O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 46-3-11 (2019)

Application by electric supplier of discriminatory rates, charges, or service rules or regulations; prohibited acts by electric suppliers generally

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Every electric supplier is prohibited from having or applying any rate, charge, or service rule or regulation which unreasonably discriminates against or in favor of (1) any member of a class of consumers as opposed to any other consumer who is or should be in the same class of consumers for such purposes, or (2) any class of its consumers as opposed to another class of consumers for such purposes, provided that this prohibition shall not apply to any rate, charge, or service rule or regulation relating solely to service rendered by a municipality to consumers whose premises are located within its limits as they existed on March 29, 1973.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, every electric supplier is prohibited from, directly or indirectly, by ordinance, law, policy, contract, rate, regulation, or otherwise:

(1) Requiring that a consumer receive retail electric service from such electric supplier as a condition for such consumer to receive from such electric supplier or any other person any goods or other services that are not reasonably related to the furnishing of retail electric service to such consumer’s premises;

(2) Offering a consumer lesser charges or more favorable terms or conditions for retail electric service because of such consumer’s receiving or agreeing to receive from such electric supplier any goods or other services that are not reasonably related to the furnishing of retail electric service to such consumer’s premises;

(3) Imposing higher charges for any goods or other services that are not reasonably related to the furnishing of retail electric service to a consumer’s premises because of such consumer’s failure or refusal to receive retail electric service from that supplier; or

(4) Furnishing retail electric service to any premises which such electric supplier is not entitled to serve under this part.

History

(Ga. L. 1973, p. 200, § 10.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS This section not unlawful attempt to regulate or fix charges of municipal utilities. - Ga. L. 1973, p. 200, § 10 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-3-11) does not attempt to interfere with either the municipality or the electric membership corporation in the establishment of their rate levels. Therefore, it is clear that the section does not constitute an unlawful attempt to regulate or fix the charges of municipal utilities prohibited by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. I (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. I), subject to the exception in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I, II; Art. XI, Sec. I, Para. IV). City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975). Electric supplier may recover underbilled services. - Public policy prohibits suppliers of electricity from charging consumers in the same class at different rates; thus, an electric membership corporation was entitled to recover from a farmer for underbilled services. Habersham Elec. Membership Corp. v. Mize, 211 Ga. App. 329, 439 S.E.2d 26 (1993). Defenses allowed against recovery of underbilled services. - When an electric supplier’s act results in the underbilling of

its customer, and the supplier seeks to recover the correct billing amount, the customer can assert accord and satisfaction, equitable estoppel, or statute of limitation defenses. Brown v. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 272 Ga. 453, 531 S.E.2d 712 (2000), reversing Brown v. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 238 Ga. App. 347, 518 S.E.2d 727 (1999). Electric supplier may condition sale by it of satellite dish to retail electric service clients. - An electrical supplier may require a consumer to receive retail electric service from ‘‘such electric supplier’’ as a condition for the consumer to purchase a satellite dish from the supplier, but under O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-200 and 46-3-201, an electric membership corporation must require a consumer to be a member of that EMC before the EMC can sell a satellite dish to the consumer. Washington Elec. Membership Corp. v. Avant, 256 Ga. 340, 348 S.E.2d 647 (1986). Cited in Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Albany Oil Mill, Inc. v. Sumter Elec. Membership Corp., 212 Ga. App. 242, 441 S.E.2d 524 (1994).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Right of public utility corporation to refuse its service because of collateral matter not related to that service, 55 ALR 771. Variations of electric utility rates based on quantity used, 67 ALR 821.

Right of electrical company to discriminate against a concern which desires service for resale, 112 ALR 773. Variations of utility rates based on flat and meter rates, 40 ALR2d 1331.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 1986–2006 · leading case: Albany Oil Mill, Inc. v. Sumter Elec. Membership Corp., 441 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
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Albany Oil Mill, Inc. v. Sumter Elec. Membership Corp., 441 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 8× “Albany Oil Mill asserts that the trial court erred in applying OCGA §§ 46-3-11 and 46-3-12 in granting summary judgment to Sumter Electric.”
Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 544 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 2001). · cites it 4× “The record further reflects that the PSC took uniformity of application of the GTESA into consideration in ruling on the issue, after noting that residential customers are the only customer clients in this State who have not had the opportunity to benefit from the lower cost of…”
Brown v. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 531 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 6× “We granted certiorari and posed this question: When an electric supplier’s act results in the underbilling of its customer, and the supplier seeks to recover the correct billing amount, does OCGA § 46-3-11 preclude the assertion of accord and satisfaction, equitable estoppel, or…”
Brown v. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 518 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 6× “[P]ublic policy dictates that the consumer in this situation simply has no defense to avoid liability for underbilled services, once it is established that the consumer received the amount of service alleged by the utility, and once it is established that the consumer did not…”
Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 529 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “The trial court’s finding that the term “consumer” refers to the individual tenants and not to the landlord lacks any basis in fact or law and cannot stand.”
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 628 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “Federated alleged that Georgia Power’s pricing system unreasonably discriminated against it and other established customers in favor of newer customers, thus violating OCGA § 46-3-11. Following a hearing, the Commission issued an order acknowledging discrimination in Georgia…”
Washington Elec. Membership Corp. v. Avant, 348 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 1986). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 46-3-11 forbids all electrical suppliers from “[rjequiring that a consumer receive retail electric service from such electric supplier as a condition for such consumer to receive from such electric supplier or any other person any goods or other services that are not…”
Habersham Elec. Membership Corp. v. Mize, 439 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “from having or applying any rate, charge, or service rule or regulation which unreasonably discriminates against or in favor of (1) any member of a class of consumers as opposed to any other consumer who is or should be in the same class of consumers for such purposes, or (2)…”
City of Lawrenceville v. Ricoh Elec., Inc., 174 F. App'x 491 (11th Cir. 2006). “(citing O.C.G.A § 46-3-11(a)). In Brown, however, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Mize , holding that “a customer can assert accord and satisfaction, equitable estoppel, or statute of limitation defenses when an electric supplier sues to recover the correct billing amount.”
— 46-3-11(a) — 2 cases
Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 544 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 2001). “The record further reflects that the PSC took uniformity of application of the GTESA into consideration in ruling on the issue, after noting that residential customers are the only customer clients in this State who have not had the opportunity to benefit from the lower cost of…”
City of Lawrenceville v. Ricoh Elec., Inc., 174 F. App'x 491 (11th Cir. 2006). “(citing O.C.G.A § 46-3-11(a)). In Brown, however, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Mize , holding that “a customer can assert accord and satisfaction, equitable estoppel, or statute of limitation defenses when an electric supplier sues to recover the correct billing amount.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.