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2018 Georgia Code 45-19-39 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 45-19-39 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 45-19-39

TITLE 45 PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

Section 19. Labor Practices, 45-19-1 through 45-19-46.

ARTICLE 2 FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

45-19-39. Appeal to superior court of final order of special master or complaint dismissed by administrator.

  1. Any party to a hearing before a special master or a complainant whose complaint has been dismissed by the administrator may appeal any adverse final order of a special master by filing a petition for review in the superior court in the county in which the alleged unlawful practice occurred or in the superior court of the residence of the respondent within 30 days of the issuance of the final order. Neither the administrator nor the special master shall be a named party; however, the administrator must be served with a copy of the petition for review. Within 30 days after the petition is served on the administrator, the administrator shall forward to the court a certified copy of the record of the hearing before the special master, including the transcript of the hearing before the special master and all evidence, administrative pleadings, and orders, or the entire record if no hearing has been held. For good cause shown, the court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record. All appeals for judicial review shall be in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act"; provided, however, that if any provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 50 conflict with any provision of this article, this article controls. An individual employed by the administrator pursuant to paragraph (3) of Code Section 45-19-27 shall not have the authority to represent the complainant in any appeal to superior court of a final order of the special master or in any proceeding in any court, except to secure judicial enforcement of preliminary procedural orders of a special master.
  2. The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the special master as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm a final order of the special master or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the final order if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
    1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
    2. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
    3. Made upon unlawful procedures;
    4. Affected by other error of law;
    5. Not supported by substantial evidence, which shall mean that the record does not contain such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support said findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions; or
    6. Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
  3. If, upon judicial review of any order of a special master or in a proceeding in which a complainant seeks enforcement of a conciliation agreement, the court rules in favor of the complainant, then the court may in its discretion render an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs of litigation in the superior court to the complainant.

(Ga. L. 1978, p. 859, § 17; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1097, § 1.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Language of O.C.G.A. § 45-19-39 is virtually identical to language from federal cases interpreting federal Administrative Procedure Act, U.S.C.S. § 553. See Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Montgomery, 248 Ga. 465, 284 S.E.2d 263 (1981).

Attorney's fees.

- There is no relationship between O.C.G.A. §§ 45-19-38(d) and45-19-39(c). The reference to "this article" in § 45-19-38(d) relates only to the remedial award of the special master; the provision of § 45-19-39(c) with respect to attorney's fees provides a remedy over and above that of the special master and is not governed by O.C.G.A. § 45-19-38(d). Robinson v. Department of Cors., 211 Ga. App. 134, 438 S.E.2d 190 (1993).

When the superior court denied attorney's fees based on the erroneous assumption that the court was precluded from awarding fees because the attorney was being compensated by the Office of Fair Employment Practices under O.C.G.A. § 45-19-27(3), the case was remanded to the court for exercise of the court's discretion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 45-19-39(c). Robinson v. Department of Cors., 211 Ga. App. 134, 438 S.E.2d 190 (1993).

When the trial court had ruled in favor of an employee on the employer's appeal of the order of the special master in an employer discrimination case, but the court failed to exercise the court's discretion to determine whether the employee was entitled to attorney's fees for judicial review of the master's order pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 45-19-39(c); the case was remanded to the trial court for the exercise of the court's discretion in regard thereto. Department of Cors. v. Finney, 212 Ga. App. 436, 442 S.E.2d 12 (1994).

Issue of remedial action is separate from attorney's fees.

- The issue of entitlement to recovery of attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 45-19-39(c) is a separate issue from entitlement to a recovery of attorney's fees in a special master proceeding. Finney v. Department of Cors., 263 Ga. 301, 434 S.E.2d 45 (1993).

Superior courts have subject matter jurisdiction over timely Title VII claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 filed pursuant to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notification to the claimant that, the federal prerequisites for suit having been fulfilled, suit may be filed. Collins v. DOT, 208 Ga. App. 53, 429 S.E.2d 707 (1993).

Original state court jurisdiction.

- The General Assembly's adoption of the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), O.C.G.A. § 45-19-20 et seq., providing a state remedy, enforceable in state courts following state administrative proceedings, does not and cannot preclude pursuit of a ripe and independent federal Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C, action in state courts. The superior courts' appellate jurisdiction over state FEPA claims does not affect their original jurisdiction over Title VII claims. Collins v. DOT, 208 Ga. App. 53, 429 S.E.2d 707 (1993).

Cited in Georgia Bureau of Investigation v. Heard, 166 Ga. App. 895, 305 S.E.2d 670 (1983); Collier v. Department of Human Resources, 196 Ga. App. 843, 397 S.E.2d 632 (1990); Board of Regents v. Cohen, 197 Ga. App. 463, 398 S.E.2d 758 (1990); Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga./Albany State College v. Moore, 210 Ga. App. 623, 436 S.E.2d 789 (1993).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 383 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 73A C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 153.

Cases Citing Georgia Code 45-19-39 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 1

Finney v. Department of Corrections

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1993-07-15

Citation: 434 S.E.2d 45, 263 Ga. 301, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 2534, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 533

Snippet: fees to a successful claimant. Compare OCGA § 45-19-39 (c), which expressly authorizes the superior court