judicial tribunal and required notice and service; (2) a dispossessory action was comparable to a civil trial if the tenant answered under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b): and (3) rent was an issue of pecuniary value in a dispossessory action under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-52(a), 44-7-53(b), and 44-7-54. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Matassino, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 3, 2012).

Subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53 prohibits opening defaults in dispossessory actions in magistrate court. Johnson v. Housing Auth., 198 Ga. App. 816, 403 S.E.2d 97 (1991).

Grantor remaining in possession. - When the grantor, or the grantor's privy, in a security deed remain in possession of the premises after lawful foreclosure of the deed, the grantor is a tenant at sufferance and is subject to being summarily dispossessed by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, or by the purchaser's privy. Collins v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 156 Ga. App. 374, 274 S.E.2d 760 (1980).

Sale pursuant to power of sale. - When all right, title, and interest of an owner has been divested by a sale made pursuant to a power of sale given by the owner in a deed to land to secure a debt, and the owner thereafter remains in possession, the owner is a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser and, as such, may be summarily dispossessed. Swindell v. Walker, 71 Ga. App. 603, 31 S.E.2d 670 (1944).

Proper parties. - Only proper parties to an issue arising under a warrant sued out to dispossess a tenant holding over are the alleged landlord and the tenant, and it is error to allow other persons under whom the tenant claimed possession to be made parties defendant to the proceeding. Fitzgerald Trust Co. v. Shepard, 60 Ga. App. 674, 4 S.E.2d 689 (1939).

Discharge in bankruptcy not payment of rent. - Discharge in bankruptcy of a debt existing on account of overdue rent is not payment of the rent within the meaning of this statute. Carter v. Sutton, 147 Ga. 496, 94 S.E. 760 (1917). See Hamilton v. McCroskey, 112 Ga. 651, 37 S.E. 859 (1901) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53).

Issuance of writ of possession at initial hearing is error. - Trial court errs in granting an immediate writ of possession at the initial hearing stage of the dispossessory proceedings. The purpose of that hearing is not to decide the substantive issues involved, but rather to determine the amount of money that the tenant has to pay into the registry of the court in order to remain in possession of the premises pending the ultimate resolution of the litigation. Bradshaw v. Jackson Hills Apts., 169 Ga. App. 447, 313 S.E.2d 734 (1984).

Landlord not estopped from dispossessing tenant by accepting rent after proceedings instituted. - When a tenant's check is tendered and accepted at a time when the tenant is in continued possession of the premises, but after dispossessory proceedings have been instituted on the basis that the tenant is a tenant holding over, the acceptance of the rent, accruing after the dispossessory proceedings have been instituted, does not estop the landlord from pressing to dispossess the tenant. Cheeves v. Horne, 167 Ga. App. 786, 307 S.E.2d 687 (1983).

There is no right to trial by jury in summary dispossessory action. West v. VA, 182 Ga. App. 767, 357 S.E.2d 121 (1987).

Cited in Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144, 91 S. Ct. 593, 27 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1971); Dampier v. Bank of Alapaha, 124 Ga. App. 618, 184 S.E.2d 693 (1971); Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971); Vlahos v. DeLong, 132 Ga. App. 722, 209 S.E.2d 12 (1974); Gainesville Liquidation, Inc. v. Hanley, 134 Ga. App. 472, 214 S.E.2d 723 (1975); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 134 Ga. App. 624, 215 S.E.2d 511 (1975); Speir v. Davis, 235 Ga. 788, 221 S.E.2d 575 (1976); Hodkinson v. Maloof, 137 Ga. App. 602, 224 S.E.2d 524 (1976); Smith v. Hudgens, 140 Ga. App. 562, 231 S.E.2d 530 (1976); Powers v. Simmerson, 142 Ga. App. 335, 235 S.E.2d 769 (1977); King v. Ellis, 146 Ga. App. 157, 246 S.E.2d 1 (1978); Crymes v. Crymes, 148 Ga. App. 299, 251 S.E.2d 155 (1978); Marshall v. U.S. Mgt. Corp., 149 Ga. App. 141, 253 S.E.2d 818 (1979); Leverette v. Moran, 153 Ga. App. 825, 266 S.E.2d 574 (1980); Crump v. Jordan, 154 Ga. App. 503, 268 S.E.2d 787 (1980); Peter E. Blum & Co. v. First Bank Bldg. Corp., 156 Ga. App. 680, 275 S.E.2d 751 (1980); King v. Chrisler, 160 Ga. App. 784, 287 S.E.2d 124 (1982); Smith v. Mack, 161 Ga. App. 95, 289 S.E.2d 299 (1982); Housing Auth. v. Hudson, 250 Ga. 109, 296 S.E.2d 558 (1982); Jordan v. Atlanta Neighborhood Hous. Servs., Inc., 169 Ga. App. 600, 313 S.E.2d 787 (1984); Taylor v. Carver State Bank, 177 Ga. App. 856, 341 S.E.2d 502 (1986); Kelley v. Daugherty, 201 Ga. App. 291, 410 S.E.2d 759 (1991); Browning v. Federal Home Loan Mtg. Corp., 210 Ga. App. 115, 435 S.E.2d 450 (1993).

Transfer to Court of Record

In general. - When an affidavit is made before a justice of the peace, and the tenant contests the dispossessory proceeding, the trial of the issue shall be in a court of record, and the justice of the peace shall transfer the proceedings to such court. Lopez v. Dlearo, 232 Ga. 339, 206 S.E.2d 454 (1974); Lamb v. Sims, 153 Ga. App. 556, 265 S.E.2d 879 (1980); Rucker v. Fuller, 247 Ga. 423, 276 S.E.2d 600 (1981).

No automatic transfer. - There is no automatic transfer of a dispossessory action from the state court to the superior court upon the defendant's timely answer in the state court. Rowe v. Fleet Mtg. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 593, 487 S.E.2d 133 (1997).

Defendant in a dispossessory action was not entitled to an automatic transfer to superior court when the state court was the court of record with jurisdiction over the action. Gentry v. Chateau Properties, 236 Ga. App. 371, 511 S.E.2d 892 (1999).

State Court of DeKalb County is a "court of record," and thus is authorized to adjudicate a contested dispossessory action. Napper v. National Mtg. Group, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 148, 390 S.E.2d 70 (1990).

Filing in justice court. - If the landlord chooses to file a dispossessory action in the justice court, the landlord does so with the risk that the tenant will answer, causing the justice court to lose jurisdiction. Rucker v. Fuller, 247 Ga. 423, 276 S.E.2d 600 (1981).

How transfer effected. - Transfer of the case from the justice court to the superior court is not initiated by the tenant; rather, the transfer takes place by operation of the law. The tenant has merely answered the complaint and formed issues which must be tried in another court. Rucker v. Fuller, 247 Ga. 423, 276 S.E.2d 600 (1981).

Payment of costs upon transfer. - When a dispossessory case is transmitted to the superior court unaccompanied by required advance costs or a proper pauper's affidavit, the clerk shall not be required to docket such case. The payment of advance costs and fees required by law shall be the responsibility of the plaintiff in the dispossessory action. In the event that the case is not docketed because of failure to pay costs or present a pauper's affidavit, the case must be dismissed for want of prosecution. Rucker v. Fuller, 247 Ga. 423, 276 S.E.2d 600 (1981).

Transfer denied. - Because the commercial tenants did not assert a counterclaim in a landowner's dispossessory action, as the tenants were permitted to do under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(b), and the relief the tenants sought under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b), to enjoin the landowner from pursuing the dispossessory action in the state court, was within the court's inherent jurisdiction to simply deny relief in the dispossessory action, there was no cause to grant the tenants' motion to transfer the matter to a superior court. Davita, Inc. v. Othman, 270 Ga. App. 93, 606 S.E.2d 112 (2004).

Removal to superior court was proper. - Superior court's order vacating justice of peace's order in contested dispossessory action for lack of jurisdiction and removing case to superior court for a proceeding on merits was proper. Young v. Hinton, 163 Ga. App. 692, 295 S.E.2d 150 (1982).

Transfer improper when defendant does not answer. - If the defendant never files an answer to a dispossessory proceeding in the justice of the peace court, that court retains jurisdiction over the case and the justice of the peace court's attempt to transfer the case to the state court is without foundation in law. Jones v. Cooke, 169 Ga. App. 516, 313 S.E.2d 773 (1984).

Dispossessory action held not transferable. - In a dispossessory action filed in state court, there was no evidence of the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship, and no evidence justifying a challenge to the ownership of the land so as to require transfer of the case to the superior court. Bread of Life Baptist Church v. Price, 194 Ga. App. 693, 392 S.E.2d 15 (1990).

After a credit corporation filed a dispossessory warrant in state court and alleged that it was the owner of a house and that the defendants were tenants at sufferance, and after the defendants denied that they were tenants at sufferance and alleged that they owned the premises, the defendants' contention that the case should have been transferred to the superior court because the case involved a dispute over title to the premises was without merit. Claimed defects in the landlord's title to premises cannot be raised as a defense to a proceeding for possession. Thomas v. Wells Fargo Credit Corp., 200 Ga. App. 592, 409 S.E.2d 71, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 409 S.E.2d 71 (1991).

Because the state court is a court of record with jurisdiction over a dispossessory action, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to transfer. Solomon v. Norwest Mortg. Corp., 245 Ga. App. 875, 538 S.E.2d 783 (2000).

Answer

Unqualified right to answer and counterclaim. - Statute gives a tenant an unqualified right to answer and counterclaim in all dispossessory proceedings; it is unnecessary that this answer and counterclaim be accompanied by any bond or rent payment. Mountain Hardwoods & Pine, Inc. v. Coosa River Sawmill Co., 233 Ga. 414, 211 S.E.2d 712 (1975); Seagraves v. Mount Zion Village, Inc., 134 Ga. App. 719, 215 S.E.2d 688 (1975); McKisic v. College Park Hous. Auth., 134 Ga. App. 813, 216 S.E.2d 369 (1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53).

Defendant in a dispossessory proceeding has an unqualified right to answer and counterclaim. Stroup v. Robbie Jon Dev. Corp., 159 Ga. App. 652, 284 S.E.2d 667 (1981).

Opening of default judgment improper. - Intent of the 1982 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53 was to deny the tenant the opportunity to contest the dispossessory action if the tenant failed to answer the summons within the seven days prescribed, and thus the trial court had no authority to grant a motion to open a default judgment. A.G. Spanos Dev., Inc. v. Caras, 170 Ga. App. 243, 316 S.E.2d 793 (1984).

The 1982 amendment of subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53, which deleted language pertaining to opening of default, indicates the legislative intent to deny a tenant an opportunity to contest a dispossessory action if the tenant fails to answer the summons within the prescribed time. Avery v. Warrick, 172 Ga. App. 674, 324 S.E.2d 532 (1984).

What constitutes an "answer" in a dispossessory action is to be liberally construed. Rucker v. Fuller, 247 Ga. 423, 276 S.E.2d 600 (1981).

Formalities not required. - Tenant's attempt to contest a dispossessory proceeding is not to be ignored, or dismissed, because of a failure to meet the formalities required for other judicial proceedings but not expressly required for a dispossessory proceeding. Lamb v. Housing Auth., 146 Ga. App. 786, 247 S.E.2d 597 (1978).

Answer not conditioned on rent payment. - Failure to make a rent payment does not render defective the answer and counterclaim so that no issue remains to be tried. Seagraves v. Mount Zion Village, Inc., 134 Ga. App. 719, 215 S.E.2d 688 (1975); Jelks v. World of Realty, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 720, 266 S.E.2d 357 (1980).

Motion for dismissal treated as answer. - In a dispossessory action against the former owners of property by purchasers at a foreclosure sale, the former owners' pro se motion for dismissal was legally sufficient since it created a triable issue as to the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. Womack v. Columbus Rentals, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 501, 478 S.E.2d 611 (1996).

Oral or written answer. - "Answer" which is sufficient to open the default may be oral or in writing. Hill v. Hill, 241 Ga. 218, 244 S.E.2d 862 (1978).

Unsigned answer. - Written but unsigned answer is sufficient to create a contested dispossessory proceeding and thus to open a default to a dispossessory summary. Lamb v. Housing Auth., 146 Ga. App. 786, 247 S.E.2d 597 (1978).

Effect of failure to answer. - Language "If the tenant fails to answer" is construed to mean and refer to the time of the hearing. If the tenant fails to so answer, the court shall issue a writ of possession; and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a verdict and judgment by default for all rents due, in open court or chambers, as if every item and paragraph of the affidavit were supported by proper evidence without the intervention of the jury. West Court Square v. Assayag, 129 Ga. App. 59, 198 S.E.2d 510 (1973).

Tenant waived any argument that the manager filing a dispossession action against the tenant lacked authority to bring the action as it ceased to exist under O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1105 due to a merger; the tenant failed to raise the issue in the dispossession proceedings, or to answer the dispossession affidavit at all under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53, making all of the allegations in the complaint admitted, and the tenant was barred from relitigating the matter in a suit for wrongful possession by collateral estoppel. Vickers v. Merry Land & Inv. Co., 263 Ga. App. 316, 587 S.E.2d 816 (2003).

Answer raised issue of fact as to landlord-tenant relationship. - Since the defendants in a dispossessory action denied that a landlord-tenant relationship existed, and there was no evidence or admission that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises or that the defendants were on the premises without the landlord's consent, genuine issues of material fact remained as to the plaintiff's allegations that it was the owner of the premises and that the defendants were tenants at sufferance. The trial court therefor erred in striking the defendants' answer, granting a judgment on the pleadings, and entering an immediate writ of possession. Thomas v. Wells Fargo Credit Corp., 200 Ga. App. 592, 409 S.E.2d 71, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 409 S.E.2d 71 (1991).

Case on trial calendar. - Under the provisions of this statute, a tenant who has filed the tenant's answer in a dispossessory proceeding is entitled to have the case placed upon the trial calendar so that a trial of the issues may be had in accordance with the procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record. Whipper v. Kirk, 156 Ga. App. 218, 274 S.E.2d 662 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Trial in magistrate court. - If a tenant answers, a trial of the issues may be had in the magistrate court. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-69.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 960.

C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, §§ 1384, 1392.

ALR. - Tenant's liability in damages for holding over after expiration of term as affected by reason or excuse for so doing, 122 A.L.R. 280.

Retaliatory eviction of tenant for reporting landlord's violation of law, 23 A.L.R.5th 140.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENJohnson v. Hous. Auth. of Atlanta, 403 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 44-7-53 14×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“She contends that the state court erred by finding that OCGA § 44-7-53 (a) prohibits opening defaults in dispossessory actions filed in magistrate court regardless of the language in OCGA §§ 15-10-41 (b) (2) and 15-10-43 (e) suggesting that defaults could be opened.”
2
GREENA. G. Spanos Dev., Inc. v. Caras, 316 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 44-7-53 12×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“(“Spanos”) and appellee/tenant William Caras concerning a lease agreement and the proper interpretation of recently amended OCGA § 44-7-53. Spanos argues that the trial court erroneously allowed Caras to open the default that resulted when he failed to answer Spanos’…”
Later courts cite it for
“since caras failed to include his contention of improper service in his motion to open the default or in his answer, he has waived that defense.” · 1 citing court
cites § 44-7-53 8×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“192, 193 (1) ( 413 SE2d 491 ) (1991) (“The trial notice provisions of OCGA § 9-11-40 and the concern for an expedient resolution of dispossessory actions from OCGA § 44-7-53 merge in the requirement under Uniform State Court Rule 8.3 of 24 hours trial notice in dispossessory…”
4
GREENJones v. Cooke, 313 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 44-7-53 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“See OCGA § 44-7-53 (a) (Code Ann. § 61-303). Appellee was thus entitled to a verdict and judgment by default for all rents due as if every item and paragraph of his affidavit were supported by proper evidence.”
Later courts cite it for
“had both an excuse for delay in filing his motion . . . and also a sufficient ground to set aside the verdict and judgment.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENThomas v. Wells Fargo Credit Corp., 409 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 44-7-53 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“Defendants contend in their third and fourth enumerations that the trial court erred in striking their answer and that plaintiff "failed to prove that [it] had ownership." *594 "The defense of lack of landlord-tenant relationship is a proper defense to a dispossessory action…”
6
GREENTaylor v. Carver State Bank, 341 S.E.2d 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 44-7-53 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“OCGA § 44-7-53 (c) does not provide for the right to a trial by jury in a dispossessory action, but provides for "the trial court to expedite a trial of the issues.”
Later courts cite it for
“a dispossessory is a summary proceeding to determine the disposition of the property pending trial of any contested issues.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENHill v. Levenson, 383 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 1989).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“The magistrate court obtained jurisdiction over dispossessory actions by OCGA § 44-7-53. OCGA §§ 15-10-41; 15-10-42 prescribe the procedures of the magistrate court.”
Later courts cite it for
“the right to trial by jury exists only where the right existed prior to the adoption of the first georgia constitution.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENFavors v. Arnold, 351 S.E.2d 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 44-7-53 6×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“” OCGA § 44-7-53 (c). Under Rule 8.3, the state court’s trial calendar shall be “distributed or published a sufficient period of time, but not less than 20 days, prior to the session of court at which the actions listed thereon are to be tried, except that the trial calendar for…”
9
GREENGentry v. Chateau Props., 511 S.E.2d 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 44-7-53 4×cited by 5 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
10
GREENTemp-N-Around Med. Resources, Inc. v. Venture, 546 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 6 cases
Later courts cite it for
“a corporation . . . can be represented in a court of record only by an attorney,” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENCornelius v. Finley, 413 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 44-7-53 4×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“The trial notice provisions of OCGA § 9-11-40 and the concern for an expedient resolution of dispossessory actions from OCGA § 44-7-53 merge in the requirement under Uniform State Court Rule 8.”
12
GREENWomack v. Columbus Rentals, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“]” OCGA § 44-7-53 (a). “It is[, however,] clear that what constitutes an ‘answer’ in a dispossessory action is to be liberally construed.”
13
GREENWest v. Vets. Admin., 357 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“See generally OCGA § 44-7-53 (c). It follows that the appellant’s demand for jury trial was properly denied.”
14
GREENSolomon v. Norwest Mortg. Corp., 538 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“As currently enacted, OCGA § 44-7-53 (b) provides “If the tenant answers, a trial of the issues shall be had in accordance with the procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record.”
Later courts cite it for
“after foreclosure sale, the former owner cannot attack dispossession without first setting aside the foreclosure and deed” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENCalifornia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Day, 388 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 44-7-53 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“mises, appellant, as landlord, had to demand possession from appellee and, if refused, make an affidavit under oath in any court with subject matter jurisdiction (OCGA § 44-7-50); have the sheriff serve appellee with appellant’s affidavit and the summons issued pursuant to…”
16
GREENAvery v. Warrick, 324 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 44-7-53 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
““Before November of 1982, OCGA § 44-7-53 (a) provided, in pertinent part, ‘(a) If the tenant fails to answer at or before the date *675 provided in subsection (b) of Code Section 44-7-51 (seven days), the tenant may reopen the default as a matter of right by making an answer…”
17
GREENDavita, Inc. v. Othman, 606 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“, and under OCGA § 44-7-53 (b), “if the tenant answers, ‘a trial of the issues shall be had in accordance with procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record.”
18
GREENHarper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 699 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“” OCGA § 44-7-53 (a). Indeed, a tenant’s failure to timely answer the dispossessory warrant entitles the owner not only to an immediate writ of possession but also to judgment for any other items sought in the warrant.”
19
GREENRowe v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 487 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“As currently enacted, OCGA § 44-7-53 (b) provides “If the tenant answers, a trial of the issues shall be had in accordance with the procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record except that if the action is tried in the magistrate court the trial shall be had in…”
20
GREENBrowning v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 435 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 44-7-53 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 44-7-53
“OCGA § 44-7-53.’ ” Thomas v. Wells Fargo Credit Corp.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320032024

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.37N.D. Ga.2Ga.1
By subsection
(a)1 case
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Matassino, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
(b)1 case
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Matassino, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2012).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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