O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 45-2-5 (2019)

Municipal or county governments not to require residence as condition of employment

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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No municipal or county government in this state shall require as a condition of employment by such government that applicants for employment as officers or employees, or such officers or employees now or hereafter employed, must reside within the boundaries of the municipality or county.

History

(Ga. L. 1975, p. 1576, § 1.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article discussing effect of City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 240 S.E.2d 60 (1977), on limits of municipal government autonomy, see 12

Ga. L. Rev. 805 (1978). For article, ‘‘The United States Supreme Court as Home Rule Wrecker,’’ see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 363 (1982).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Ordinance restricting residence held unconstitutional. - Ordinance of the City of Atlanta providing residential requirements for officers and employees of the police and fire bureaus contrary to this section is unconstitutional and void under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV). City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 240 S.E.2d 60 (1977). Ordinance not in conflict with this section. - A city ordinance requiring all public safety personnel to reside within 8.75 miles of city hall, is not in conflict with O.C.G.A. § 45-2-5 because this ordinance does not impose a distance require-

ment which makes residence within the political subdivision necessary. Dixon v. City of Perry, 262 Ga. 212, 416 S.E.2d 279 (1992). Residency not required. - County attorney is not a county elected official, but rather is a county employee, so the residency requirement of O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(1) does not apply to the county attorney under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III and O.C.G.A. § 45-2-5; a county attorney is entitled to sovereign immunity as a county employee. Wallace v. Greene County, 274 Ga. App. 776, 618 S.E.2d 642 (2005).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Qualifications of voter registrars and deputy registrars established by former Code 1933, are unaffected by Ga. Laws 1975, p. 1576 (see now O.C.G.A. § 45-2-5), prohibiting counties and municipalities from requiring em-

ployees to reside within. 1975 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 75-111. City of Commerce may not require that city manager be elector of municipality. - See 1986 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U86-12.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 80 et seq.

C.J.S. - 67 C.J.S., Officers and Public Employees, § 26.

PUBLIC OFFICERS & EMPLOYEES

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases, 1992–2005 · leading case: Wallace v. Greene Cnty., 618 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
Wallace v. Greene Cnty., 618 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “3 Relying on OCGA § 45-2-1 (7), Wallace contends that Moss was ineligible for immunity as a Greene County official since he is not a qualified voter on the County’s voting rolls. It is questionable whether this Code section applies because county attorneys have been deemed…”
Dixon v. City of Perry, 416 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 1992). · cites it 7× “This argument, based on OCGA § 45-2-5, 1 which forbids residency requirements in municipal employment, fails because the ordinance Dixon challenges does not contain such a residency requirement and because the purpose underlying the ordinance does not conflict with the purpose…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.